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If Nobody Is Going There Anymore Because It's Too Crowded, 
Then Who Is Going?  Experimental Evidence of Learning and 
Imitation in the El Farol Coordination Game 
1.1.  Introduction 
This paper concerns Yogi Berra's colorful observation: “Nobody goes there 
anymore.  It’s too crowded.”  A well-known problem in economics concerns the manner 
in which externalities, crowding in particular, can cause individual optimizing behavior 
to conflict with social optimizing behavior.  In some coordination problems, however, 
externalities create problems that are even more serious: they make it difficult for agents 
to even know how to optimize their own individual behavior.   
Crowding can occur in systems that have some fixed capacity.  A person’s 
participation in an event may make that event less profitable or desirable for others who 
also participate.  For example, the effects of crowding are experienced by one who lacks 
offers while selling a house during a buyer’s market or by one who experiences slow 
downloads while accessing CNN.com during a major crisis.  In some cases, crowding 
effects can be reduced by an external mechanism that explicitly coordinates the 
participants’ actions.  Often, however, such mechanisms do not exist, and people must 
implicitly learn to coordinate actions in order to limit the negative effects of crowding. 
Negative effects may build gradually, as in a large realty market where each 
additional home listing has only a marginal negative effect on the selling prices of 
2 
 
existing listings.  In other cases, crowding can reach a critical point.  One too many web 
surfers seeking the latest news during a crisis may cause a popular web site to crash.  The 
latest disappointing profit report may send a stock market into a nosedive. 
This paper analyzes a theoretical problem comparable to the latter two examples.  
The El Farol Bar Game1
N people decide independently each week whether to go to a bar that 
offers entertainment on a certain night.  For concreteness, let us set N at 
100.  Space is limited, and the evening is enjoyable if things are not too 
crowded—specifically, if fewer than 60 percent of the possible 100 are 
present.  There is no sure way to tell the numbers coming in advance; 
therefore a person or agent goes (deems it worth going) if he expects 
fewer than 60 to show up or stays home if he expects more than 60 to go.  
Choices are unaffected by previous visits; there is no collusion or prior 
communication among the agents; and the only information available is 
the numbers who came in the past weeks (408). 
 first introduced by Arthur (1994) features abrupt congestion 
effects when people cannot explicitly coordinate either directly or through some external 
mechanism.  Arthur provided a simple description of the game: 
 
His simulations found that mean attendance converges always to 60.  Moreover, an ever 
evolving “ecology” of strategies emerges such that, collectively, they predict this 
threshold attendance accurately on average.  There still exists swings about the mean 
attendance, suggesting that the artificial agents are not fully coordinating. 
The current study relaxes the limit on available information so that people are 
partially aware of others’ strategies.  The goal of the study is to identify ways people 
learn when given limited information about the success of strategies used by others.  A 
hybrid design was developed consisting of laboratory experiments and computer 
                                                 
1 The game is also known as the Santa Fe Bar Problem. 
3 
 
simulations.  The basic design (see section 1.3) asks each subject in a group to develop a 
strategy to play the Bar Game.  Artificial agents implementing these strategies then play 
against each other in a computer simulation.  Subjects are informed of results, which 
include partial information about the success of others’ strategies.  Subjects then develop 
another strategy, and this process repeats several times. 
This method resembles Axelrod’s Prisoner’s Dilemma tournaments (1984).  The 
inclusion of a controlled laboratory experiment differentiates this project from Axelrod’s 
tournaments.  His tournaments were more informal and lacked a tangible incentive 
structure for the participants (although one could there were argue reputational 
incentives); this project uses grade points to motivate participation.  Further, the 
participant pool varied between Axelrod’s two iterations; here the same subjects are used 
throughout.  While this experiment follows in the same spirit as Axelrod’s tournaments, it 
proceeds with a rigorous design to discover whether people can learn to coordinate and in 
what way they do so. 
Discovering how people behave in the Bar Game is important because, despite its 
colloquial name, the game models several real-world settings.  This coordination game is 
studied in the economics and complex systems literatures as a model of stock market 
behavior.  In a model with a bounded population, increasing agent sophistication 
(reasoning ability) at the individual level may lead to decreasing diversity at the 
population level.  A more sophisticated agent can potentially do better, but a less diverse 
population can lead to inefficient social outcomes (Johnson, et al., 1998).  In models of 
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the related Minority Game2
The studies mentioned above each use computer simulation.  When modeling a 
complex adaptive system, a simulation can be an effective method (Holland and Miller, 
1991).  If one is trying to investigate ways that learning occurs, however, this approach is 
limited because the dynamics of learning must be specified in the simulation.  To 
overcome this liability of a purely computational model, this project implements a new 
experimental approach combining computer simulations involving artificial agents with a 
laboratory experiment involving human subjects. 
, as agent sophistication increases, aggregate payoffs first rise 
but then fall.  A bound on rationality improves the system’s efficiency (Savit, Manuca 
and Riolo, 1997; Manuca, Li, Riolo and Savit, 1998; and Li, Riolo and Savit, 1999a, 
1999b).  In studies of the Bar Game in the computer science literature, systems with 
boundedly rational agents can lead to better outcomes than those with fully rational 
agents (Greenwald, Mishra and Parikh, 1998; Bell, Sethares and Bucklew, 1999; and 
Bell, et al., 1999). 
The experimental approach has proved useful in uncovering the nature of learning 
dynamics in coordination games (see Ochs, 1995; Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil, 1990; 
Van Huyck, Cook, and Battalio, 1994; Duffy and Ochs, 1999).  In particular, the Two-
Island Game of Meyer, Van Huyck, Battalio, and Saving (1992) shares many features 
with the Bar Game investigated in this paper.  These researchers found that though the 
symmetric equilibrium correctly described variable means, naïve subjects did not behave 
                                                 
2 The Minority Game is a restricted form of the Bar Game (Greenwald, Mishra and Parikh, 1998; 
Challet and Zhang, 1997; Li, Riolo and Savit, 1999a, 1999b; Manuca, Li, Riolo and Savit, 1998; 
and Savit, Manuca and Riolo, 1997).  In this game it is always best to take the action that differs 
from what the majority of people are taking. 
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in accordance with standard theory and were not able to learn to coordinate on useful 
precedents. 
The Bar Game presents an environment in which it is difficult to coordinate, but 
this study differs from previous ones both in methodology and focus.  This project 
employs the strategy method (Selton, 1967).  This method differs from the standard 
economics experiment, in which a subject takes a single action during a round of play.  
With the strategy method, a subject submits instead a strategy for play.  A strategy 
specifies a complete plan of action that prescribes what the subject will do in every 
possible situation.  The strategy method may grant the observer insight into subjects’ 
motivation (Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993).  It also allows her to acquire data on 
information sets not actually reached during play of the game.  However, the strategy 
method has some limitations.  It eliminates the observation of timing decisions and their 
effect during play of a repeated game (Roth, 1995).  Furthermore, its hypothetical 
character may make it unrealistic as an abstraction of a natural environment (Brandts and 
Charness, 2000).  Despite these limitations, the strategy method proves valuable because 
of the added insight it provides. 
This paper contributes to the existing knowledge of complex systems by 
integrating experimentation using human subjects into a computational model.  This 
methodology is advantageous because no a priori assumptions are needed on the 
structure of the learning dynamics.   The paper also contributes to the economics 
literature by providing evidence that people use imitation behavior as a method of 
learning and by demonstrating a variation on the strategy method.  
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1.2.  Theoretical Properties 
Consider the one-shot Bar Game with N agents indexed by i.  The bar has a 
capacity of c.  The agents have identical preferences toward the attendance and consider 
the bar to be not crowded if the realized attendance does not exceed capacity, i.e., A ≤ c.  
Each agent independently chooses an action ai ∈ {0, 1}, where 0 and 1 can be interpreted 
as “stay home” and “go to the bar.”  The realized attendance is A = ∑i ai.  Table 1.1 
presents the payoffs for the generic case3
Table 1.1 indicates that an agent’s payoff depends both on her choice of action 
and the actual attendance.  For instance, an agent who “goes” receives a payoff of 
.   
G  if A 
≤ c (the bar is not crowded) and receives a payoff of G  otherwise.  The strategy “stay” is 
the security strategy in the stage game and always leads to a payoff of S.   This payoff 
structure features a discontinuity in marginal payoffs as the attendance increases beyond 
capacity.  As long as attendance is below capacity, increasing the attendance by one 
person does not affect payoffs.  However, once the bar reaches capacity, increasing the 
attendance by one extra person causes payoffs to decrease for all who decide to go.  
While one can relax this discontinuous payoff construction to some degree without 
drastically altering outcomes, the critical mass aspect is relevant to many economic 
problems.  The discontinuous payoff structure gives the model its typically fluctuating 
attendance pattern (Arthur, 1994).   Why a completely deterministic computer simulation 
leads to a random appearing attendance pattern can be explained analytically (Zambrano, 
2004).  
                                                 
3 This is the payoff structure for the canonical game as described in Arthur (1994).  The Minority 
Game (see footnote 2) has c = N/2, and its payoff matrix is ((1, 0), (0, 1)). 
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In pure strategies any outcome in which exactly c agents attend is a Nash 








 combinations of these outcomes.  
Keeping the capacity c a fixed proportion of N, the number of Nash equilibria in this 
game grows exponentially with the size of N.  The presence of multiple equilibria makes 
it very difficult for the agents to coordinate.  The aggregate payoff for these equilibria, 
which are Pareto optimal, is c * G  + (N - c)S.  There is a symmetric mixed strategy Nash 
equilibrium in which homogeneous agents choose “go” with the same probability, which 
approaches c/N as N gets large.  Computing the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, 
the expected payoffs πi to “go”  and “stay” for agent i are, respectively: 
E(πi | ai = 1) = G  * Pr(A > c | ai = 1) + G  * Pr(A ≤ c | ai = 1)                        (1a) 
        E(πi | ai = 0) = S                                                              (1b) 
Setting these expectations equal and letting p represent the common probability to 
“go,” we get: 





















)(                                      (2) 
Note that when all agents play the mixed strategy p* that solves equation (2), each 
agent’s expected payoff is only S.  The aggregate expected payoff from this symmetric 
mixed strategy is simply N * S, which is strictly less than c * G  + (N - c) S since S < G .   
The pure strategy Nash equilibria described above Pareto dominate the symmetric mixed 
strategy equilibrium.  This equilibrium is only as efficient as the outcome in which all 
agents choose to “stay,” which is the agents’ security strategy. 
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While the properties of the stage game are relatively straightforward, they become 
more interesting and complex in the repeated game.  The only information available to an 
agent in the standard version of the finitely repeated Bar Game is the common history of 
aggregate attendance at the bar during every previous round (Arthur, 1994, 408).  The 
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium of the stage game described above is also a Nash 
equilibrium for the finitely repeated game.  A feature of this equilibrium that one may 
find desirable is its fairness—all agents receive the same expected payoff.  Other fair but 
more efficient equilibria exist.   For example, one symmetric pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium is for agents to cyclically change their actions such that each agent chooses 
“go”  (i.e., ai = 1) exactly c out of every N rounds, and attendance is exactly c in every 
round.  Of course, the question of how agents could learn to coordinate their actions in 
this cyclic manner is the crux of this problem, and the answer depends heavily on the 
population’s heterogeneity. 
Population heterogeneity plays a strong role in the aggregate performance of 
agents in this coordination problem.  If all agents are using the same deterministic 
strategy (so that each responds the same way as her peers in any given round), then all 
will choose to either “go” or “stay” each round.  The first case leads to the least efficient 
outcome, and the second case leads to the security outcome.  For example, if all agents 
adapt using the Cournot best-response or fictitious-play algorithms, the attendance will 
oscillate between zero and N.   Aggregate payoffs will average N/2 (S + G ) in the 
Cournot case (and less with fictitious-play), which is strictly less than the aggregate 




An understanding of how agents learn to implicitly coordinate actions and reach 
these more efficient outcomes demands some specific knowledge of the strategy space.  
As the strategy space for this game is vast, a methodical search through the space will 
likely be fruitless.  Another approach is to discover a subset of pertinent strategies that 
may be used by real people.  This objective—to investigate which classes of strategies 
are utilized by subjects to play this game in a laboratory setting—is incorporated into the 
design of the experiment. 
1.3.  Experimental Design 
This experiment was designed to evaluate how human subjects learn to coordinate 
in a finitely repeated version of the El Farol Bar Game.  To gain insight into the learning 
process, it is helpful to understand how subjects update strategies.  Therefore strategies 
were collected from subjects in the laboratory and then implemented in computer 
simulations.  Due to the time required to convert the subjects’ written strategies into 
computer code, the collection and simulation steps did not occur concurrently.  The 
procedural detail of each step follows. 
Laboratory Procedures 
 The experiment consisted of eight repetitive sessions over the course of a 
semester for each of two independent cohorts.  Figure 1.1 below summarizes the design 
and illustrates the interaction of the laboratory and computational components of the 
experiment. 
As one reads from top to bottom, this figure displays a progression in perspective 
from the experiment (eight weeks long) to session (once weekly meeting with subjects in 
10 
 
the lab) to trial (one simulation of the finitely repeated Bar Game on the computer).  
Starting at the top, the aggregate experiment consists of two treatment groups which each 
participate in eight sessions.  Moving down the figure, each session consists of three 
tasks: reviewing previous sessions’ results, formulating new strategies, and running the 
simulations for the Bar Game trials.  The first two tasks took place in the lab, but the 
simulations occurred separately after the subjects departed.  The bottom of the figure 
shows the detail of a trial, which consisted of a single simulation of the Bar Game played 
for 100 rounds using ten subjects’ strategies. 
At the beginning of each session (after the first), the subjects received reports of 
previous sessions that included statistics for the group as a whole, for each individual, 
and for several categories of strategies.  After subjects reviewed the data, each formulated 
a strategy to be played in the Bar Game.  Their strategies were then coded and the 
simulations were run. 
This experiment consisted of two independent sessions with subjects recruited 
from two upper-level undergraduate economics classes from January 20 to March 30, 
20004
4
.  The only difference between the two treatments (other than the subject pools—
see footnote ) was in the payoff structure, so that one treatment group had a greater 
incentive to play “go” relative to “stay,” as illustrated in Table 1.2.  Each of these 
treatments lasted for eight sessions.  Each sub-table shows a subject’s payoff for a 
                                                 
4 The selection of the subject pool from these two courses had two undesirable characteristics.  
The first class (treatment A) was an experimental economics course that introduced economic 
principles through experiments; the second (treatment B) was a political economy course that 
used game theory to analyze political institutions.  The potential bias was mitigated, however, by 
the fact that in neither case did the curricula cover repeated games during the course of the 
experiment.  A few of the subjects had been exposed to a variation of the game during a pilot 
experiment in an earlier semester. 
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particular action given the ex post attendance for a single round.  Other experimental 
parameters are summarized in Table 1.3, with Table 1.3.a showing those parameters 
common across all sessions, and Tables 1.3.b and 1.3.c listing the participation by session 
for treatments A and B, respectively.   
These subject pools were selected for two reasons.  The combination of the 
strategy method and computer simulations made it infeasible to finish the experiment 
within the standard length of a couple of hours.  Using classes and conducting the 
experiment during the course of a semester maintained the subject pool and allowed the 
use of this unique methodology.  Second, I used grade points, rather than money, to 
provide subjects with incentives.  Each subject had the option of using the experimental 
score to substitute for her lowest homework score5.  The use of grades to induce value in 
an experiment can elicit high levels of motivation (Friedman and Sunder, 1994, 43; see 
also Isaac, Walker and Williams, 1994; Kormendi and Plott, 1982; Marimon, Spear, and 
Sunder, 1993).  Each course formed an independent treatment group6
At the beginning of the first session, the subjects received written instructions
. 
7
                                                 
5 Each homework assignment was 5% of the total course grade.  For each class, the median grade 
was B+. 
 
and heard them read aloud.  To ensure all subjects understood the instructions, the 
subjects completed a brief quiz on the payoff structure, and any wrong answers were 
publicly explained.  Following the instructions, each subject formulated a strategy for the 
6 One subject was enrolled in both courses, but only participated in the treatment group with the 
class that met earlier. 
7 The instructions used a neutral language in the description of the game.  In particular, the word 
“event” was used in place of the word “bar.”  Copies of the written instructions and strategy 
submission form are available upon request. 
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first session’s simulations of the Bar Game and recorded it on a strategy submission form 
(see footnote 7).  The only restrictions placed on the form of the strategy were 
completeness, consistency, and feasibility (it could not condition on unavailable 
information).  As the subjects turned in their strategies, they were checked to ensure they 
did not violate the restrictions listed above.  This completed the laboratory session with 
the subjects.  Next the strategies were encoded into a computer program, and the 
simulations were run, producing summary results to be presented in the next session. 
In the second session, the subjects listened to oral instructions and then received 
summarized results from the first session.  These results included: 
(a) The average per-round payoff and attendance for all previous sessions.  The 
use of per-round figures maintained consistency with the payoff matrix. 
(b) A listing of each subject’s performance in the previous round (see Figure 1.2 
for a typical listing).  The performance statistics included each subject’s average per-
round payoff, the percentage of rounds her strategy selected “go,” and the percentage of 
rounds it made the ex post optimal selection.  The data were sorted from highest to lowest 
payoff.  The listing identified subjects only by their university ID numbers to maintain 
anonymity 
(c) A listing of various categories of the subjects’ strategies.  Figure 1.3 presents 
an example.  Section 1.4 discusses the categories in detail.  For consistency, a single set 
of categories was used for both treatments; this set remained constant throughout all 
sessions of the experiment.  These categories were developed after the first laboratory 
session was finished and were determined from the actual set of strategies the subjects 
submitted.  If a strategy could be classified into two or more separate categories, then it 
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was included in all categories into which it fit.  Each category included a generic 
example.  The data presented for each category included the number of subjects who used 
a strategy from the category and the average per-round payoff received by strategies in 
the category. 
The subjects received the results in the form of written handouts, overhead 
projections, and oral summaries.  The instructions were then briefly reviewed, and the 
subjects had an opportunity to ask questions before receiving the payoff matrix either on 
the chalkboard or on the strategy submission forms.  Then each subject formulated a new 
(possibly the same) strategy.  Again, submitted strategies were reviewed for 
completeness, consistency and feasibility.  Session 1 lasted approximately 30 minutes, 
and sessions 2-8 each lasted about 10-15 minutes.  After the session the strategies were 
encoded and the simulations were conducted.  This process continued for eight sessions. 
At the end of the experiment, the instructor for the courses from which the 
subjects were drawn included each subject’s average payoffs in her course grade.  This 
inclusion provided the necessary incentive for active participation.  The instructor divided 
each subject’s average payoff for the whole experiment by the maximum average payoff 
achieved, and then scaled these relative payoffs to a point value corresponding to one 
homework assignment.  At the end of the semester, she gave each subject the option to 
substitute her experiment score for a low homework score (see footnote 5).  In all but a 





After the laboratory session was complete, each subject’s strategy was encoded 
into a computer program8
1.  Select ten subjects’ strategies randomly from a uniform distribution without 
replacement and load their strategies into the simulation
, which played out the simulations of the Bar Game.  During 
each trial (100 rounds of an iterated Bar Game played with 10 subjects) , the simulation 
used the following algorithm: 
9
2. Implement simultaneously these ten strategies
. 
10
3. Determine attendance at the event for this round, and update the collective 
attendance history. 
.  Every round each strategy 
prescribes an action (“go” or “stay”), possibly conditioning on the common 
attendance history, its private payoff history, and/or its private action history.  (In 
round 1, no historical information is yet available.)  Each strategy then updates 
its private action history. 
4. Allocate payoffs and, for each of the ten strategies, update its private payoff 
history. 
5. Repeat procedure starting at step two until 100 rounds of the simulation are 
complete. 
                                                 
8 The simulation was coded in ObjectiveC using the Swarm v1.3.1 libraries.  It was compiled and 
run on Hewlett-Packard machines running the HP-Unix operating system.  A listing of the code is 
available from the author by request. 
9 The program used the Mersenne Twister MT19337 high quality pseudo-random number 
generator provided in the Swarm libraries.  It has a period of 219337or 106001. 
10 Strategies are technically activated sequentially in a single computer processor; however, the 




Each trial game was an independent run on the computer.  The number of trials 
conducted in a particular session was 100 times the number of subjects participating in 
that session, resulting in each subject’s strategy engaging in approximately 1000 trials.  
This format minimized small group-size bias in the play.  Earlier pilot experiments had 
revealed that 100 rounds per trial were sufficient to observe full interaction of the 
strategies played. 
The results of the hybrid laboratory and computer experiments follow. 
1.4.  Results 
Attendance varied widely about its mean level, which was near the capacity, as in 
Arthur (1994).  The subjects submitted strategies that ranged from the very simple (single 
action, deterministic) to the complex (composites of deterministic, stochastic, and 
conditional).  Some strategies resembled classic ones such as Cournot best-response, 
fictitious-play, reinforcement learning, and pure strategies; however, many were hybrids 
of these strategies. 
Table 1.4 presents the mean attendance and payoff for each treatment group by 
session.  A particular strategy’s reported payoff for a session is the average over all 
rounds of all trials in which it played during that session.  Table 1.4 then presents the 
mean of all strategies’ payoffs.  Figures 1.4 (attendance) and 1.5 (payoffs) present the 
same data in graphical form.  For Treatment A, though the mean attendance was 6.03, 
close to the capacity and socially optimal level of 6.00, the attendance generally 
increased throughout the experiment.  The attendance started at a low of 3.98 in session 
1, increased from the previous session 5 out of 7 times, and ended on a high of 6.99 in 
session 8.  A simple linear regression of the mean attendance on session numbers results 
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in a positive coefficient on the session variable that is statistically significant, confirming 
an increasing pattern.  In contrast, the attendance pattern of Treatment B did not display 
an increasing trend. 
The payoff graphs for each group nearly mirror the attendance graphs after 
rotating them 180 degrees about the horizontal axis.  For Treatment A, the average payoff 
decreased as mean attendance continued to increase beyond the capacity.  Likewise for 
Treatment B, losses and gains in the mean payoffs were matched by shifts in attendance 
above and below the bar’s capacity. 
 
Result 1:  Subjects used strategies that could generally be classified into ten 
categories.  These categories11
(1) “Always” go.  
, listed in the order of most used to least used, were: 
(2) Streaking and/or alternating strategy, for example: “Go” for rounds 1-30, “stay” 
for rounds 31-80, and alternate between “go” and “stay” rounds 81-100 (“go” 
in round 81). 
(3) Condition choice on previous round’s attendance, such that “go” is prescribed if 
attendance was below some threshold.  For example, If attendance last round < 
4, then “go,” otherwise “stay.” 
(4) Condition action on subject’s own payoff history. 
(5) Condition action on some attendance average. 
(6) Condition action on previous round’s attendance, such that “go” is prescribed if 
                                                 
11 Figure 1.3 displays the categorical data in the form presented to the subjects for treatment B in 
session 6.  These results were presented in cumulative form so that in any given session, subjects 
could see the aggregate and categorical results for all previous sessions.   
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attendance was above some threshold.  For example, If attendance last round > 
4, then “go,” otherwise “stay.” 
(7) “Always” stay. 
(8) Trigger-like strategy, for example: For rounds 1-10, “go.”   If average 
attendance through round 10 is less than 6, then “go” for all remaining rounds, 
otherwise “stay” for all remaining rounds. 
(9) Mixed strategy, for example: “Go” with probability 0.6, “stay” with probability 
0.4. 
(10)  Other. 
Discussion:  The first nine categories comprised 99.5 percent of strategies 
submitted by the subjects, with only 3 of 623 strategies falling into the tenth category 
“Other.”  Some subjects submitted strategies that could potentially be classified into 
multiple categories.  For instance, such a strategy might dictate to play a mixed strategy 
the first half of the rounds, and then alternate between go and stay that last 50 rounds.  In 
these cases, the strategy was included in all applicable categories, except for “Always” 
stay and “Always” go. 
Strategies were classified as “Always” go and “Always” stay if they dictated the 
action at least 95 percent of the time, as it was not uncommon for a subject to “stay” in 
round 1 and “go” in rounds 2-100 (or vice versa).  This behavior may have been a 
sophisticated signaling effort on the subject’s part, or it may have been influenced by the 
design of the strategy submission form.  To help subjects avoid submitting incomplete 
strategies that conditioned on past information, the form explicitly asked subjects what 
their choice was in round 1.  The category “Streaking and/or alternating strategy” was 
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mostly composed of strategies that either cycled repeatedly through some series of 
actions or played the same action for extended rounds before switching to the other.  
Strategies in the third category listed above were very much like Cournot best-response, 
except they did not always condition on attendance relative to capacity, as best-response 
would dictate in this game.  In general, these strategies dictated to go if the previous 
round’s attendance was below some threshold.  Category (6) was just the opposite: these 
strategies directed to go if the previous attendance was above some threshold (again these 
strategies did not always condition on attendance relative to capacity).  Category (4), 
conditioning on payoff history, is indicative of reinforcement learning, while category 
(5), conditioning on attendance averages, is indicative of fictitious play-like behavior.  
Trigger strategies in category (8) prescribed the same action for all remaining rounds 
after some condition is met in a particular round.  Often the condition was the subject’s 
own payoff or the average attendance up to that point in the game. 
Tables 1.5.a and 1.5.b present session data for these categories for Treatments A 
and B, respectively.  These tables include the number of strategies, and payoff means and 
standard deviations for each category by session.  Table 1.5.c summarizes the treatments 
for all sessions. 
Even though the researcher defined the categories upon completion of the first 
session, relatively small standard deviations of payoffs characterized the categories.  
Referring to Tables 1.5.a and 1.5.b, the third row of data for each category shows its 
sample standard deviation of payoffs.  In most cases, the categories’ figures are less than 
those for the session as a whole (shown in the last row of each table).  Considering both 
treatments, the only categories that did not display tighter standard deviations of payoffs 
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than the treatment session as a whole were categories (4) and (5)—those strategies that 
condition on payoff history and an attendance average.  Each of the other seven defined 
categories was distinguished by the relative homogeneity of its payoffs.  This results 
holds strongest for categories (1), (3), and (7)—those that prescribe to “Always” go, go if 
the previous round’s attendance was below some threshold, and “Always” stay12
The category data aggregated across all sessions that Table 1.5.c presents 
provides additional support that payoffs within categories were bunched closely.  Here, 
eight of nine categories have lower payoff standard deviations than all strategies 
combined in at least one treatment, and four categories show the same for both 
treatments.  However, these data are not as illuminating as those presented by session.  
Category (1), for example, had very similar payoffs within each session, but the variance 
between sessions was high. 
. 
One contribution of this project is the comprehensive list of strategies that 
subjects developed.  The use of the strategy method with only minimal guidelines placed 
on strategy structure enabled the subjects to submit imaginative responses.  This method 
allows one to gauge behavior that people may use in strategic settings similar this game, 
with a word of caution.  One should not expect this specific listing of elicited strategy 
classes to generalize to other games, even those similar to the Bar Game.  What one can 
take from this result is the expectation of heterogeneity across, but not necessarily within, 
strategy categories. 
 
                                                 
12 There are slight deviations in the payoffs for “Always” Go and “Always” Stay from subject to 
subject within a round because these categories allow up to 5 percent of the rounds to use some 
other rule.  
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Result 2:  Subjects imitated the most successful strategies.  
Discussion:  For Treatment A, the strategy category with the highest payoff in a 
particular session never had fewer subjects use it in the following session, and in all but 
one case had more subjects use it in the following session.  Table 1.6 presents the results.  
Column 2 lists the category receiving the highest average payoff in session t.  Column 3 
gives the absolute increase in the number of subjects whose strategies fell within the 
category from session t to t+1, and column 4 lists the corresponding percent increase.  
For session 7, two categories are listed as best because of the small difference (less than 1 
percent) in their payoffs.   
The imitation effects are more pronounced for Treatment B.  With this group, the 
top-performing category always increased in usage, except in session 2.  This session had 
two top-performers, one whose usage increased by 8 subjects, and another whose usage 
dropped by one subject.   
In this treatment, the strategy “Always” go appears to be the focal strategy—
subjects used it a total of 104 times, making it much more popular than the two runner-
ups that were used 62 times each.  Subjects using this strategy received the highest payoff 
in five sessions.  After each of these five sessions, the number of subjects using this 
strategy increased prominently, with an average gain of 6.8 subjects (out of about 40) per 
session.  Because this strategy was a focal point both in popularity and payoffs, subjects 
may have chosen to imitate it.  Players who perform poorly tend to imitate the strategies 
of those they see doing better (Axelrod, 1996).  This evidence from both treatments 
strongly suggests that some subjects imitated the best performing strategy of previous 
session or sessions.  The imitation appears limited to the best strategies; more general 
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replicator effects are not observed. 
 
Result 3:  In both treatments, the following categories of strategies grew in usage, 
while all others decreased in usage:  
• Category (1): “Always” go (from 7 subjects in session 1 to 34 subjects in session 
8). 
• Category (5): Condition choice on some attendance average (fictitious play-like) 
(from 3 to 8 subjects). 
• Category (9): Mixed strategy (from 1 to 5 subjects). 
Discussion:  These strategies increased in usage in both treatments.  High payoffs 
cannot explain the growing popularity of these three categories; the payoff rank 
(averaged over the whole experiment) of these three were fifth, second, and eighth out of 
ten, respectively.  The growing use of the “Always” go strategy may be due to it being 
the top-ranked category in several sessions, as discussed in Result 2.  The fictitious play-
like category was the top performer in two sessions, and overall received the second 
highest payoff averaged over all sessions and treatments.  The mixed strategy usage is 
more difficult to explain, and may be due to the small sample size. 
 
Result 4:  Play did not converge to the pure strategy equilibrium of the stage 
game, in which attendance equals capacity, in either treatment.  
Discussion:  An inspection of Table 1.4 and Figure 1.4 reveals that the mean 
attendance did not converge to the capacity attendance (six).  Figure 1.4 especially 
highlights the difficult nature of this coordination problem.  This result is partially limited 
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by the number of sessions during which subjects had the opportunity to learn. 
This variation of the Bar Game presented additional information to the subjects 
that may have assisted them to coordinate their actions to a higher degree.  Specifically, 
in this experiment subjects were able to observe the strategies and payoffs of the others, 
albeit in a reduced form.  This additional information did not appear to help the subjects 
to improve their payoffs; Treatment B’s payoffs had a high variance without a trend and 
Treatment A’s payoffs appeared to decrease throughout the experiment (see Figure 1.5).  
Also, subjects’ payoffs were inefficient relative to random strategies.  Table 1.4 lists the 
payoff efficiencies13
This experiment has shown that subjects did appear to imitate successful 
strategies when playing a finitely repeated Bar Game in a laboratory setting.  While the 
evidence of this result is somewhat limited, it does suggest that subjects did not behave in 
accordance with strict rationality.  Widespread imitation behavior in this game can be 
dangerous as it can cause peoples’ actions to become overly homogeneous, which would 
 for each session and shows the mean efficiency in Treatment A was 
49.5 percent and in Treatment B was 32.5 percent.  Both of these values are much less 
than the efficiencies obtained by strategies which predict an attendance randomly drawn 
from a uniform distribution U(0, 10); a simple simulation shows these efficiencies are 
63.6 percent and 58.7 percent, respectively.  While the motivation for including this extra 
information was not to assist the subjects to improve payoffs nor to help play converge to 
the Nash equilibrium, the results do illustrate the difficulty the subjects faced in this 
coordination problem. 
                                                 
13 Payoff efficiency measures the percentage of potential payoff above the minimum payoff that 
the players receive and is equal to (actual joint payoff – minimum joint payoff)/(maximum joint 
payoff – minimum joint payoff) (Bednar et al., 2010). 
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result in poor outcomes.  Despite this concern, there was evidence of imitation behavior 
in both treatments. 
1.5.  Conclusion 
This experiment has collected a sampling of actual strategies that human subjects 
used when faced with a difficult coordination problem.  Rather than specifying a 
functional form to which subjects’ strategies had to conform, this project sought to record 
their behavior in a less restrictive environment.  This sample provides insight into subject 
behavior and displays its heterogeneous nature.   The experiment has also provided 
suggestive evidence that subjects do use imitation behavior as a form of learning in this 
type of game.  Despite employing this learning behavior, subjects did not improve 
collective outcomes throughout the experiment. 
Besides providing support for imitation as an observed form of learning in 
coordination settings, perhaps the strongest contribution of this present work is its novel 
hybridization of traditional laboratory experiments involving human subjects with 
computational simulations.  Inspired by Axelrod’s (1984) tournaments, this project 
employed accepted experimental controls that his study lacked.  The combination of 
methods allows the testing of theories in procedurally difficult situations.  Further, the 
unrestrictive manner in which the strategy method was employed provided a descriptive 
catalog of real people’s strategic decisions.  Necessarily, each of these implementation 
choices involved some drawbacks. 
This methodology contributes to both the complex systems and the experimental 
economics fields by providing a fresh approach one can take in the design of a research 
project.  Intertwining the dual approaches of studying human subjects in laboratory 
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settings and computational agents in simulation settings allows each technique to 
complement the other.  The incorporation of agent-based computational methods assists 
in the design of more complex laboratory experiments.  Concurrently, the inclusion of 
living, breathing “agents” allows the validation of computational algorithms. 
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 Table 1.1: Generic payoff structure.  
       
       
   
Not 
Crowded Crowded   
  Go G  G    
  Stay S S   
   with G  > S > G    
       
       
 
 
       
       
       
       
Table 1.2: Treatment payoffs. 
       
       
Table 1.2.a: Treatment A.  Table 1.2.b: Treatment B. 
       
       
 Not Crowded Crowded   
Not 
Crowded Crowded 
Go 2 0  Go 4 0 





Table 1.3: Experimental parameters.  
       
       
     
Table 1.3.a: Parameters common across sessions.  
     
    Number of Sessions 8  
    Trial Group Size for Bar Game (N) 10  
    Capacity (c) 6  
    Rounds of Bar Game per Trial 100  
             Payoffs Treatment Group A 
Treatment 
Group B  
    “Go” & not crowded 2 4  
    “Go” & crowded 0 0  




Table 1.3.b: Treatment A sessions. 
         
Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Participants 38 37 38 35 35 38 37 37 
Trials 3800 3700 3800 3500 3500 3800 3700 3700 
         
         
         
         
Table 1.3.c: Treatment B sessions. 
         
Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Participants 49 43 43 44 29 40 40 40 




 Table 1.4: Mean attendance and payoffs.  
       
Session 
Treatment A Treatment B 
Attendance Payoffs Payoff Efficiency Attendance Payoffs 
Payoff 
Efficiency 
1 3.98 1.35 67.5% 6.11 1.67 41.8% (0.937) (0.328)  (1.08) (0.445)  
2 6.25 0.87 43.5% 6.85 1.13 28.3% (1.67) (0.136)  (0.813) (0.103)  
3 5.52 1.19 59.5% 7.33 0.73 18.3% (0.953) (0.178)  (0.760) (0.146)  
4 6.16 1.05 52.5% 5.59 1.80 45.0% (0.969) (0.0809)  (1.35) (0.571)  
5 6.39 1.02 51.0% 6.74 1.22 30.5% (0.750) (0.0598)  (1.04) (0.240)  
6 6.89 0.70 35.0% 7.38 0.77 19.3% (0.744) (0.189)  (0.844) (0.111)  
7 6.02 1.07 53.5% 5.66 1.99 49.8% (1.09) (0.148)  (0.713) (0.734)  
8 6.99 0.66 33.0% 6.94 1.07 26.8% (0.744) (0.179)  (0.798) (0.100)  
Mean 6.03 0.99 49.5% 6.58 1.30 32.5% (0.950) (0.235)  (0.704) (0.472)  
       




Table 1.5.a: Number of strategies, payoff means and 
standard deviations for each category, treatment A. 
 
   Session 
Strategy Categories  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 “Always” Go 
n 1 7 9 12 12 15 11 15 
µ 1.89 0.97 1.31 1.12 1.04 0.63 1.22 0.53 
σ 0.000 0.012 0.151 0.011 0.016 0.153 0.011 0.017 
2 Alternating or  Streaking 
n 10 15 11 8 8 10 10 9 
µ 1.41 0.93 1.12 0.95 0.97 0.69 0.98 0.64 




If At-1 < x, then Go 
n 11 11 4 3 3 3 7 3 
µ 1.67 0.67 1.31 1.01 0.99 0.93 0.86 0.92 
σ 0.271 0.051 0.107 0.051 0.018 0.113 0.061 0.077 
4 Condition on Payoff History 
n 2 2 9 4 4 5 3 3 
µ 1.21 1.00 1.11 1.07 1.07 0.76 1.11 0.80 





n 0 0 1 5 6 4 5 3 
µ - - 1.48 1.08 1.04 0.89 1.07 0.89 




If At-1 > x, then Go 
n         
µ 1.01 - 0.99 0.95 0.93 0.47 1.23 0.62 
σ 0.008 - - 0.076 - - - 0.202 
7 “Always” Stay 
n 8 0 3 2 0 0 1 2 
µ 1.00 - 1.00 1.00 - - 1.00 1.00 
σ 0.003 - 0.003 0.005 - - - 0.004 
8 Trigger-like 
n 2 3 4 3 2 1 0 0 
µ 1.65 0.98 1.22 1.03 1.00 0.82 - - 
σ 0.329 0.018 0.164 0.027 0.047 - - - 
9 Mixed 
n 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 1 
µ - - 1.35 1.03 1.01 0.61 - 0.54 
σ - - - 0.094 - - - - 
10 Other 
n 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
µ 1 - - - - - 1.11 - 
σ - - - - - - 0.134 - 
           
 All 
n 38 37 38 35 35 38 37 37 
µ 1.35 0.87 1.19 1.05 1.02 0.70 1.07 0.66 
σ 0.337 0.143 0.181 0.079 0.063 0.198 0.150 0.188 
Notes: 
1.  The first, second, and third rows for each category indicate: n = number of strategies, 
µ = their mean payoff, and σ = the sample standard deviation of their payoffs. 
2. Those category payoff standard deviations noted in bold were less than the standard 
deviation of all payoffs for the session.  Those category payoff standard deviations 
noted in bold italic were at least fifty percent less than the standard deviation of all 
payoffs for the session. 
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Table 1.5.b: Number of strategies, payoff means and 
standard deviations for each category, treatment B. 
 
   Session 
Strategy Categories  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 “Always” Go 
n 6 10 18 4 12 21 14 19 
µ 2.23 1.22 0.64 2.66 1.45 0.71 2.77 1.13 
σ 0.050 0.036 0.023 0.021 0.022 0.027 0.025 0.038 
2 Alternating or  Streaking 
n 11 11 8 11 5 6 4 6 
µ 1.46 1.05 0.76 1.67 1.15 0.73 1.82 0.97 




If At-1 < x, then Go 
n 19 9 6 10 8 5 2 3 
µ 1.64 1.15 0.9 1.65 0.97 0.82 1.09 1.02 
σ 0.432 0.064 0.119 0.262 0.148 0.120 0.096 0.017 
4 Condition on Payoff History 
n 4 5 2 4 3 1 0 1 
µ 1.56 1.1 0.92 1.94 1.24 0.87 0 1.04 





n 3 4 3 4 1 2 6 5 
µ 1.6 1.13 0.97 2.17 1.22 0.94 2.52 1.13 




If At-1 > x, then Go 
n 6 6 4 3 1 0 2 1 
µ 1.68 1.12 0.57 2.41 1.02 0 1.28 0.99 
σ 0.545 0.104 0.060 0.402 - - 0.429 - 
7 “Always” Stay 
n 0 1 1 5 1 3 7 0 
µ 0 1 1 1.01 1 1 1 0 
σ - - - 0.011 - 0.000 0.006 - 
8 Trigger-like 
n 5 2 1 1 1 1 2 4 
µ 2 1.22 0.83 2.21 1.37 0.87 2.35 1.17 
σ 0.171 0.079 - - - - 0.003 0.134 
9 Mixed 
n 1 0 3 2 2 4 6 4 
µ 1.22 0 0.73 1.72 1.17 0.79 1.31 0.9 
σ - - 0.071 0.665 0.077 0.090 0.071 0.027 
10 Other 
n 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
µ 2.15 0 0 0 1.12 0 0 0 
σ - - - - - - - - 
           
 All 
n 49 43 43 44 29 40 40 40 
µ 1.67 1.13 0.73 1.80 1.22 0.77 1.99 1.07 
σ 0.450 0.106 0.149 0.581 0.233 0.112 0.763 0.106 
Notes: 
1.  The first, second, and third rows for each category indicate: n = number of strategies, 
µ = their mean payoff, and σ = the sample standard deviation of their payoffs. 
2. Those category payoff standard deviations noted in bold were less than the standard 
deviation of all payoffs for the session.  Those category payoff standard deviations 
noted in bold italic were at least fifty percent less than the standard deviation of all 
payoffs for the session. 
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Table 1.5.c: Number of strategies, payoff means and 
standard deviations for each category, treatment summaries. 
 
Strategy Categories  Treatment A Treatment B 
1 “Always” Go 
n 82 104 
µ 0.942 1.349 
σ 0.315 0.755 
2 Alternating or  Streaking 
n 81 62 
µ 0.965 1.214 




If At-1 < x, then Go 
n 45 62 
µ 1.079 1.299 
σ 0.405 0.428 
4 Condition on Payoff History 
n 32 20 
µ 1.016 1.349 





n 24 28 
µ 1.029 1.599 




If At-1 > x, then Go 
n 13 23 
µ 0.908 1.343 
σ 0.218 0.642 
7 “Always” Stay 
n 16 18 
µ 1.000 1.003 
σ 0.004 0.007 
8 Trigger-like 
n 15 17 
µ 1.135 1.594 
σ 0.266 0.540 
9 Mixed 
n 6 22 
µ 0.928 1.082 
σ 0.306 0.348 
10 Other 
n 3 2 
µ 1.073 1.635 
σ 0.115 0.734 
     
 All 
n 297 331 
µ 0.99 1.31 
σ 0.290 0.597 
Notes: 
1.  The first, second, and third rows for each category indicate: n = number of strategies, 
µ = their mean payoff, and σ = the sample standard deviation of their payoffs. 
2. Those category payoff standard deviations noted in bold were less than the standard 
deviation of all payoffs for the treatment.  Those category payoff standard deviations 
noted in bold italic were at least fifty percent less than the standard deviation of all 




Table 1.6:  Evidence of imitation behavior. 
    
Table 1.6.a:  Treatment A. 
Session (t) 
Best Strategy Category  






1 “Always” Go + 6 600% 
2 Condition On Payoff History + 7 350% 
3 Condition On Some Attendance Average + 4 400% 
4 “Always” Go + 0 0% 
5 Condition On Payoff History + 1 25% 
6 Cond. On Previous Attendance:                   If At-1 < x, then Go 
+ 4 133% 
7* Cond. On Previous Attendance:                   If At-1 > x, then Go 
+ 1 100% 
 “Always” Go +4 36% 
    
    
Table 1.6.b:  Treatment B. 
Session (t) 
Best Strategy Category 






1 “Always” Go + 4 67% 
2* “Always” Go + 8 80% 
 Trigger-like Strategy - 1 -100% 
3 “Always” Stay + 4 400% 
4 “Always” Go + 8 200% 
5 “Always” Go + 9 75% 
6 “Always” Stay + 4 133% 
7 “Always” Go + 5 38% 
* In both Session 7 of Treatment A and Session 2 of Treatment B, 
   there were virtual ties for the best performing strategy 
   categories. 
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Figure 1.1: Experiment design. 

















Trial:  100 rounds of a 
repeated Bar Game.
A single simulation of the 
bar game with 10 
randomly selected 
subjects' strategies.
    Session: One laboratory 
meeting with the subjects and 
subsequent simulations.
1. Review the previous results. 
2. Collect new strategies.






































Group A -- Session 5 Individual Results
Payoff: per round is from a possible range of 0 - 2.
%Go: The % of rounds your strategy chose "Go".
%Right: The (% of rounds your strategy chose "Go" and attendance
             turned out to be 0 - 6) + (% of rounds your strategy chose
             "Not Go" and attendance turned out to be 7 - 10).
U of M ID Payoff %Go %Right
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.185 80.7% 64.1%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.165 49.6% 53.8%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.132 24.9% 46.1%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.063 100.0% 53.2%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.063 99.0% 52.8%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.053 100.0% 52.6%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.050 100.0% 52.5%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.048 99.0% 52.1%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.047 95.0% 50.9%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.044 89.0% 49.6%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.044 100.0% 52.2%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.042 99.0% 51.8%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.038 100.0% 51.9%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.037 100.0% 51.8%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.032 100.0% 51.6%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.032 67.7% 44.7%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.021 21.8% 37.8%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.021 22.0% 37.8%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.017 23.2% 35.3%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.015 90.0% 47.3%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.012 56.8% 44.7%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.009 79.0% 45.7%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.006 10.0% 32.8%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.004 21.2% 35.5%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 1.001 100.0% 50.0%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 0.998 0.3% 31.8%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 0.983 3.3% 30.6%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 0.980 3.7% 31.7%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 0.979 76.0% 41.5%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 0.965 43.4% 34.5%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 0.946 51.0% 34.8%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 0.945 75.0% 39.5%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 0.935 10.8% 25.9%
xxx-xx-xxxx-x 0.819 49.0% 24.9%
Figure 1.2: Typical individual results as presented to the subjects.
(ID's are masked in this paper for privacy)
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Figure 1.5: Average payoffs. 
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A Framework to Investigate Multiple Game Environments 
Using Computer Experiments 
2.1. Introduction 
This study develops a framework that employs artificial adaptive agents in 
computer experiments to investigate the effects of multiple game environments on the 
performance and structure of finite automata strategies.  Multiple game environments 
encapsulate strategic situations in which agents compete on varied fronts.  Variations of 
multiple game environments have been studied to explain the emergence of culture 
(Bednar and Page, 2007), social systems (Miller and Page, 2007), decision making in the 
presence of reasoning constraints (Samuelson, 2001), and decision making under 
uncertainty (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 2001).  This framework facilitates an understanding 
of how the multifaceted strategic situation affects the qualities of strategies.  
This modeling technique using computer experiments allows an analysis of 
optimizing behavior without the rigidity required for a formal mathematical model 
(Holland and Miller, 1991).  This approach also has the advantage that one may study 
more complex and difficult situations than with a strictly mathematical model.  Another 
benefit is the potential to observe emergent behavior. 
This paper presents the conceptual and procedural design of the experimental 
framework and summarizes the technical implementation issues.  A brief overview of the 
experimental approach follows.  Discussion subsequently addresses games, strategies, 




To clarify the language in this paper, an experiment consists of numerous trials, 
each with a specific environment defined by the set of simultaneously played games and 
the cognitive cost function.  Figure 2.1 illustrates the components of a trial.  Each trial 
consists of a number of independent runs.  Each run continues for a number of 
generations.  During each generation, evolutionary dynamics are applied separately to 
each player’s stock of strategies, and then the players’ automata match to play every 
supergame within the defined environment.  Each supergame is a repeated 2 x 2 normal 
form game.   
A player or agent in this experimental framework possesses a pool of available 
strategies.  Each strategy is a heuristic that directs how the agent will play against an 
opponent.  The framework allows this pool of strategies to evolve over time in two ways.  
First, it applies a selection process so that relatively successful strategies will replicate 
and replace less successful strategies.   Second, it applies a genetic algorithm that creates 
new strategies by combining different parts of existing strategies, similar to chromosomal 
crossover in a cellular nucleus.  These dynamic processes will over time adapt a player’s 
strategy pool to the particular environment in which it is competing.  The framework 
reports a rich set of statistics that measure the performance and describe the structure of 
the strategies.  Thus, a researcher may gain insight into which features of the game-cost 
environment are driving the changes in the performance and structural statistics as the 
strategy pool evolves.  Chapter 3 will incorporate strategy evolution to pursue these 
insights.  
The framework capitalizes on evolved strategy pools by implementing a facility 
to store and retrieve experienced strategies.  This feature allows a researcher to match 
agents with distinct histories against each other.  In this mode of operation, the 
framework allows the adaptive processes to be deactivated to focus attention on the role 
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history plays in the multiple game environments.  Chapter 4 will utilize this feature to 
consider the influence of experience. 
2.2. Games 
Game Selection 
This purpose of this framework is to facility the investigation of multiple game 
environments.  It is primarily designed for simple 2 x 2 matrix games because these 
games are individually well understood1
One goal of this research is to compare the performance of strategies in different 
single game and multiple game environments.  To this end, it would be convenient to 
have a way to measure the similarity between two environments.  Rapoport, et al. (1976), 
Kilgour and Fraser (1988), Walliser (1988), and Parisi (2000) all develop game 
taxonomies which could assist in the development of a dissimilarity measure.  This 
project incorporates the Rapoport, et al. (1976) taxonomy that restricts the set of games to 
all ordinally distinct, finitely repeated, 2 x 2 games.  These games are characterized by 
each player having payoffs that include exactly one each of “1,” “2,” “3,” and “4” in the 
four cells of the payoff matrix
. 
2
The framework focuses on these games because the taxonomy allows the 
similarity between them to be measured precisely.  The Rapoport, et al. (1976) taxonomy 
.  Bednar, et al. (2010) develop an alternative method to 
compare different games by defining the entropy of outcomes as a measure of behavioral 
variation in a normal form game. 
                                                 
1 One could extend the framework to investigate other types of games with little additional programming. 
2 The computer framework is not restricted to ordinally distinct games and will play any 2 x 2 matrix 
games.  For instance, widening the scope to all ordinal 2 x 2 games, including those not strictly ordinal, 
would require no additional programming (taxonomized by Kilgour and Fraser (1988)). 
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contains seventy-eight strategically distinct, strictly ordinal games3 2.  Table .1 provides 
this taxonomy in concise form and briefly describes the subdivisions of the taxonomy. 
Employing this taxonomy, one can measure the dissimilarity between two games 
by comparing their phyla, classes, orders, genera, and species.  The phyla division, for 
instance, classifies games as either “no conflict,” “complete opposition,” or “mixed 
motive.”  The measure scores two identical games with a dissimilarity of zero and 
becomes larger as two games become more dissimilar along the branches of the 
taxonomy.  Because this list of subdivisions becomes increasingly more refined, the 
measure weights more heavily differences in the more general subdivisions than the more 
specific subdivisions.  Specifically, differences in phyla add five to the dissimilarity 
measure, differences in classes add four, differences in orders add three, differences in 
genera add two, and differences in species add one.  The sum of all these differences 
gives the dissimilarity measure.4
Other Features 
  For comparison, the average dissimilarity of any two 
randomly created games is 8.0. 
The simulation framework allows the user to control additional features related to 
the play of games.  The features expand the applicability of the framework for further 
research projects.  The features, set by parameters in the input file, include: noisy 
selection of actions, time discounting of payoffs, and indefinite length games. 
                                                 
3 There are 576 possible numeric configurations using these payoffs.  However, eliminating strategically 
equivalent games reduces the set to 78.  Walliser (1988) provides an alternative taxonomy of the 78 
games. 
4 Using Rapoport, et al. (1976) notation, if games are both members of phylum M, class E, the dissimilarity 
measure weighs the subclass (P or p) the same as class.  If games are both members of phylum M, class e, 
order D0, the measure weighs the suborder (e0 or e2) the same as order.  The measure ignores 
competitive pressure since this is irrelevant to automated agents.  For games that match one of two genera 
(f to ft, for example), the measure weighs the genus difference one-half as much as a complete mismatch 
(i.e., 1 instead of 2). 
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In addition to specifying which games will be played in an input file, the user can 
also opt to match players in randomly generated games.  Because these could be 
asymmetric, the user can direct that two matched automata play every game twice, with 
each player acting in both the row and column roles. 
The framework supports two matching paradigms, mean and random matching. 
Mean matching sweeps all possible pairings of the two players’ strategies and games.  
Each of the row player’s automata plays every game with each of the column player’s 
automata.  As its name suggests, random matching stochastically selects the automata and 
game.  The program selects each player’s automaton from a uniform distribution, and 
selects the game based on specified probability parameters5
2.3. Strategies 
.  The two automata then play 
the selected game for a set number of rounds.  This matching process repeats until it 
reaches the user-determined number of pairings. 
This framework implements strategies as finite automata.  Also known as Moore 
machines, the economics literature contains extensive references to these structures (for 
example, Aumann (1981) and Miller (1996)).  Conceptually, each state of a finite 
automaton represents a portion of agent n’s strategy by specifying the action to take when 
in the state and the next state to which the strategy should transition after it executes the 
action.  The current state of an automaton is called its active state; likewise, an automaton 
activates a state when it plays its prescribed action. 
Consider a game environment G, composed of a set of g  2 x 2 games.  Formally, 
a finite automaton i of agent n is a machine Μi = ( iS , 
0
iS ,θi, fi, τi) where  
 iS  is the set of states of size ns . 
 0i iS S⊆  is the set the initial states of size not greater than g . 
                                                 
5 With g  randomly created games, each game is assigned a probability of play equal to 1/ ( ) 1g −  
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 ( ) 0 is a mapping : i i iG Sθ θ⋅  .  This initialization function assigns a starting 
state 0,i gs  dependent on the game to be played. 
 ( )  is a mapping : i i i nf f S A⋅  .  This action function prescribes the action an 
∈ An agent n will play at state si.   
 ( )  is a mapping : i i i m iS A Sτ τ⋅ ×  .  This transition function determines to 
which state the automaton transitions dependent on the action played by the 
opponent, agent m. 
Thus, an automaton6
 As a simple example, consider the four-state automaton in a two-game 
environment (Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken) in Figure 
 corresponds to the conventional meaning of a strategy as a complete 
description of agent n’s plan of action in all possible circumstances that are consistent 
with agent n’s plans.  An automaton implementation of a strategy differs subtly from the 
game theoretic notion of a strategy.  The latter requires a complete plan of action for all 
possible situations, including those not consistent with agent n’s plan of action 
(Rubenstein, 1998, p. 144).  
2.2.a.  First, note that a 
complete description of an automaton specifies for each state an assigned action (listed 
inside of the circle as “0” or “1”) and two transition arrows (the upper for an opponent’s 
action of “0” and the lower for an opponent’s action of “1”).  It also specifies for each 
game the initial state in which to begin (identified by the thickened arrows).  Also, two 
automata can represent the identical strategy when a they only differ by a reordering of 
the states; the two automata represented in Figures 2.2.d and 2.2.e provide such an 
example. 
The present approach imposes some symmetry restrictions on the strategies.  
Players n and m will have a common number of strategies ( )n m= , common number of 
                                                 
6 Hereafter, “automaton” will mean “finite automaton.”  Another related type of automaton is the cellular 
automaton (see Wolfram, 2002). 
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states per strategy ( )n ms s s= = , and a common set of actions.  Attention on 2 x 2 games 
defines the action space as { }0,1n mA A A= = = 7
This approach, which follows Miller (1996), allows both specificity and 
reusability in the application of states.  For example, Figure 
.  In addition, the particular game being 
played determines only the initial state in which the automaton begins.  Once play 
commences, an automaton executes actions and transitions independent of the game; 
actions depend only on the current state and transitions from that state depend only on the 
opponent’s action.  Thus, agents play the games simultaneously in the sense that an agent 
uses a given automaton to play all the games it faces.  This automaton remains fixed 
structurally until it has played all relevant games.  It may then be subjected to an 
evolutionary process which modifies its structure. 
2.2.a shows a four-state 
strategy that plays two games as if it were two independent strategies.  States 1 and 2 are 
used exclusively for Prisoner’s Dilemma, and states 3 and 4 are used exclusively for 
Chicken.  This dichotomous approach could conceivably allow a strategy to target each 
game with a sub-strategy that works particularly well in that game, but perhaps not so 
well in others.  This specialization may come at a cost, however, if cognitive resources 
are constrained. 
A strategy can economize on these costs by emphasizing reusability, in which it 
uses a subset of states to play multiple games.  Figure 2.2.b provides such an example.  
Consider this automaton paired with another that always alternates between actions 0 and 
1.  The automaton in Figure 2.2.b uses state 1 exclusively for Prisoner’s Dilemma, it uses 
state 3 exclusively for Chicken, and it potentially uses states 2 and 4 for both games.  
Because the transition function, iτ , is deterministic and not dependent on the game being 
played, once the path of states played for two different games coincide on the same state 
                                                 
7 The actions (0, 1) correspond to (up, down) for the row player and (left, right) for the column player.  The 
2 x 2 games employed here are consistent with Rapoport, et al. (1976), and thus the actions have no 
consistent interpretations as cooperate, defect, etc. 
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(state 4, for example), the automaton effectively plays the two games similarly for the 
remaining rounds. 
This convergence of paths may limit the development of specificity in automata 
with just a few states, like those illustrated in Figure 2.2.  Increasing an automaton’s 
states enhances its ability to achieve complete or partial state specificity toward games.  
The number of states can serve as a measure of the complexity of an automaton 
(Rubenstein, 1998; Samuelson, 2001; Bednar and Page, 2007)8
A tradeoff of using a complex automaton with many states is the unwieldy size of 
the set of possible machines, {Μi}
.  A more complex 
automaton will be capable of the more complex behavior of state specificity.  
9
Cognitive Costs 
.  Because this set grows exponentially with the 
number of states, it is difficult to develop tractable theoretic results.  However, modeling 
strategies as automata allows a direct measure of the mental cost of using the strategies. 
The strategic environment with both multiple games and cognitive costs puts two 
opposing pressures on an automaton.  The multiple games would tend to advantage to an 
automaton that uses more states (enabling greater specialization), at least in the case of 
dissimilar games.  When one views states (or their use) as reasoning resources, cognitive 
costs could advantage the automaton that uses fewer states. 
The presence of cognitive costs captures the notion of bounded rationality.  There 
are practical reasons why the complexity of a strategy should relate to its associated cost 
that go beyond the simple paradigm that its uses more cognitive resources.  Rubenstein 
                                                 
8 A weakness of this measure is that an automaton needs x + 1 states to account for x periods of memory 
(Bednar and Page, 2007).  Rubenstein (1998) develops another measure of complexity based on the 
maximal order of its states. 
9 A high-end estimate for an automaton with s  states, a  possible actions, and playing g  games is 
2s s ga s + , which for sixteen states, two actions, and four games is 2160.  However, this is a significant 
overstatement because many of the configurations are strategically equivalent. 
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(1998, p. 137) argues that “a more complex plan is more likely to break down, is more 
difficult to learn, and may require more time to be implemented.” 
There are a number of conceivable ways in which to model cognitive costs.  
Bednar, et al. (2010) use a game’s empirical entropy to measure of the cognitive load 
induced by game complexity.  This framework, rather, develops four methods (and 
allows the no cost case) that base cost on the implementation or development of a plan, 
proxied by activation or accessibility of an automaton’s states.  States can be viewed as 
cognitive subroutines that contribute to an automaton’s overall strategy as well as its 
cognitive cost.  The following paragraphs briefly describe the motivation for each cost 
specification; the section on statistics explains the specifications of these costs. 
Under the first two cost options, it is viewed as costly to maintain and/or utilize a 
stock of active components (that is, states that are actually used or visited).  With these 
two cost measures, cost is increased if a state is activated when the automaton plays the 
games.  Both are based on a binary state indicator function: if a state is used one or more 
times, then cost increases.  They differ on whether the indicator function applies at the 
single game level or at the game ensemble level.   
The third cost option also considers state activation, but departs from the binary 
indicator function and instead relies on frequencies of state activation.  Briefly, this cost 
measure looks at how state activation frequencies vary from game to game.  It assumes 
that two games that induce very similar patterns of state activation are less cognitively 
taxing than two other games that induce drastically different state activation patterns.   
 The fourth cost option (adopted in Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation) is 
distinct from the other three because it bases cost on the potential for a state to be used 
rather than on its actual usage.  Here, it is costly for an automaton to keep a state ready to 




Players or agents in this framework possess a set (pool, population) of available 
strategies that it uses to determine its behavior.  This set of strategies is the agent’s 
cognitive resources.  The size of agent n’s set of strategies is n .  There are different ways 
to interpret an agent’s application of its strategy pool. 
One way is to view this pool of strategies as its “cognitive toolkit.”  When the 
agent faces a certain strategic situation (that is, a particular game), it could select which 
tool or strategy would be most likely to bring a desirable outcome and then play that 
strategy.  This interpretation is akin to tagging in classifier systems (Holland, 1986).  In a 
multiple game environment, an automaton strategy could become specialized to play a 
particular game.  It is the pool of strategies, then, that encapsulates the agent’s ability to 
play multiple games. 
An alternative view, adopted in this framework, is to view an agent’s pool of 
strategies as its “cognitive test kit.”  Under this paradigm, an agent typically applies all n  
of its available strategies when facing any strategic situation10
n
, testing its strategies.  Over 
time it will adjust its pool by increasing the presence of those strategies that perform well 
and decreasing the presence to those that perform poorly (keeping  constant).  A 
strategy pool will usually become more homogenous as it repeatedly tests its strategies 
and adjusts its pool.  The entire set of strategies may then be loosely viewed as player’s 
“super strategy.”  In this view, the ability to play multiple games lies within the 
automaton itself; even if the pool converges to a single automaton replicated many times, 
its inherent ability to play multiple games stems from employing distinct initial states for 
each game. 
                                                 
10 An agent applies all of its strategies in the mean matching paradigm.  With random matching, an agent 
selects which strategy to apply by stochastically drawing from a uniformly distribution.  With a 
sufficiently large number of applications, these two approaches should yield similar results.  Section 2.6 
provides more details about the matching process. 
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2.4. Statistics 
 The computer simulation program developed for this framework generates 
several statistics that serve both to drive the dynamics within the model to measure game 
outcomes and strategy characteristics that are related in textual and graphically output.  
The statistics fall within three broad classes based on whether they describe payoff matrix 
outcomes, the strategies’ performance, or their structure.  The key statistic is profit, 
because a strategy’s relative profit influences its likelihood to propagate into the next 
generation.  Profit and the other principle statistics are described briefly below; 
descriptions of the remaining statistics are found in Appendix 2.1. 
Payoff Matrix Outcome Distributions 
The program tracks the outcome of each round of each game played and tallies 
the number of occurrences for each outcome cell in the payoff matrix.  This information 
is output as a fraction of all rounds that play resulted in each payoff matrix cell.  For 
example, 0.50 for the (0, 0) ~ (Up, Left) payoff cell, 0.30 for the (0, 1) ~ (Up, Right) 
payoff cell, 0.15 for the (1, 0) ~ (Down, Left) payoff cell, and 0.05 for the (1, 1) ~ 
(Down, Right) payoff cell.  This information is outputted at the individual automaton 
level and at the population aggregate level. 
Performance Statistics 
Performance statistics capture outcomes of an automaton’s play of the set of 
games.  Profit, the main performance statistic, is determined by the difference of two 
others—average score and total cost. 
Score 
The program records scores that the automaton strategy earns for each game it 
plays.  The score for each game represents the outcomes against all opponents and over 
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all rounds.  The score is expressed as an average per round so that it is comparable to the 
relevant game payoff matrix. 
The program also reports the mean score the automaton strategy earns across all 
games it plays.  The mean score weights each individual game score by the number times 
the strategy plays it. 
For an example, suppose an automaton strategy plays game 1 for six rounds and 
game 2 for two rounds.  It earns payoffs of 1, 2, 3, 4, 4, and 4 in game 1 and earns 
payoffs of 1 and 3 in game 2.  The automaton’s reported score for game 1 is 3.0, its score 
for game 2 is 2.0, and its mean score is 2.75. 
Costs 
The program calculates an automaton’s cost for its play in up to four different 
ways.  Parameters determine which of the four costs the program actually calculates.  The 
program aggregates the separate costs into a total cost measure if more than one type of 
cost is calculated. 
The user can opt to normalize the magnitude of the costs.  After the first 
generation this procedure calculates either a multiplicative or additive factor that equates 
the average cost incurred across the population of automata strategies to the average 
score the population earned.  Thus, this cost normalization procedure makes the 
population’s mean first round profit—score minus total cost—equal to zero.  This factor 
is then applied to costs incurred in all following generations.11
Specifically, with multiplicative cost adjustment, the program calculates a 
normalization factor 
 
η×  equal to the strategy population’s mean score divided by its 
mean unadjusted total cost in the first generation.  The program then multiplies all total 
cost measures (in the first and all future generations) by η×  to arrive at the normalized 
total cost statistics.  A similar procedure occurs with additive cost adjustment.  Here, the 
                                                 
11 The adjustment procedure can be applied to the row and column populations separately or collectively. 
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normalization factor η+  equals the strategy population’s mean score minus its mean 
unadjusted total cost in the first generation.  The program then adds η+  to all total cost 
measures in all generations to arrive at the normalized total cost statistics. 
The four separate measures of cost, explained below, are formulaically combined 
to construct total cost (before normalization): 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )21 3 40 1 1 2 2, 3 3 4 4
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1total cost 1 1 1 1
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The αi parameter indicates the extent that the ith type of cost is included in total 
cost.  To focus attention on a single type of cost, all but one αi parameters are set to zero.  
The calculated statistics C1, C2,g, C3, and C4 are based on, respectively, the number of 
distinct states activated during the play of all games, the number of distinct states 
activated during play of game g, the similarity of state activation frequencies across all 
games played, and the number of accessible states across all games.  These measures are 
in turn explained more fully below. 
Cost 1 and Distinct States Activated in All Games 
The first method to model costs (hereafter, “Cost 1”) considers it costly to 
maintain a stock of component procedures.  This correlates to relating cost to the number 
of distinct states activated during the play of all games.  If an agent ever activates a state, 
it must spend “cognitive capital” to maintain it in its stock of applicable procedures.  The 
model calculates Cost 1 as a function of distinct states activated (DSA) to play all games 
expressed as a fraction of all s  states. 
As an example, consider an eight-state strategy that plays two games.  It activates 
only states 1, 2, and 3 to play Prisoner’s Dilemma, it activates only states 2, 3, and 5 to 
play Chicken, and it never activates states 4, 6, 7, and 8.  Its cognitive cost is based on the 
use of fifty percent (four of eight) of its states.  Specifically, letting g index games (1… g
) and s index states (1… s ), the distinct states activated and Cost 1 are: 
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Thus, with four distinct states activated, α1 = 1, and β1 = 2, Cost 1 for this 
example is  (1 + 4/8)2 ≅ 2.25. 
Cost 2 and Distinct States Activated Per Game 
The second method to model costs (“Cost 2”) considers it costly to utilize a 
component procedure.  In this light, cognitive costs have some similarity to capacity 
constraints in the language comprehension literature in which working memory can be 
construed to include both storage and operational functions (Just and Carpenter, 2002).  
Thus, a strategy’s cost increases as the average state activation rate per game played 
(again expressed as a fraction of all s  states) increases. 
Continuing the preceding example, the automaton activated three of eight states to 
play Prisoner’s Dilemma, and it activated three of eight states to play Chicken, so the 
mean states activated per game is 3.0.  Specifically, Cost 2 for a given game g is 
 ( ) ( ) 22 2,Cost 2 1 gg C
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The overall Cost 2 for the set of games played is simply the mean of these costs: 
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Thus, with each game activating three states, α2 = 1, and β2 = 2, Cost 2 for this example 
is (1 + 3/8)2 ≅ 1.89, which is less than Cost 1. 
Cost 3 and Automaton-Level State Activation Similarity 
The third method to model costs (“Cost 3”) considers the manner in which an 
automaton activates its states to play different games.  With this cost measure, an 
automaton that plays two games in a similar manner is rewarded (in terms of a low cost), 
and an automaton that plays two games in a dissimilar manner is penalized (in terms of a 
high cost).  Under Cost 3, an automaton’s behavioral homogeneity across the g  games it 
plays serves as a proxy for its manner of activation.  The degree of similarity of an 
automaton’s state activation frequencies across games played captures the behavioral 
homogeneity. 
The focus on states’ activation frequencies rather than binary activation indicators 
distinguishes Cost 3 from the other two cost measures.  State activation similarity for a 
single state of an automaton is measured as the standard deviation of its activation rate 
(the percent of rounds during which the agent activated the state) across all games played.  
The activation similarity for the automaton as a whole is the mean of its states’ activation 
similarities. 
Consider automaton i, and let xi,g,s indicate the percentage of rounds it activates 








=∑ .  For each state, the program 
calculates the standard deviation of the state’s activation percentage across all games 
played.  It then takes the mean across all states of these standard deviations to create the 
automaton-level state activation similarity measure (ALSAS): 
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Figure 2.3 provides two contrasting examples.  Automaton A on the left of the 
figure has a much more consistent pattern of state activation across the three games it 
plays than has automaton B on the right.  Correspondingly, automaton A’s state 
activation similarity measure of 3 0.887C ≅  is much lower than automaton B’s measure 
of 3 23.49C ≅ . 
Cost 3 is based on this measure of automaton-level state activation similarity.  
The program calculates the Cost 3 statistic as follows: 
 ( ) ( )
33
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3 3 3 3
3 3
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 (2.8) 
The 3γ  parameter in equation (2.8), allows the user to scale ( )s gµ σ  in a manner 
comparable to s  in the Cost 1 and Cost 2 formulas [equations (2.3) and (2.5)].  
Continuing the example of Automaton A above with the state activation similarity of 
0.887, and with 3 1α = , 3  = 2β , and 3 1γ = , the corresponding Cost 3 is (1 + 0.887)
2 ≅ 
3.56. 
Cost 4, Accessible States per Game, and Accessible States in All Games 
The fourth method to model costs (“Cost 4”) considers the potential for a state to 
be activated during the play of any game.  This view considers it costly to have a 
cognitive state available, or accessible, for use—whether or not it is actually activated is 
irrelevant.  A state is accessible in game g if, given the starting state for the game, that 
state may potentially be reached.  This case will be true if, beginning from the starting 
state, there is a sequence of transitions that leads to the accessible state.  For example, in 
Figure 2.2.b, states 1, 2, and 4 are accessible when playing Prisoner’s Dilemma, and 
states 2, 3, and 4 are accessible when playing Chicken. 
This accessibility statistic is calculated for each game separately to measure the 
proportion of states that are accessible in that game.  A strategy that has less the one 
hundred percent accessible states when playing a particular game is effectively less 
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complex than it could potentially be.  Such a structure could lead to lower costs.  The 
accessibility in all games statistic simply takes the union of the accessible states across all 
games.  For example, the automaton in Figure 2.2.b has 100 percent if its states 
accessible in all games.  In the four-state automaton of Figure 2.2.c, states 1 and 3 are 
accessible in Prisoner’s Dilemma, states 3 and 4 are accessible in Chicken, and state 2 is 
not accessible in any game.  The corresponding accessibility measures are 0.5 for 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, 0.5 for Chicken (giving an average accessibility of 0.5).  The overall 
accessibility is C4 = 0.75 since states 1, 3, and 4 are accessible in at least one game (state 
2 is not accessible in any game).  The accessible states in all games statistic forms the 
basis for Cost 4: 
( )
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With 4 1α =  and 4  = 2β  the corresponding Cost 4 for the automaton in Figure 2.2.c is (1 
+ 3/4)2 = 3.0625, while Cost 4 for the automaton in Figure 2.2.b is (1 + 4/4)2 = 4.0, the 
maximum possible. 
Comparing the Cost Measures 
The Cost 1 and Cost 2 statistics are both binary measures in the sense that they 
consider only whether each state has been utilized or not.  They differ in the scope of this 
consideration; for Cost 1 the scope is the entire set of games, and for Cost 2, the scope is 
single game at a time.  When the set of games is a singleton, they are equivalent. 
With either of these two costs, a state that is activated but a single round 
contributes the same to the cost measure as does a state that is activated nearly every 
round.  Cost 3 does not share this feature because, not being a binary measure, it looks at 
the commonality of state activation frequencies across games.  The three examples 
provided in Figure 2.4 illustrate the differences between these costs measures.  Each 
example contains two simple automata that differ in only one of the three cost statistics.  
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In Figure 2.4.a, the automata differ only in distinct states activated in all games (Cost 1), 
in Figure 2.4.b, the automata differ only in distinct states activated per game (Cost 2), and 
in Figure 2.4.c, the automata differ only in automaton-level state activation similarity 
(Cost 3). 
Cost 4 is also a binary measure in the sense that it considers only whether each 
state has the potential to be utilized (i.e., accessible) or not.  Since it is based upon the 
union of states accessibility in each individual game, it is alike Cost 1 that is based upon 
the union of states utilized in each individual game.  Cost 4 differs from Cost 1 because 
all accessible states might not be actually utilized; this will depend upon the opponent’s 
sequence of actions. 
Profit 
The primary performance statistic is profit, defined as a strategy’s score net of its 
total cost.  Where strategies compete in multiple, simultaneously played games, the 
average score all of games played, net of cost, determines profit.  The simulation 
framework bases selection on strategies’ profits, so profit may be construed as a 
strategy’s fitness. 
Other Performance Statistics 
The framework is designed to be capable of addressing a broad set of research 
questions.  For this reason, the simulation program also generates three other 
performance statistics.  The first measures the frequency that action 0 is actually played 
by the strategy.  The other two measure homogeneity of play by considering state 
activation frequencies.  At the automaton level, the program measures the variance of 
state activation across games played.  At the population level, the program reports the 
variance of state activation across the population for a given game (see Figure 2.5).  




Whereas the performance statistics measure (retroactively) how a strategy 
actually activated its states (and received the resulting payoffs and costs), the structural 
statistics describe how an automaton strategy could have potentially activated its states 
based on its construction.  These statistics summarize and describe an automaton’s 
initialization, action, and transition functions, ( )θ ⋅ , ( )f ⋅ , and ( )τ ⋅ .  Though a strategy’s 
structure certainly influences its behavior, it is not the sole determinant.  Its structure 
interacts with opponents and the environment to determine the specific actions to take.  
Still, an understanding of a strategy’s structure gives insight into potential behavior and 
economization. 
An automaton strategy economizes by using less than its full complement of 
states when playing the set of games.  One key feature of an automaton’s structure is the 
inherent limitation on which states it can potentially use.  There may be a subset of states 
within an automaton out of which no transitions lead.  So once play transitions into this 
subset, the automaton cannot access any states outside of the set.  When this subset is a 
single state, it acts as an attractor because the transitions terminate at the state. 
The accessible states in all games statistic is described above and forms the basis 
for the fourth cost measure.  The other key structural statistics are detailed below.  Each 
measures the proportion of accessible states (as opposed to all states) that meet the 
statistic’s criterion since states that are not accessible are irrelevant. 
Terminal States 
This statistic measures the proportion of accessible states that are terminal states.  
A state is terminal if all transitions from it lead directly to itself.  Formally, automaton i 
has a terminal state k if ( ), ,, = i i k j i ks a sτ  for all opponent actions aj.  For example, in 
Figure 2.2.a state 4 is terminal, as is state 3 in Figure 2.2.c.  The presence of a terminal 
state indicates that the strategy uses a trigger mechanism.  This type of strategy responds 
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to an opponent’s action by making an irrevocable commitment to continue playing the 
same action for the remainder of the game. 
Counting States 
This statistic measures the proportion of accessible states that count.  A state 
counts if it is not a terminal state and both transitions lead to the same state.  Formally, 
automaton i has a counting state k ≠ l  if ( ), ,, = i i k j is a sτ l  for all opponent actions aj.  This 
definition differentiates counting states from terminal states.  Counting states allow a 
strategy to delay a response to an action played by an opponent’s strategy.  State 3 in 
Figure 2.2.d provides an example. 
Other Structural Statistics 
The multiple games experimental framework produces several other statistics that 
describe the potential capabilities of an automaton strategy that are encoded in its 
structure.  One is the proportion of (accessible) states that play action 0.  Note that this is 
a distinct statistic from action 0 usage frequency described above.  The usage frequency 
measures the percentage of rounds the automaton actually used action 0 during play of 
the game(s); the proportion of states that play action 0 measures the automaton’s 
capability to play action 0. 
Three statistics measure how an automaton reciprocates its opponent’s actions.  
The first statistic is the proportion of states that reciprocate an opponent’s 0-actions; that 
is, those that transition to a state that plays action 0 in response to action 0 being played 
by the opponent.  The second statistic analogously measures action 1 reciprocity.  The 
third statistic measures the proportion of states that reciprocate both action 0 and action 1.  
These states are labeled Tit-for-Tat states, and an automaton that has one or more of them 
is incorporating Tit-for-Tat components into its overall strategy. 
Two other statistics describe how a strategy begins play.  These are the percent of 
starting states the play action 0 and the number of distinct initial states.  For instance, 
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consider the two automata in Figure 2.2.f; the one on the right has two distinct initial 
states while the other on the left has only a single initial state.  Additionally, the program 
can output a complete description of the automaton.  Appendix 2.1 describes these 
statistics in further detail. 
Output of the Statistics 
The simulation program allows flexibility in the manner that it reports the 
statistics.  There are two modes in which to execute the computer experiments—
graphical user interface (GUI) mode and batch mode.  In GUI mode, the statistics are 
reported visually in time series graphs that are drawn on the computer screen as the 
program runs.  Each statistic the user selects is displayed in a separate window.  The GUI 
mode is useful for initial exploratory experiments and for demonstrations of the 
experiments.  Although the GUI mode does have a limited ability to write the results to 
output files, the batch mode is better suited for generating and collecting data. 
The batch mode is capable of running trials over sweeps of parameters and 
formatting the data for analysis by common statistical analysis software.  The program 
reports the data on two levels—for the whole pool of automaton strategies that belong to 
a player and for the individual automata themselves.  The former is in essence the 
population means of the latter.  The program writes these different data sets to separate 
files.  Additionally, it writes to separate files for the row player and the column player. 
Both modes allow the user to specify how often the data is conveyed.  The user 
specifies the number of generations between data output.  The user has an additional 
optional to create snapshots of the strategy level data at the same frequency as the 
aggregated data or only during the first and last generations.   
Other options allow the user to select which statistics should be included in the 
output.  Most of the statistics described above and in Appendix 2.1 are calculated for 
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each game played12
Additionally, the program generates a report on the details of the application of 
the genetic algorithm if desired by the user.  Lastly, it saves the evolved automata after 
the last generation to special serialized files that can be reused in subsequent experiments. 
.  The user can opt for the output to include the game level statistics in 
addition to the means over all the games played. 
2.5. Dynamics 
Evolutionary Dynamics 
In this model, the row and column players will each have a finite set of strategies 
available to use.  This set of automata represents a repertoire of possible approaches to a 
problem.  Employing the test kit paradigm explained above, this procedure allows a 
thorough probing of the relative merits of different approaches.  Over time, this set (or 
population) will evolve, as strategies that performed relatively successfully will come to 
represent a greater proportion of the population.  Conversely, those automata that 
performed relatively poorly will dwindle.  This dynamic captures the simple idea that an 
agent who has several options available will choose a strategy that performed well in the 
past. 
The model uses a genetic algorithm to supplement this dynamic.  Genetic 
algorithms, first developed by Holland (1975), are a highly efficient method to optimize 
in environments with high dimensionality, noise, discontinuities and nonlinearities 
(Miller, 1996).  In the context of dynamics modeled with a genetic algorithm, strategies 
become chromosomes and evolve according to the paradigms of selection, crossover, and 
                                                 
12 Exceptions include the distinct states activated for all games, automaton-level state activation similarity, 
and distinct initial states statistics.  Since the program uses these statistics to derive cost 1, cost 3, total 
cost and profit, it also cannot report any of these statistics on a per game basis. 
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mutation borrowed from biology.  Agents compete over several generations, and the 
model applies the genetic algorithm during each generation13
Selection, the first subroutine in the evolutionary dynamic, occurs in two steps.  
First the program ranks the strategies according to their profit in the previous generation 
and identifies the top 
. 
( )1 x n−  strategies (where x ∈ [0, 1] is the crossover rate).  The 
dynamic copies these strategies directly into the new strategy pool.  In the second step, 
the program randomly selects the remaining ( )x n  strategies for the new pool.  During 
this step, a strategy’s probability for selection increases with its relative profit.  Before 
adding these randomly selected strategies into the new pool, the dynamic executes the 
second subroutine, the genetic algorithm. 
The implementation of strategies as finite automata makes them amenable to a 
genetic algorithm dynamic.  Conceptually, an automaton is an array of states just as a 
chromosome is (loosely) an array of nucleotides.  The genetic algorithm first applies 
crossover to pairs of the randomly selected strategies and then applies mutation.  
Crossover provides an opportunity for an agent to recombine portions of different 
existing strategies to create novel ones.14
2.6. Algorithm 
  Mutation allows for additional variation to seep 
into the strategy pool.  The following section on the framework’s algorithm contains the 
specifics of the selection mechanism that the model employs.   
The experimental framework uses the following algorithm to conduct a trial of an 
experiment.  Appendix 2.2 describes the framework’s software platform15
2
 and other 
technical specifications.  Appendix .3 details program usage and parameter input.  A 
                                                 
13 Since the program applies the dynamics at the beginning of a generation before matching occurs, it skips 
the dynamics in the first generation. 
14 The framework provides two ways to implement crossover.  The first recombines states between pairs of 
automata.  The second translates the automata into bit strings, and then recombines the bit strings (see 
Miller, 1996).  See section 2.6 for the details. 
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number of independent runs comprise a single trial (see Figure 2.1).  Each run of the 
program applies the four steps outlined below.  The program applies one of two substeps 
when they are labeled with an ‘a’ or ‘b’. 
Step 1: Initialize populations.  Trial parameters determine the number of automata 
n  and m  in the row and column players’ strategy pools and how the populations are 
initialized.  The simulation either creates the populations randomly or loads them from 
previous trial(s). 
Step 1a: Create population randomly.  The simulation creates finite automata 
during which it assigns the actions and transitions randomly from a uniform distribution. 
Step 1b: Load population from a previous simulation run.  Alternatively, the 
population is loaded intact from a saved file.  For each strategy, the only the features 
retained are the finite automaton itself and its ID number (performance records are 
discarded).16
Step 2: Apply dynamics.  This simulation models the evolutionary dynamics as 
described in section 2.5 
 
above to include selection, crossover, and mutation.  The 
program skips this step during the first generation and applies the dynamic independently 
on the row and column populations. 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 The simulation is written is Java v1.6 and uses the Repast (Recursive Porous Agent Simulation Toolkit) 
v3.1 simulation libraries.  Repast uses a high quality Mersenne Twister pseudo-random number 
generators included in the Colt v1.0.2 libraries.  Each run used a unique clock-determined seed.  Java’s 
platform independence allowed the use of a variety of computers and operating systems to run the 
simulations.  Code is available from the author upon request. 
16 A loaded strategy’s automaton will only have initial states designated for games in which it has 
experience.  For each new game it is to play, the program randomly assigns an initial state. 
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Step 2.1: Copy top performers.  The simulation ranks the automata based on their 
profit in the preceding generation17 ( )1  crossover rate n−.  It then adds the best  automata 
to the next generation’s strategy pool without any alterations. 
Step 2.2: Add genetically modified strategy pairs.  For the remaining positions in 
the next generation’s strategy pool, the program selects pairs of strategies, modifies them 
either by bit-wise or state-wise crossover and mutation, and inserts them into the new 
population.   
Step 2.2.1: Identify parent strategies.  The simulation randomly selects (with 
replacement) two automata.  The probability for selection depends on the relative fitness 
(profit) of the strategies18
Step 2.2.2: Apply crossover.  The framework encompasses two options for 
implementing crossover: bit-wise and state-wise.  In either case, crossover does not affect 
at which state(s), depending on the game, the automata begin play.  For instance, 
. 
( )Prisoner's Dilemma 4iθ = , means the ith automata initiates in state 4 when playing the 
the PD game.  After crossover, the automaton will still begin in its fourth state, though 
the characteristics of that state may have been changed by crossover. 
Step 2.2.2a: Apply bit-wise crossover.  The algorithm first converts the automata 
to bit representations19
                                                 
17 In the default setting, the profit statistic uses no time discounting, weighting all rounds equally.  The user 
may specify a time discounting parameter. 
, then it applies the crossover genetic operator.  The program 
18 The population’s profits are normalized so that each automaton i’s fitness is ( ) /fi iπ µ σ α= − + , where 
πi is i’s profit, µ and σ are the mean profit and standard deviation.  The relative performance parameter, 
α, ensures that automata that perform worse than α standard deviations from the mean cannot be selected 
since the algorithm reassigns negative fitness scores to zero.  As α increases toward infinity, selection 
depends less on performance and more on chance (Miller, 1996).  The program selects the automata by 
two independent draws from the cumulative distribution of fitness scores (with replacement). 
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determines randomly a common crossover point and length   for the two binary strings.  
It swaps the strings’ next   bits beyond this crossover point.  For this operation, the 
simulation treats the strings as circular so that if there are fewer than   bits to the end of 
the strings, it continues the swapping at their beginnings. 
Step 2.2.2b: Apply state-wise crossover. The algorithm applies the crossover 
genetic operator directly on the automata.  The program determines randomly for the two 
automata a common crossover point between states and crossover length  .  It swaps the 
automata’s next   states beyond the crossover point.  For this operation, the simulation 
treats the automata as circular so that if there are fewer than   states to the end of the 
automata, it continues the swapping at their beginnings. 
Step 2.2.3: Apply mutation.  The framework applies either bit-wise or state-wise 
mutation (corresponding with the crossover option) to an automaton after crossover.  Top 
performing automata copied to the new pool in step 2.1 are not subject to mutation. 
Step 2.2.3.a: Apply bit-wise mutation.  For each of the two automata that 
experienced crossover, the program flips each bit in its string with a parameterized 
probability.  The program converts the bit string back to a conceptual finite automaton 
and adds it to the pool for the next generation. 
Step 2.2.3.b: Apply state-wise mutation.  For each state k, the program makes 
three independent draws from a uniform distribution.  If the first draw is below the 
mutation probability threshold, the program modifies its action function ( )if ⋅  and assigns 
the other action as the output of ( ),i i kf s .  If the second draw is below the threshold, the 
program modifies its transition function ( ),iτ ⋅ ⋅  and assigns a randomly determined state 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 The simulation encapsulates a finite automaton in an Automaton object built from State objects.  To 
maintain procedurally consistency with Miller (1996) during selection, the bit-wise crossover option 
converts this Automaton object to a bit representation (a string of 0’s and 1’s).  This bit string consists of 
binary representations of the initial starting state for each of the g  games followed by representations for 
each of the s  states.  Three numbers, converted to binary strings, comprise each state’s structure: the first 
is the state’s action, and the second and third are the transition states if the opponent plays actions 0 or 1. 
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as the output of ( ), , 0i i k ms aτ = .  If the third draw is below the threshold, the program 
assigns a randomly determined state as the output of ( ), , 1i i k ms aτ = .  After all states have 
been (potentially) modified, the program adds the automaton to the next generation’s 
strategy pool. 
Step 3: Play Games. 
Step 3.1: Match automata.  The program allows two methods to match the row 
and column players’ automata for competition in the supergames (that is, repeated 
games)—mean matching and random matching. 
Step 3.1a: Mean matching.  Under this paradigm, each automaton in the row 
population (agent n) pairs with every automaton in the column population (agent m) to 
play all supergames selected for that particular trial.  Thus, each automaton in agent n’s 
(m’s) pool plays m g⋅  ( )n g⋅ supergames in every generation. 
Step 3.1b: Random matching.  Under this paradigm, the user sets the number 
matches or uses the default setting of n m g⋅ ⋅  matches (the total number of pairings with 
mean matching).  For each match, a randomly selected automaton from the row strategy 
pool competes against a randomly selected automaton from the column pool (draws are 
independent from a uniform distribution).  They play a stochastically determined 
supergame, where parameters specify the game probabilities. 
Step 3.2: Play supergame(s).  The matched automata then play a repeated game 
for a parameterized number of rounds20
                                                 
20 Setting the rounds per game parameter to 10*
.  During every round, each automaton plays the 
action specified by its current state and then transitions to the state dependent on the play 
of its opponent.  To accommodate play of an asymmetric game, an option allows the 
automata to play the game, switch (row and column) roles, and play it again. 
s , where s  is the number of states, ensures the play 
extends well beyond the automata’s intrinsic memory capacity (Miller, 1996). 
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In the multiple-game settings, simultaneous play means that an automaton plays 
each of the selected games before the algorithm applies selection.  This ensures that the 
same automaton is playing the different games (with a possibly distinct starting state for 
each game).  Automata play a game for the full number of specified rounds before 
switching to a different game21
Step 4: Iterate or stop program.  The program terminates execution if it has 
reached the final generation.  Otherwise, the algorithm proceeds to the next generation 
(step 2). 
. 
2.7. Applications and Extensions 
The overall experimental design of the framework presents two primary types of 
applications for the investigation of strategic behavior in multiple games settings.  One 
type of application studies how strategies evolve in varied game and cognitive cost 
settings.  The framework provides various measures of strategies’ game performance and 
structural characteristics to assess the tradeoff between specialization and reusability of a 
strategy’s subcomponent states, the appearance of certain heuristic rules (such as trigger 
strategies), and the relationship between similarity of games in the environment and 
strategy development.  Chapter 3 of this dissertation will address these issues. 
An important byproduct of this first type of application is the creation of strategy 
pools that have adapted to particular multiple game (and cost) settings.  The framework 
saves the actual automata strategies after they complete their evolutionary process.  These 
strategy pools can then serve as the inputs for the other main type of application of this 
framework. 
                                                 
21 With noisy actions, the program repeats each pairing of automata five times to minimize the influence of 
the random variations (see Miller, 1996). 
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The second primary application investigates the role experience plays in multiple 
game settings.  The investigator may face off agents employing strategy pools that 
encapsulate disparate experiences to address the multiple game environment issues of 
specialization, reusability, and game similarity.  Chapter 4 of this dissertation will 
explore these topics. 
One can envision interesting, straightforward extensions of this framework.  One 
category of extensions includes matching players with asymmetric capabilities.  The 
asymmetry could exist with the number of automata in each player’s strategy pool or the 
number of states per automata.  In the presence of cognitive costs, it may be that having 
additional resources available turns out to be not a significant advantage, depending on 
the mix of games the player faces.   
Other potential extensions relate to expanding the types of games the framework 
allows.  The core of the framework relies on the taxonomy of strictly ordinal 2 x 2 games 
provided in Rapoport, et al. (1976).  While this taxonomy serves to organize and classify 
the seventy-eight possible games in a sensible manner, it excludes many other interesting 
2 x 2 games.  Kilgour and Fraser (1988) develop a taxonomy of all ordinal 2 x 2 games, 
including those not strictly ordinal (those games in which a player may rank one or more 
of her payoffs equally), extending the set of games to seven hundred twenty-six.  The 
existing framework is currently capable of examining games within this extended 
taxonomy.  More generally, with some modifications to the programming code, one 
could employ the framework to handle other classes of games than 2 x 2 games. 
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Table 2.1: Concise Rapoport, Guyer, and Gordon (1976) taxonomy. 
Notes: 
1.  Asterisks indicate symmetric 
games. 
2.  Every game’s natural 
outcome is the Up Left cell of 
its payoff matrix. 
The natural outcome (NO) 
defined by Rapoport, et al. 
(1976) is determined by 
applying the following 
conditions in sequence: 
a. If a single outcome 
contains the high payoff for 
both players (4 for each), then it 
is the NO. 
b. If there are two 
dominated strategies, then their 
elimination defines the NO. 
c. If there is a single 
dominated strategy, then after 
its elimination, the NO is the 
outcome in which the player 
with no dominated strategies 
receives the higher payoff. 
d. The NO is the 
maximin outcome. 
3. Phyla include: 
    N – No conflict (see 2.a. 
           above). 
    Z – Complete opposition 
          (constant sum games). 
    M – Mixed motive. 
4.  Classes include: 
    EP – NO is a Nash 
equilibrium (NE) and Pareto 
optimal. 
    Ep – NO is a NE but not 
            Pareto optimal. 
    e – Natural outcome is not a 
          NE. 
5.  Orders include: 
    D2 – Two dominating  
             strategies. 
    D1 – One dominating 
             strategy. 
    D0 – Zero dominating  
             strategies. 
    Phylum M, Class e has two 
        suborders: 
    D0e2 – No dominating  
                strategies, two NE. 
    D0e0 – No dominating  
































































































1 N EP D2 - SS 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 
2* N EP D2 - SS 4 4 3 3 1 2 2 1 
3* N EP D2 - SS 4 4 3 2 2 3 1 1 
4 N EP D2 - SS 4 4 3 2 1 3 2 1 
5* N EP D2 - SS 4 4 3 1 1 3 2 2 
6* N EP D2 c WS 4 4 2 3 3 2 1 1 
7* M EP D2 - SS 3 3 4 2 2 4 1 1 
8 M EP D2 - SS 3 3 4 2 1 4 2 1 
9* M EP D2 - SS 3 3 4 1 1 4 2 2 
10 M EP D2 - SS 2 3 4 2 1 4 3 1 
11 Z EP D2 - SS 2 3 4 1 1 4 3 2 
12* M Ep D2 - SS 2 2 4 1 1 4 3 3 
13 M EP D2 - SS 3 4 4 2 2 3 1 1 
14 M EP D2 - SS 3 4 4 2 1 3 2 1 
15 M EP D2 - SS 3 4 4 1 2 3 1 2 
16 M EP D2 - SS 3 4 4 1 1 3 2 2 
17 M EP D2 - SS 2 4 4 2 1 3 3 1 
18 M EP D2 - SS 2 4 4 1 1 3 3 2 
19 M EP D2 t WS 3 4 4 3 1 2 2 1 
20 M EP D2 t WS 3 4 4 3 2 2 1 1 
21 M EP D2 t WS 2 4 4 3 1 2 3 1 
22 N EP D1 c WS 4 4 3 3 2 1 1 2 
23 N EP D1 - SS 4 4 3 3 1 1 2 2 
24 N EP D1 c WS 4 4 3 2 2 1 1 3 
25 N EP D1 - SS 4 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 
26 N EP D1 c WS 4 4 2 3 3 1 1 2 
27 N EP D1 c WS 4 4 2 1 3 2 1 3 
28 N EP D1 - SS 4 4 3 1 2 2 1 3 
29 N EP D1 - SS 4 4 3 1 1 2 2 3 
30 N EP D1 c WS 4 4 2 2 3 1 1 3 
31 M EP D1 - SS 3 4 2 2 1 3 4 1 
32 M EP D1 - SS 3 4 2 1 1 3 4 2 
33 M EP D1 - SS 3 4 1 2 2 3 4 1 
34 M EP D1 - SS 3 4 1 1 2 3 4 2 
35 M EP D1 - SS 2 4 3 2 1 3 4 1 
36 M EP D1 - SS 2 4 3 1 1 3 4 2 
37 M EP D1 - SS 3 4 2 3 1 2 4 1 
38 M EP D1 - SS 3 4 1 3 2 2 4 1 
39 M EP D1 t WS 2 4 3 3 1 2 4 1 
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Table 2.1: Concise Rapoport, Guyer, and Gordon (1976) taxonomy (continued). 
 
Notes (continued): 
6.  Genera include: 
    f – Force vulnerable. 
    t – Threat vulnerable. 
    c – Competitive pressure. 
7.  Stability: 
    SS – Strongly stable. 
    WS – Weakly stable. 
    US – Unstable. 
A game in which the NO is also a NE 
is strongly stable (SS) if there are no 
competitive, threat, or force pressures, 
and it is weakly stable (WS) if exactly 
one of these pressures is present.  All 
other games are unstable (US). 
8.  This payoffs in table here correct 
two typographical errors in Rapoport, 
et al. (1976).  The first is for Game 
17: column payoffs in game 17 as 
reported there had two 3’s and no 2.  
The second is for Game 30: as 
reported there, it was identical to 
game 27. 
9.  Common games (highlighted in 
bold type) with toy names are: 
    12 ~ Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) 
    25 ~ Stag Hunt (SH) 
    39 ~ Bluff (BL) 
    66 ~ Chicken (CH) 
    68 ~ Leader (LD) 
    69 ~ Battle of the Sexes (BS) 
10.  The following games conform 
with Parisi’s (2000) taxonomy: 
    1. Pure common interest games  
        ~ 1–11, 13–46, and 49–56. 
    2. Battle of the sexes games 
        ~ 58–69.  
    3. Prisoners’ Dilemma games 
        ~ 12, 47, 48, and 57. 
    4. Inessential games 





























































































40 M EP D1 - WS 3 4 4 1 2 2 1 3 
41 M EP D1 - SS 3 4 4 1 1 2 2 3 
42 M EP D1 - SS 3 3 4 1 2 2 1 4 
43 M EP D1 - SS 3 3 4 1 1 2 2 4 
44 M EP D1 f WS 2 4 4 1 1 2 3 3 
45 Z EP D1 - SS 3 2 4 1 2 3 1 4 
46 M EP D1 f WS 3 2 4 1 1 3 2 4 
47 M Ep D1 f WS 2 3 4 1 1 2 3 4 
48 M Ep D1 f WS 2 2 4 1 1 3 3 4 
49 M EP D1 ctf US 3 4 4 3 2 1 1 2 
50 M EP D1 tf US 3 4 4 3 1 1 2 2 
51 M EP D1 ctf US 3 4 4 2 2 1 1 3 
52 M EP D1 tf US 3 4 4 2 1 1 2 3 
53 M EP D1 ctf US 3 3 4 2 2 1 1 4 
54 M EP D1 tf US 3 3 4 2 1 1 2 4 
55 M EP D1 tf US 2 4 4 3 1 1 3 2 
56 M EP D1 tf US 2 4 4 2 1 1 3 3 
57 M Ep D1 tf US 2 3 4 2 1 1 3 4 
58 N EP D0 c WS 4 4 2 3 1 1 3 2 
59 N EP D0 - SS 4 4 2 2 1 1 3 3 
60* N EP D0 - SS 4 4 2 1 1 2 3 3 
61* N EP D0 c WS 4 4 1 3 3 1 2 2 
62 N EP D0 c WS 4 4 1 2 3 1 2 3 
63* N EP D0 c WS 4 4 1 2 2 1 3 3 
64 M EP D0 f WS 3 4 2 1 1 2 4 3 
65 M EP D0 f WS 2 4 3 1 1 2 4 3 
66* M e D0e2 c US 3 3 2 4 4 2 1 1 
67 M e D0e2 c US 2 3 3 4 4 2 1 1 
68* M e D0e2 c US 2 2 3 4 4 3 1 1 
69* M e D0e2 - US 2 2 4 3 3 4 1 1 
70 M e D0e0 c US 3 4 2 1 4 2 1 3 
71 M e D0e0 c US 3 3 2 1 4 2 1 4 
72 M e D0e0 c US 3 2 2 1 4 3 1 4 
73 M e D0e0 c US 2 4 4 1 3 2 1 3 
74 M e D0e0 c US 2 4 3 1 4 2 1 3 
75 Z e D0 c US 2 3 4 1 3 2 1 4 
76 M e D0e0 c US 2 3 3 1 4 2 1 4 
77 M e D0e0 - US 2 2 4 1 3 3 1 4 
78 M e D0e0 c US 2 2 3 1 4 3 1 4 
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Figure 2.1: An example of a trial for a two-game environment. 
 
Trial T1 ~ 40 independent runs of  
 game-cost environment: ({Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken}, Cost 1) 
Run R2  
Run R40  
Run R1 ~ 100 generations with  
 Row strategy population with 2 automata {R1, R2} 
 Column strategy population with 2 automata {C1, C2} 
Generation G2  
Generation G100  
Generation G1 ~  
 Apply evolutionary dynamics 
 Match automata in game(s)   (mean matching method illustrated) 
 
Match M2 ~ Row automaton R1 vs. Column automaton C2 








Match M1 ~ Row automaton R1 vs. Column automaton C1 
                     Play every supergame within the game environment 
  
1  
Supergame S1 ~ 
10 rounds of Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Game #12  C1 
2, 2 4, 1 





Supergame S2 ~ 
10 rounds of Chicken 
Game #66  C1 
3, 3 2, 4 






Figure 2.2: Finite automata examples. 
 
Figure 2.2.a: A four-state automaton that specializes all states  
to the play of a particular game. 
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma potentially uses only states 1 and 2, and Chicken potentially 





Figure 2.2.b: A four-state automaton that specializes some states to the play 
of a particular game and reuses other states for both games. 
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma exclusively uses states 1, Chicken exclusively uses state 3, 
but both games potentially use states 2 and 4. 
 
  
0 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 




0 1 0 1 
1 1 1 
1 
0 0 0 0 





Figure 2.2.c: A four-state automaton that displays limited accessibility 
in each game and overall. 
 
In Prisoner’s Dilemma, states 1 and 3 are accessible.  In Chicken, states 3 and 4 
are accessible.  Accessible states in all games is the union, states 1, 3, and 4—





Figure 2.2.d: A four-state automaton with a counting state. 
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Figure 2.3: An example of the automaton-level state activation similarity statistic. 
 
A player has a pool of two three-state strategies (A and B) and plays three games… 
 Percent of rounds the player activates each state 




Game 2  
 
Game 3   
Standard deviation 0.943      1.247      0.471   26.56      18.41      25.50 
Automaton-level state 
activation similarity 
(mean standard deviation) 
0.887 23.49 
 
65% 30 % 5% 
0% 50% 50% 
30% 5% 65% 42% 8% 50% 
 
40% 11% 49% 
40% 10% 50% 
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Figure 2.4: Differentiating cost examples. 
 
Figure 2.4.a: Automata that vary only by Cost 1. 
The three-state automata A and B differ in distinct states activated in all games, but 
they have the same distinct states activated per game and nearly the same automaton-
level state activation similarity. 
 Percent of rounds the player activates each state 
 Automaton A Automaton B 
Game 1   
 
 
Game 2  
 
Game 3   
Distinct states activated 
in all games 3 2 
Distinct states activated 
per game 1.67 1.67 
Automaton-level 
state activation similarity 0.157 0.157 
 
Figure 2.4.b: Automata that vary only by Cost 2. 
The three-state automata A and B differ in distinct states used per game, but they 
have the same distinct states activated in all games and nearly the same automaton-level 
state activation similarity. 
 Percent of rounds the player activates each state 
 Automaton A Automaton B 
Game 1   
 
 
Game 2  
 
Game 3   
Distinct states activated 
in all games 3 3 
Distinct states activated 
per game 1.67 2.33 
Automaton-level 
state activation similarity 0.210 0.209 
50% 50% 0% 
99.1% 0.1% 0% 
100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
100% 0% 0% 
50% 49.9% 0.1% 
33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 
99.1% 0.1% 0% 
99.9% 0.1% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
100% 0% 0% 
33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 
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Figure 2.4.c: Automata that vary only by Cost 3. 
The three-state automata A and B differ in automaton-level state usage similarity, but 
they have the same distinct states activated in all games and distinct states activated per 
game. 
 Percent of rounds the player activates each state 
 Automaton A Automaton B 
Game 1   
 
 
Game 2  
 
Game 3   
Distinct states activated 
in all games 3 3 
Distinct states activated 
per game 3 3 
Automaton-level 
state activation similarity 0 0.246 
 
 
65% 30 % 5% 
5% 65% 30% 
30% 5% 65% 65% 30% 5% 
65% 30% 5% 
65% 30% 5% 
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Figure 2.5: An example of the population-level state usage similarity statistic. 
 
A player has a pool of three, three-state strategies (A, B, and C) and plays two games… 
 Percent of rounds the player activates each state 




Automaton B  
 
Automaton C   
Standard deviation 2.357      4.110      4.967   26.56      18.41      25.50 
Population-level 
state usage similarity 





65% 30 % 5% 
0% 50% 50% 
30% 5% 65% 60% 24% 16% 
 
65% 20% 15% 
65% 30% 5% 
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Appendix 2.1  
Descriptions of Other Statistics 
State Activation Frequency 
This performance statistic measures the percent of rounds a state is activated 
during play of a game.  State activation frequencies form the basis of automaton-level 
state activation similarity and Cost 3.  
Population-Level State Activation Similarity 
This performance measure is analogous to the automaton-level state activation 
similarity described in section 2.4 above.  That statistic measures, for a single automaton, 
its behavioral homogeneity across the g  games it plays.   In contrast, the population-
level statistic measures, for a single game, an agent’s behavioral homogeneity across its 
strategy pool’s n  automata. 
The program calculates the population-level state activation similarity (PLSAS) 
separately for each game.  The program first finds, for each state, the standard deviation 
of the percent of all rounds the agent activates it (over all automata in the player’s 
strategy pool), and then the program averages the s  standard deviations.  Consider a 
player with a pool of n  automata, and let , ,i g sx  indicate the percent of rounds automaton i 
activates state s when playing game g.  Then the population state activation similarity is 
 ( ) ( )2, , ,
1 1
1 1PLSAS:  
s n
x






′= −∑ ∑  (2.10) 
where , , ,
1
1 nx






′ = ∑ . 
Figure 2.5 presents two contrasting examples.  The player has a much more 
consistent pattern of state activation across the three automata in its strategy pool for 
Game 1 on the left of the figure than it has for Game 2 on the right.  Correspondingly, the 
agent’s PLSAS of 3.81 for Game 1 is much lower than its PLSAS of 23.49 for Game 2. 
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One drawback of this measure is that it does not account for potential strategic 
equivalence between two structural different automata.  The automata displayed in 
Figures 2.2.d and 2.2.e provide an example of strategic equivalence.  Renaming states 1, 
2, 3, and 4 of the automaton in Figure 2.2.d to 4, 1, 2, and 3 and sorting the renumbered 
states from low to high results in the automaton in Figure 2.2.e.  The population state 
activation similarity statistic would incorrectly state the degree of similarity. 
Figure 2.5 provides an example of this measurement error.  Suppose for game 222
Action 0 Usage Frequency 
, 
automata A and C are strategically equivalent such that states 1, 2, and 3 for A 
correspond to states 3, 1, and 2 for C.  Without considering equivalence, the population 
state activation similarity statistic is 23.49 for game 2.  After correcting for equivalence, 
the measure falls to either 20.43 (if C is rearranged to match A) or 14.14  (if A is 
rearranged to match C).  In either case, the similarity was underestimated (i.e., the 
statistic was overestimated), but it is not clear which revision is superior.  The 
measurement error can also work to understate the degree of similarity; once the 
equivalence between A and C is corrected, the population-level state activation similarity 
statistic for game 1 would increase. 
This performance statistic reports the frequency (proportion of all rounds) that 
action 0 was actually played by the automaton in each individual game and as an overall 
average. 
Play Percentage 
This performance statistic reports the frequency that each game was played.  
When the user employs mean matching, these statistics will always be ( ) 1g −  for each 
                                                 
22 Two automata could be strategically equivalent for game 2 and not for game 1 if there existed an 
equivalence for game 2’s initial state but not for game 1’s. 
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game.  In random matching, the program selects games stochastically, and the play 
percentage statistic should approach the frequency parameters set by the user. 
Percent 0-Playing States  
This structural statistic measures the percent of accessible states that play action 
0.  This is the potential to play action 0, not the frequency of actual use of action 0.  Since 
there is no consistent application of the labels “cooperate” and “defect” to binary actions 
in the Rapoport, et al. (1976) taxonomy, one must exercise prudence when comparing 
this statistic (and the next several that follow) in different game environments. 
Reciprocation Measuring Statistics 
The program measures the percent 0-reciprocating states and percent 1-
reciprocating states.  These structural statistics measure the percent of accessible states 
that reciprocate an opponent’s 0 action (1 action) by transitioning to a state that plays 0 
(1).   They correspond to “retaliatory” and “forgiving” characteristics as in Axelrod 
(1984) and Casti (1992), though the specific correspondence depends on the 
interpretation of actions 0 and 1 in a given game.  The framework also reports the percent 
of Tit-for-Tat states, those states that are both a 0-recipricator and 1-recipricator. 
Percent 0-Playing Initial States 
This structural statistic measures the percent of initial states that play action 0.  It 
corresponds to the “nice” characteristic prescribed in Axelrod (1984) and Casti (1992) (or 
one hundred percent minus this statistic does depending, again, on specific 
interpretations). 
Distinct Initial States 
This structural statistic reports the mean number of distinct starting states for all 
automata in a player’s strategy pool.  This number being less than the number of games 
indicates that the agent is playing some the games in a similar manner from start to finish.  
Figure 2.2.f illustrates two simple automata that are identical except for their initial states.  
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Assuming these are the only automata in the player’s pool, the distinct initial states 
measurement is 1.5.  The automaton on the left of the figure does not distinguish between 
Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken games while the automaton on the right does.  The 
disparity could lead to very different outcomes depending on the opposing automaton 
against which it is matched.  The program also lists the number of strategies that have 
1, 2, , s  distinct initial states. 
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Appendix 2.2 
Technical Specifications of the Simulation Framework 
The framework is coded in Java programming language and relies primarily upon 
the Repast simulation library.  It also makes uses a high quality random number generator 
from the Colt library.  These software packages are free for public download at the 
following websites: 
 Java:  http://java.sun.com/  
 Repast: http://repast.sourceforge.net/  
 Colt: http://acs.lbl.gov/software/colt/ 
The simulation code is compatible with the latest releases of these software packages, 
which at time of publication are Java version 1.6.0_24-b07, Repast version 3.1, and Colt 
version 1.2.0. 
The simulation code consists 7765 lines of code in three separate packages.  All 
code for these packages is available from the author upon request. 
Multigames package.  This package is the primary simulation code.  It contains 
the following classes: Strategy, MGGame, GAObject, MGModel, BatchMGModel, 
GuiMGModel, MGStarter, and GameRGG.  
Games package.  This package provides abstract classes and interfaces that 
implement basic game theory structures and concepts.  This package is designed 
primarily for use with either the Repast and Swarm23
My_Utilities package.  This package provides of the following helper classes: 
MyIO, MyArrays, MySerializer, MyOpenSeqStatistic, and MyOpenSequenceGraph.  
 simulation toolkits.  The package 
contains the Game and Playable interfaces and the AbstractGame, AbstractGameMxN, 
and AbstractGame2x2 classes.  This library is also available at www.nd.edu/~jleady.  
                                                 
23 The Multigames framework does not make use of the Swarm features of the Games package.  The 
Swarm simulation toolkit is available at http://www.swarm.org/. 
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Appendix 2.3 
Parameter Descriptions for the Multiple Games Simulation Program 
Usage 
java MGStarter [-b | --batch] [inputFile] 
Command line parameters: 
-b, --batch:  start in Batch mode (default is GUI mode). 
inputFile:    the parameter file, formatted in accordance with Repast specifications. 
Optionally, the GUI and Batch modes may be started individually as  
java GuiMGModel [inputfile]  
java BatchMGModel [inputfile] 
General Parameters24
trial: (int) the administrative trial number 
 – those marked with an asterisk (*) are ignored in GUI mode.  
runs*: (int > 0) the number of independent runs of the program to conduct. 
generations: (int > 0) number of generations per run. 
seedString: (String) the seeds for each individual run.  When using the default (random) 
clock seed, this must be set to “random.” 
testRun: (boolean) flag to test the program with specific automata specified by the user 
in a special input file. 
Population Parameters 
                                                 
24 Java parameter types and allowable values are listed in parentheses.  The parameter names match the 
computer code and may differ from the language used throughout Chapter 2. 
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[row|col]PopSize: (int > 0) number of strategies in [row|column] player’s pool.  
Correspond to  and n m . 
[row|col]States: (int > 0) number of states in [row|column] player's automata. 
Correspond to  and n ms s . 
Genetic Algorithm Parameters 
relativePerformance: (double) corresponds to α in the fitness formula in footnote 18. 
useMillerCrossover: (boolean) if true, use bit-wise crossover and mutation as in Miller 
(1996).  If false, use state-wise crossover and mutation. 
[row|col]CrossoverRate: (double [0, 1]) the crossover rate. 
[row|col]MaxCrossoverLength: (int [0, [row|col]States]) maximum number of states to 
crossover. 
[row|col]MutationRate: (double [0, 1]) the mutation rate. 
Cost Function Parameters 
costPar[A0|A1|A2|A3|A4|B1|B2|B3|B4|C3]: (double) determine the cost function, 
equation (2.1), where A’s correspond to α’s, B’s correspond to β’s, and C3 
correspond to γ3.  
costAdjustment: (int) determines which type of adjustment, if any, to use (multiplicative 
or additive) and how to calculate (jointly for both populations or separately for the 
row and column populations). 
Game Parameters 
roundsPerGame: (int ≥ 0) how many iterations of each supergame to play during a 
pairing of strategies.  Set to zero for an indefinitely repeated game. 
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noise: (double [0, 1]) probability the opponent's move is misreported. 
discount: (double [0, 1]) the discount factor for a repeated game. 
probContinue: (double [0, 1]) the probability for play to continue for another round in a 
repeated game. 
matchType: (String {random, mean}) how to determine pairings of strategies. 
matches: (int ≥ 0) the number of pairings per generation for random matchType. 
randomRole: (boolean) if true, each pairing of strategies from agent 1 and agent 2 plays 
the selected game twice, switching the agents’ row and column roles between play. 
gameString: (String) sets which games to play and how often. 
 Option 1 (specified games):  list the specific games and probability each is played. 
 Option 2 (random games):  randomly create g  RGG strictly ordinal games25
Input/Output Parameters 
. 
dataDir: (String) all output is saved to a new folder within dataDir named "tXXX", 
where XXX is the trial number.  
outputFile: (String) name of primary output file(s) with population averages.  Program 
will prepend “row_” or “col_” to this and append the trial number. 
outputFrequency: (int > 0) how many generations between writes to the outputFile. 
[row|col]Detail*: (int 0, 1, 2, 3) what statistics to calculate and output. 
perGame: (boolean) if true, calculates per game stats (where applicable) in addition to 
the average over all games played. 
                                                 
25 The method used does not correspond to a random draw from [1, 78], but rather from [1, 576] (see 
footnote 3).  
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write[Row|Col]Strategies*: (int 0, 1, 2, 3) different options for when to write the 
strategy-level statistics.  
writeCrossovers*: (boolean) if true, write details of each crossover during selection to 
the file "crossovers.xls". 
outputDigits: (int > 0) number of digits after the decimal point to output. 
Serialization Parameters 
serialize[Row|Col]Pop: (boolean) if true, the population is saved for future use. 
useSerial[Row|Col]Pop: (boolean) if true, the population is not randomly generated and 
instead is loaded from a previous trial. 
[row|col]SerialInputFile: (String) filename for previously saved strategy population. 
Display Parameters (for GUI mode) 
displayFrequency: (int > 0) how many generations between display updates. 
snapshots: (boolean) if true, a snapshot will be made for each graph after the last 
generation. 
graphX: (int [0, 15] with exceptions) a separate parameter for each statistic X.  Sets the 
graphical display options for statistic X: display the row player’s mean (over all 
games) statistic, display the column player’s mean statistic, show the statistic on a 
per-game level, and write the data to a file (there are some exceptions depending on 
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Strategy Evolution, Multitasking, and Context Effects 
in Costly Multiple Game Environments 
3.1. Introduction 
Multitasking is simply “the performance…of a number of different tasks or jobs 
concurrently” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2010).  Although this term originated in 
computer science as a synonym for multiprocessing, popular culture has expanded its 
meaning to describe people’s behavioral response to an output-oriented and time-
constrained life.  Multitasking—especially the business world—has become an 
increasingly predominate concept in modern life.  
Multitasking may also be applied more broadly to the functionality of the firm; 
not only does a division within a firm multitask, but the firm itself multitasks amongst its 
divisions as product and service lines become ever more diversified.  In these 
multitasking environments, firms seek to exploit synergies that will allow them to 
maximize the gains from economies of scope.  This research develops a method to model 
multitasking situations and investigates the conditions that influence whether or not 
synergies materialize. 
The popularity of these paradigms has not translated, however, into voluminous 
research in the economics field.  The traditional game theory literature has centered on 
analysis of equilibrium concepts, decision-making, and learning in strategic environments 
described by a single game.  By following the general modeling principle of striping the 
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problem to its core features, the focus on single-game settings has contributed 
enormously to the understanding of economic phenomena. 
While the study of single games is appropriate for many situations, the purpose of 
this study is to investigate how multiple-game environments affect strategy structure and 
performance.  Consider, for example, agents who must interact in distinct settings 
simultaneously.  A supplier of intermediate goods in a competitive market bids for 
contracts with a variety of firms and organizations.  These include other small firms, 
large firms, government agencies, and perhaps non-profit organizations.  A sales 
representative working for this supplier faces a heterogeneous strategic environment if 
the success of his sales strategy depends on with whom he is negotiating.  He faces a 
potentially distinct strategic game with each different type of customer.  A strategy 
emphasizing cost savings might be best suited for one type of potential customer while a 
strategy emphasizing responsiveness and personal attention might be best suited for 
another.  In addition to varying by content, sales strategies could also vary by style: 
aggressive, friendly, professional, etc.  Ideally, the sales agent would want to tailor the 
strategy’s content and style to the recipient. 
However, building and maintaining a repertoire of strategies might be costly.  In 
such cases, under what conditions should the sales representative apply the same strategy 
to different types of customers?  Can it be better to develop one strategy that is “good 
enough” for several situations, and perhaps another for one particular situation?  This 
study takes one step towards answering these questions with attention focused on the 
features of the strategic environments and their influence on outcomes. 
Continuing this example, potential customers are not the only people with whom 
he interacts in the workplace.  He must also deal with existing customers, his manager, 
peers in his firm and from competing firms, secretarial assistants, human resource 
representatives, etc.  Interactions generally do not occur in isolated capsules.  Rather, the 
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sales agent must interact intermittently—multitask—with all of these people throughout 
the workday. 
This paper models multitasking by having agents, who maintain stocks of 
strategies, compete in two games simultaneously.  The model captures agents’ limited 
cognitive abilities by implementing strategies as finite automata and by assessing costs 
related to the strategies’ complexity.  This first broad set of computer experiments 
evolves agents’ strategy stocks in defined single and multiple game environments.  It also 
provides the stock of strategies for the subsequent chapter on multiple game experiments.  
Chapter 4 will consider the role of experience in multiple game settings by pitting agents 
who have evolved in distinct backgrounds against each other. 
One purpose of pursuing this study is to establish the need for a theory capable of 
addressing the multitasked nature of the world.  A satisfactory model of decision making 
in multiple games played simultaneously must assume limits on the agents’ rationality.  If 
it did not, a hyperrational agent could simple play an ensemble of strategies consisting of 
those strategies with which it would play each game in isolation.  No separate theory 
would be needed.  This model assumes that limits on rationality exist and incorporates 
them into a strategy’s structure and cognitive costs. 
Several questions that involve these limits concern the strategies used by agents in 
multiple-game environments.  How do strategies used by agents who compete in 
multiple-game environments differ from those used in single-game environments?  Do 
these differences, if any, appear in a strategy’s employment, structure, or both?  Upon 
what conditions do these differences depend?   
This model attempts to answer these questions within certain environments.  It 
provides automated agents with experience playing in various environments 
distinguished by two features.  The first is the set of games that agents play.  This set may 
consist of a single two-player normal form game or two of these games at once.  The 
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second is the form of costs that agents incur.  The model considers two cases, one case 
without costs and another case in which costs depend on the structure of the strategy. 
Attention to strategic environments characterized by multiple games is relatively 
new in the economics literature, but is beginning to grow.  Recent studies look at 
sequences of different games.  LiCalzi (1995) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995, 2001) 
both develop theoretical models of multiple-game situations.  In these models, an agent 
faces a sequence of games and determines a strategy for a given situation based on its 
resemblance to past encounters.  Here, however, agents face games simultaneously, 
unlike Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995, 2001).  Chapter 4 will consider the role of past 
game experience.  Güth (2000a, 2000b) investigates learning in four different multiple-
game experiments.  He shows how subjects learn to anticipate rule changes as they play 
repeated sequences of games, which he calls “robust” experiments. 
Other studies align more closely with the present one both in the simultaneous 
nature of interactions and in the employment of finite automata to represent strategies.  
Samuelson (2001) considers a simultaneous three-game environment in which agents 
balance gains from more sophisticated strategies against their greater cognitive costs.  
Unlike the present study, his model does not allow sharing of cognitive resources.  
Bednar and Page (2007) develop a game theoretic model of simultaneous game settings 
to explain the emergence of culture.  Bednar, et al. (2010) use multiple game settings in a 
human subject experiments to model behavioral spillovers and find that people may 
employ heuristics that apply across games. 
This study employs artificial adaptive agents in computer experiments to 
investigate the effects of multiple-game environments on the performance and structure 
of finite automata strategies.  Miller (1996) provides the main theoretical and technical 
basis for the framework developed in Chapter 2 and extended here.  Although that study 
considered only the single-game Prisoner’s Dilemma environment, Miller and Page 
(2007) consider multiple game environment using finite automata strategies.  This 
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modeling technique allows an analysis of optimizing behavior without the rigidity 
required for a formal mathematical model (Holland and Miller, 1991).  This approach 
also has the advantage that one may study more complex and difficult situations than 
with a strictly mathematical model.  Another advantage is the potential to observe 
emergent behavior.   
Of course, one must exercise some caution when interpreting results produced 
from this type of modeling.  The results are often suggestive rather than conclusive, 
making this technique a useful complement to other research methods.  Like all modeling 
techniques, one must put careful thought into procedure and parameter selection to 
generate credible results.  The following sections discuss procedural and parametric 
decisions for the design of the experiments and more specifically for the conduct of the 
simulations. 
The overall experimental design consisted of two phases of computer 
experiments.  One purpose of the first phase of experimental trials, considered in this 
chapter, is to create populations that have evolved in a particular game setting.  A 
strategy population generated during this first phase is then ready to be matched against 
another one with a different game playing experience.  These pairings of strategy 
populations with different strategic histories comprise the second phase of trials explored 
in Chapter 4. 
The following section outlines the model and discusses related theoretic 
considerations.  Section 3.2 explains the experimental design and delineates the 
simulation procedures.  Section 3.3 presents the main findings under the natural 
equilibrium context, and Section 3.4 discusses the results for the alternative context.  The 
last section offers concluding remarks. 
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3.2. Experimental Design 
This project employs the experimental simulation framework developed in 
Chapter 2.  Specific design features for this study are described below. 
Game Selection 
 This study restricts attention to four 2x2, symmetric, ordinally distinct games—
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), Stag Hunt (SH), Chicken (CH), and Battle of the 
Sexes(BS)1
1
—for several reasons.  Symmetric games simplifies the analysis since both 
row and column players face identical situations.  Hence, unless otherwise noted, the 
results reported below relate to the row populations only.  Having simple, widely studied 
individual games allowed the focus to be on the multiple game nature of the strategic 
environments.  Table 3.  presents the versions of the games employed here.  These are 
consistent with the Rapoport, Guyer, and Gordon (1976) taxonomy (hereafter, RGG). 
 The automata that the agents use to represent their strategies can be interpreted as 
collections of mental states.  Thus, if the state of the automaton calls for action 0 to be 
taken, we can interpret this as the agent being in a mental state in which action 0 seems 
appropriate.  For example, in the PD game, if an opponent has defected in the previous 
period, and the agent’s automaton may move to a state that also defects.  Formally, I call 
this 0-reciprocating. 
 In the multigame setting, an agent can play the same or similar strategies across 
both games.  If we interpret the states of the automata as mental states, then the actions 
taken in those states and the previous plays that led to those states must have similar 
interpretations.  For example, if 0-reciprocating implies “choosing the natural 
                                                 
1 Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, and Battle of the Sexes are three of the four games in the 
Casti (1992) typology of mixed-motive games.  Leader, the other game in the Casti 
typology, is not considered here because Chicken and Battle of the Sexes are sufficient to 
model similar games since Leader has much in common with these two. 
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equilibrium” in one game, then it should not mean choosing the unnatural equilibrium in 
another game.  Otherwise, the idea of transferring a common strategy or part of a strategy 
across games becomes nonsensical. 
 Thus, a core assumption of my formulation is that action 0 has similar if not 
identical meaning across games.  In the games that I consider here, I rely on Rapoport, 
Guyer, and Gordon (1976) classification of these games.  In each game, action 0 denotes 
the natural symmetric equilibrium—the equilibrium we would expect people to play.  
Thus the generic labeling of actions simply as 0 and 1 has the advantage that action 0 is 
always the “natural” action that corresponds to the natural outcome of the game. 
 This assumption can be justified on the following lines.  In the PD, the natural 
equilibrium is (defect, defect) because defect is a dominant strategy.  In the other games, 
no dominant strategy exists and so Rapoport, Guyer, and Gordon (1976) choose the 
Pareto Dominant symmetric equilibrium.2
 This is not the only possible categorization of the strategies.  One might 
alternatively, categorize the actions by whether they are more self serving or other 
regarding.  This is the approach taken by Bednar and Page (2007) and later by Bednar, et 
al. (2010) in their experimental work.  This categorization has strong appeal but it cannot 
adjudicate between the two actions in the Battle of the Success game.  Neither strategy is 
more other regarding than the other. 
 
 Clearly, how the actions are categorized has implications for the strategies that 
evolve in the model.  Different categorizations can lead to very different causal models 
                                                 
2 Formally, the natural outcome (NO) defined by Rapoport, et al. (1976) is determined by 
applying the following conditions in sequence: (1) if a single outcome contains the high 
payoff for both players (4 for each), then it is the NO [applies to SH]; (2) if there are two 
dominated strategies, then their elimination defines the NO [applies to PD]; (3) if there is 
a single dominated strategy, then after its elimination, the NO is the outcome in which the 
player with no dominated strategies receives the higher payoff; (4) the NO is the maximin 
outcome [applies to CH & BS]. 
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(see Fryer and Jackson (2008), Nisbett (2003), and Page (2007) for summaries).  More 
generally, categories are the basis for how we interpret reality and thus underpin many of 
the statistical assumptions we make about signals (Hong and Page 2009). 
 To demonstrate the role that diverse categorizations can play in section 3.4, I 
rerun my model using the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, and Battle of the Sexes games, 
using the other-regarding / self-regarding (or, equivalently, cooperate / defect ) 
categorization of actions.  I now name these PD#, CH#, and SH# to distinguish them from 
the games under the RGG natural outcome context.  I do not consider Battle of the Sexes 
for the reason I already mentioned.  The natural hypothesis to make is that this different 
categorization will have implications for how the automata evolve (Page 2007). 
When facing multiple game environments, one might expect different types of 
strategies to be employed in an environment with two very similar games than in one 
with two quite dissimilar games. Using the RGG taxonomy allows a systematic 
measurement of the similarity of any two RGG games (see Chapter 2 for details) based 
on the nature of the payoffs in the games themselves.  Table 3.3 presents the dissimilarity 
scores between these four games, with a larger value indicating greater dissimilarity.  
This particular set of similar and dissimilar games allows a comparison of the 
performance and structure of strategies3
Chicken and Battle of the Sexes are selected because they are very similar—both 
have two symmetric Nash equilibria.  They differ mainly in the Pareto optimality of the 
various outcomes.  Obtaining an average of the two Nash equilibrium payoffs (perhaps 
through an alternating strategy) strictly Pareto dominates all other non-Nash equilibrium 
. 
                                                 
3 Samuelson (2001) provides the idea for this configuration of similar and dissimilar 
games.  He investigates a three-game environment with two similar games and one 
dissimilar game. 
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outcomes in Battle of the Sexes but only weakly Pareto dominates the greater non-Nash 
equilibrium outcome in Chicken. 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is selected because it is very different from the other three 
games and because of its importance in the literature.  Prisoner’s Dilemma has a single, 
dominant strategy, Nash equilibrium.  However, because the Nash equilibrium is Pareto 
dominated by another cooperative outcome, it may be viewed as “difficult” to play. 
Bednar, et al. (2010) develop entropy as a proxy for the difficulty of a game that uses 
observed action choices in laboratory experiments.  Possible entropy values in these 
games range from 0 when all outcomes occur in a single cell of the payoff matrix to 2 
when all outcomes occur with equal frequency (0.25).  The entropy value for PD in the 
baseline no cost setting is 1.76, indicating that PD is ex post relatively high difficulty (see 
Table 3.11).4
On the other hand, in the parlance of RGG, Stag Hunt is a game of “no conflict” 
as both players receive their greatest payoffs at the same outcome.  The other three games 
are all “mixed motive” games.  Accordingly, Stag Hunt is quite dissimilar from the other 
three games along the taxonomy divisions.  SH has two Nash equilibria; the natural 
outcome (0, 0) is the payoff dominant equilibrium, while the (1, 1) outcome is the risk 
dominant equilibrium.  Harsanyi (1995) suggests that risk dominance may be the stronger 
equilibrium pull; however, within the natural outcome payoff context and the baseline no 
cost setting, the payoff dominant outcome is ex post clearly salient: the payoff dominant 
(0, 0) outcome is reached in 99.3 percent rounds, respectively.  The corresponding 
 
                                                 
4 The lowest-to-highest entropy rankings for the single-game, no cost setting are: 
SH 0.07, BS 1.03, CH 1.51, and PD 1.76.  Entropy is formally defined in Bednar, et al. 
(2010) as ( ) ( ) ( )2log= −∑
x
H X p x p x , where X is a random variables with probability 
density function ( ) { }Pr= =p x X x . 
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entropy value for SH is 0.07, indicating that SH is relatively low difficulty in the no cost 
setting. 
Strategies 
Finite automata are used to implement a player’s strategy.  Each state of a finite 
automaton represents a portion of an agent’s strategy by specifying the action to take 
when in the state and the next state to which the strategy should transition after it 
executes the action.  This transition depends on the action taken by the player’s opponent. 
The desire to allow complete or partial state specificity toward games, as 
described above, leads to a further design consideration.  In all computer experiments 
reported here, both agents i and j employ automata with sixteen states: 
16 ,i js s s i j= = = ∀ .  The number of states can serve as a measure of the complexity 
of an automaton (Rubenstein, 1998; Samuelson, 2001; Bednar and Page, 2007)5
1
.  Since 
all automata have the same number of states by design, their complexity will not depend 
on their aggregate structure, but rather on the degree of complexity of sub-structures 
within the automaton.  A sixteen-state automaton is large enough for several independent 
sub-structures to emerge.  For instance, in the two-game settings explored in this paper, a 
strategy may evolve into two separate sub-automata of eight states each—one specific 
sub-automaton for each game played.  Automaton A in Figure 3.  provides one such 
illustrative multiple game strategy.  Alternatively, a strategy may use a common subset of 
strategies to play both games, as shown by Automaton B in Figure 3.1.  Though this 
study uses four games, it only considers only two games at a time; sixteen-state automata 
allow enough sophistication for four simultaneous game settings to be explored at a 
future time. 
                                                 
5 One weakness of this measure is that an automaton needs n + 1 states to account for n 
periods of memory (Bednar and Page, 2007).  Rubenstein (1998) develops another 
measure of complexity based on the maximal order of its states. 
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Cognitive Costs 
The primary performance statistic is profit, defined as a strategy’s score net of its 
cost.  The mean per round payoff of the stage game represents the score.  Thus, a score is 
bounded by [1, 4].  When strategies compete in multiple, simultaneously played games, 
the average score all of games played, net of cost, determines profit. 
The presence of cognitive costs captures the notion of bounded rationality.  There 
are several practical reasons why the complexity of a strategy should relate to its 
associated cost that go beyond the simple paradigm that its uses more cognitive 
resources.  Rubenstein (1998, p. 137) argues that “a more complex plan is more likely to 
break down, is more difficult to learn, and may require more time to be implemented.”  
There are a number of conceivable ways in which to model cognitive costs.  This study 
incorporates the presence of cognitive cost, but will sometimes contrast the results to the 
no cost case. 
Specifically, referring to the complete framework outlined in Chapter 2, cognitive 
costs here are modeled by “Cost 4,” which are determined by the proportion of states that 
are accessible in all games: 
( )24 4Cost 4 1  with proportion of states accessible across all gamesC C= + =
 When Automaton A in Figure 3.1 plays Battle of the Sexes, states 1-8 are all accessible; 
when it plays Prisoner’s Dilemma, states 9-16 are all accessible.  Automaton A’s 
cognitive cost would then be based on sixteen states being accessible in all games 
(proportion of overall accessible states is 1.0).  Specifically, its cognitive cost would be 
(1 + 16/16)2 = 4.0.  For contrast, consider Automaton B in the same figure.  It uses only 
states 1 and 2 to play both games, so its cognitive cost would be (1 + 2/16)2 ≅ 1.266. 
 Also, the simulation adjusts each strategy’s cost in order to normalize combined 
row and column populations’ first generation average profit to zero.  This procedure 
balances the impact of game payoffs and cognitive costs in the determination of profits. 
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Computer Experiments 
The experiment consists of twenty-eight trials, each with a specific game, cost, 
and context environment.  Table 3.4 summarizes these environments by trial.  Each trial 
consists of one hundred independent runs, and each run consists of one thousand 
generations.  Trials 1-20 cover the experiments under the natural strategy context and 
trials 21-28 cover the alternative cooperate/defect context.  During each generation, the 
row and column players’ automata match up to play either one or two repeated games. 
During any given trial, two randomly generated populations of thirty finite 
automaton strategies compete against each other.  A selection procedure filters out poorly 
performing strategies and a genetic algorithm combines successful ones into new 
strategies.  This selection occurs at the beginning of each generation (after the first). 
The end result for each trial during this phase is two populations that have 
adaptively gained extensive experience playing in a selected game and cost setting.  For 
each trial, the simulation repeats this procedure one hundred times, creating many 
independent sets of populations with a common experience.  The simulation saves the 
automaton structures of the populations after each run for use during the follow-on 
experiments (see Chapter 4). 
Simulation Algorithm 
The computer experiments use the following algorithm to conduct the trials.  A 
more detailed description of this algorithm appears in Chapter 2.  Table 3.5 summarizes 
parameter values used throughout the experiments. 
Step 1: Initialize strategy populations.  Row and column player strategy 
populations each consist of thirty randomly created automata. 
Step 2: Apply selection.  This simulation models selection mostly consistent with 
the experiments reported in Miller (1996) to include crossover rates (0.33333333) and 
mutation rates (0.005) and the relative fitness parameter (2).  The program skips this step 
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during the first generation and applies selection on the row and column populations 
independently. 
Step 2.1: Copy top performers.  The simulation selects the twenty best performing 
automata, based on their profit earned in the previous generation (average payoff in all 
rounds6
Step 2.2: Add five genetically modified strategy pairs.  For the ten remaining 
positions in the new population, the program selects five pairs of strategies, modifies 
them, and inserts them into the new population. 
 of all games played net of cognitive cost) for the new generation without any 
alterations. 
Step 2.2.1: Identify parent strategies.  The simulation randomly selects (with 
replacement) two automata.  The probability for selection depends on the relative fitness 
(profit) of the strategies.  A fitness parameter ensures that automata that perform worse 
than two standard deviations from the mean cannot be selected. 
Step 2.2.2: Apply state-wise crossover7

. The algorithm applies the crossover 
genetic operator directly on the automata.  The program determines randomly for the two 
automata a common crossover point between states and crossover length .  It swaps the 
automata’s next   states beyond the crossover point.8
Step 2.2.3: Apply state-wise mutation.  For each state k, the program makes three 
independent draws from a uniform distribution.  If the first draw is below the mutation 
probability threshold of 0.005, the program flips the state’s action from 0 to 1 (or vice 
 
                                                 
6 The profit statistic uses no time discounting and weights all rounds equally. 
7 This step is the only difference from the genetic algorithm in Miller (1996), where 
automata are first represented as bit strings, and then the operation is applied to the bits 
(as opposed to states). 
8 For this operation, the simulation treats the automata as circular so that if there are 
fewer than   states to the end of the automata, it continues the swapping at their 
beginnings. 
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versa).  If the second draw is below 0.005, the program modifies its “if opponent played 
action 0” transition to a randomly determined state.  If the third draw is below 0.005, the 
program modifies its “if opponent played action 1” transition to a randomly determined 
state.  After all states have been (potentially) modified, the program adds the automaton 
to the next generation’s strategy pool. 
Step 3: Play Games. 
Step 3.1: Match automata.  The program employs mean matching to pair 
automata for competition.  Under this paradigm, each of the thirty automata in the row 
population pairs with each of the thirty automata in the column population to play all 
games selected for that particular trial.  Thus, each automaton plays thirty or sixty 
repeated games in every generation (depending on whether the trial is for a one-game or 
two-game setting). 
Step 3.2: Play game(s).  The matched automata play a repeated game for one 
hundred sixty rounds9
In the two-game settings, simultaneous play means that an automaton plays both 
of the selected games before the algorithm applies selection.  This ensures that the same 
automaton is playing the different games (with a possible distinct starting state for each 
game).  Automata play a game for the full number of specified rounds before switching to 
a different game. 
.  During every round, each automaton plays the action specified by 
its current state and then transitions to a state dependent on the play of its opponent. 
Step 4: Iterate or stop program.  Terminate program execution if it has reached the 
last (1000th) generation.  Otherwise, increment generation and go to Step 2 (selection). 
                                                 
9 The paired automata play 10· s  = 160 rounds, where s  = 16 is the number of their 
states.  Using 10· s  rounds ensures the play extends well beyond the automata’s intrinsic 
memory capacity (Miller, 1996).  All agents report and perceive actions accurately; there 
is no noise. 
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Application of this algorithm generates strategy populations with specific game-
playing experience.  This is the first phase of broader research agenda.  The second phase 
(Chapter 4) consists of experiments that match these populations against each other in 
both familiar and novel multiple game environments.  The following section describes 
and explains the results of the first phase trials. 
 
3.3. Results for the Natural Outcome Context 
The results illustrate the performance of strategy populations in terms of profit, 
score, and cost in the various game strategic environments using the generic action 0 or 1 
label consistent with the RGG taxonomy.    In the results and discussions that follow, 
score will normally be preferred to profit as the primary measure of performance.  Profit 
is most useful as the measure to drive the evolution of strategies since it incorporates both 
interactive outcomes (scores, or equivalently, payoffs) and cognitive costs.  When 
interpreting and comparing outcomes, though, scores are more easily compared to the 
payoffs in the game matrices themselves, and so provide a clearer picture.  Additionally, 
as expanded on below, the differences in costs from game to game are negligible, and so 
scores correlate highly with profits. 
 Structural characteristics of the strategy populations, also presented here, can 
explain much of the populations’ differing performance in the various environments.  The 
results presented below will evaluate the impact of cognitive cost on the performance and 
structure of strategy populations.  Two tables below summarize the single-game results: 
Table 3.6 for cognitive cost environments and Table 3.7 for no cost environments.  In 
these, a comparison of the fourth data column labeled “distinct states activated in all 
games” provides a quick snapshot of how costs drive automata to evolve to simpler 
structures.  Overall, facing costs drives the number of activated states from 4.63 to 1.32, a 
reduction of 71 percent.  This is expanded in Result 3.1.2 below.  Tables 3.8 and 3.9 
summarize the two-game results for cognitive cost and no cost environments, 
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respectively.  On the whole in the two-game settings, the number of activated states from 
7.49 to 2.09, a reduction of 72 percent, in the presence of cognitive costs.  Note that 
unless otherwise noted, all tables and figures present population results on a per 
automaton basis.  These results are means over the one hundred runs and the thirty 
automata comprising the player’s population in each run. 
The results presented in this chapter arise from matching two new, inexperienced 
populations repeatedly over 1,000 generations.  The purpose is to trace the evolution of 
the strategies, to evaluate their last generation performance and structure, and to create 
populations that have evolved in a particular game and cost setting.  A strategy 
population generated during this phase of the experiment is then ready to be matched in 
the second phase against another one with a different game playing experience (see 
Chapter 4). 
In addition to producing experienced populations of strategies, the experiments in 
this phase provide baseline values for performance and structural statistics.  The results 
show differences between both types of statistics for strategy populations that evolved in 
different game environments. 
Result Group 3.1 – General Results Common in One-Game and Two-Game Settings 
Result 3.1.1.  Populations converge from thirty automata with entirely random 
structures to many copies of one or two functionally distinct automata; in about ninety of 
one hundred runs of a given cognitive cost trial, all thirty automata activate their states 
in exactly the same frequencies, and in the other ten runs, twenty-nine automata activate 
their states exactly the same along with only one uniquely acting automaton. 
The typical population converges rather quickly to a very small set of functionally 
distinct automata; in other words, redundancy of particular automata within the 
population of thirty is common.  Most automata within a population will use the same 
states with the same frequencies.  For example, Figure 3.2 illustrates a typical automaton 
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strategy (this particular one is row automaton #1 from trial 17, run 1, after evolving for 
one thousand generations).  All twenty-nine other automata in the population are identical 
to this one.  Although a population’s automata in most trials do not evolve to thirty 
identical structural copies, they do mostly evolve to identical operational copies.  For 
example, the full sixteen-state automaton shown in Figure 3.2.a is rather complicated.  
However, once inaccessible states are removed from consideration (since they can never 
be activated), this automaton reduces in functionality to simple two-state automaton 
shown in Figure 3.2.b10
One way to measure this convergence is by considering the standard deviation of 
a particular state’s usage (the percentage of rounds that the automaton spent in this state) 
across all automata in a population during the play of a game.  A low value indicates that 
each automaton strategy in the population uses that particular state with relatively the 
same frequency.  One can then average the standard deviations across all states (and 
games in multiple-game environments) to obtain a measure of homogeneity. The statistic 
that measures this homogeneity is the population-level state activation similarity 
(PLSAS).   Figure 3.
.  Most populations evolve to just one or two functionally 
equivalent reduced-form automata; some structural differences from automaton to 
automaton may occur, but these are most often in the inaccessible portion of the 
automaton, and therefore irrelevant.  For instance, suppose row automaton #2 in the 
automaton #1’s population was identical to it except that the right-side transition (if 
opponent plays action 1) from state 8 leads to state 6 instead of state 7.  Then automaton 
#2 would function identically to #1 since it is impossible to reach state 8 in the first place. 
3 shows that PLSAS converges rather quickly (by about the 100th 
generation) to its eventual 1000th generation value of about 0.22 in single game Cost 4 
                                                 
10 The automaton in Figure 3.2.b could still be reduced further the simpleton one-state 
automaton that plays action 0; however, that reduction did not occur with this particular 
automaton in the computer experiment (trial 17, run #1, row automaton #1). 
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environments (the four actual values range from 0.17 to 0.27; see Table 3.6).  This value 
means that averaged over 16 states, the standard deviation across thirty automata of a 
state’s activation frequency is 0.22.  An analysis of Battle of the Sexes, which has a 
PLSAS of 0.22, helps to illustrate what this value means.  Of the one hundred sample 
runs, ninety runs have a PLSAS of 0, eight runs have PLSAS’s of 2.23 or 2.24, and two 
other runs have PLSAS of 2.91 and 0.74.  So, in ninety percent of the runs, all thirty 
automata in a population function in exactly the manner in the sense that they use their 
states in exactly the same frequencies.  The automata in the runs with the non-zero 
PLSAS’s function almost identically.  For instance, if an automaton activates only two 
states (as most did), a PLSAS measure of 2.24 corresponds to twenty-nine of the 
automata behaving identically (activating the same two states each with the same 
frequencies) and just one errant automaton activating different states. 
A typical population of thirty converges, for instance, to one or two distinct state 
usage patterns.11
Result 3.1.2:  On average, strategies use only 1.32 (of 16) states in cognitive cost 
settings and 4.63 states in no cost settings, leaving 92 percent and 71 percent, 
respectively, of their cognitive power idle.  The strategies typically use but a few states in 
substantial frequencies by the last generation of a run.  For example, the automaton 
strategy in Figure 3.
  This homogeneity result is by design.  In the selection dynamics, the 
algorithm copies high performing strategies directly and combines them into new ones 
for the next generation.  The resulting population that emerges from thus experience-
gaining portion of the experiment consists of a few strategies tuned for a particular game-
cost environment.  
2.a utilizes just two states, 5 and 12.  The functionally equivalent 
automaton has just two states, as shown in the inset, Figure 3.2.b.  Several statistics 
                                                 
11 There may be more truly distinct patterns; however, some minor differences stem from 
states that are played with very low frequencies. 
107 
reported in Tables 3.6 and 3.8 provide support that strategies use very fewer of their 
available states. 
Two performance statistics that demonstrate this result are distinct states activated 
in all games and mean states activated in per game (these measures are identical in 
single-game environments).  In the one-game, cognitive cost environments, the typical 
automaton strategy activates about 1.3 (out of 16) states.  In two-game, cognitive cost 
environments, distinct states activated per game is about 1.6 and distinct states activated 
in all games is about 2.1.  Although these strategies all have 16 states available, they 
usually economize by using just a few states.  For example, the automaton in Figure 3.2 
activated only one state (12) when it played Prisoner’s Dilemma (because its opponents 
always played action 0) and just two states (5 and 12) when it played Battle of the Sexes.  
For this automaton, distinct states activated per game is 1.5 and distinct states activated in 
all games is 2. 
These performance statistics are driven by the underlying structure of the 
automata, and in particular, by the number of accessible states because these determine 
the cognitive cost.  A state s is accessible if, given the initial starting state, a series of 
transitions exists such that state s can be potentially reached.  Whether an accessible state 
is actually ever activated depends on the series of actual actions taken by the two 
competing strategies.  Referring to the automaton if Figure 3.2, it has two accessible 
states (5 and 12) both when playing Prisoner’s Dilemma and when playing Battle of the 
Sexes, so 12.5 percent of its states are accessible. 
For the single game environments with cognitive costs, only 9 percent of states 
are accessible on average.  This is true for any of the four games; there is no statistically 
significant difference between the different games for this statistic.  Similar results stem 
from the multiple game, cognitive cost environments.  In these, accessible states are 
calculated per game and across all games, with the latter serving as the basis for cognitive 
costs.  12 percent of states are accessible per game and 14 percent are accessible across 
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both games.  Again, there is no significant variance for among the six pairings of games 
for either of these statistics. 
Result 3.1.3:  Cognitive costs significantly affect nearly all performance and 
structural statistics, and the differences are most pronounced in Prisoner’s Dilemma and 
Stag Hunt.  In particular, costs reduce the number of states that can be / are activated; 
structurally, the proportion of accessible states falls (on average in single game settings) 
from 73 to 9 percent, and performance-wise, the number of distinct states activated falls 
from 4.63 to 1.32.  The presence of costs significantly affects both the structure and 
performance of strategies, as shown by a comparison of the statistics in Tables 3.6 and 
3.7 (for one-game settings) and Tables 3.8 and 3.9 (for two-game settings). 
For instance, a comparison of distributions of payoff matrix outcomes for one-
game, cognitive cost environments (Table 3.10) and for one-game, no cost environments 
(Table 3.11) shows drastically different distributions for both Prisoner’s Dilemma and 
Stag Hunt.  For the former, the presence of costs increases the prevalence of the dominant 
strategy Nash equilibrium (the top left cell) from 34.3 percent to 97.1 percent.  
Accordingly, payoff efficiency falls from 54.4 to 1.4 percent12
                                                 
12 Payoff efficiency E is the percentage of the potential joint payoff above of minimum 
joint payoff that players receive: 
.  Without costs, players 
are able to coordinate on the Pareto efficient but dominated cooperative outcome (bottom 
right cell) 43.1 percent of the time, but with costs this outcome almost never occurs.  For 
the later, Stag Hunt shows an opposite flow in efficiency: without costs, players’ action 
lead to the payoff dominant Nash equilibrium (top left cell) 99.3 percent of the time, but 
with costs, this percentage drops to 83.6 percent as in almost 16 percent of rounds, play 
gets stuck at the risk dominant Nash equilibrium (bottom right cell).  Efficiency falls 
from 99.3 percent to 83.6 percent. 
actual joint payoffs  minimum joint payoffs






The payoff matrix distributions outcomes (and payoff efficiencies) for two-game 
settings that include Prisoner’s Dilemma or Stag Hunt follow a similar alteration as the 
one-game settings when comparing the no cost (Table 3.13) and cognitive cost (Table 
3.12) cases. 
Table 3.14 shows Welch’s t-statistics for differences between all statistics in the 
one-game, no cost settings and the corresponding statistics in the one-game, cognitive 
cost settings.  For Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt, all differences are statistically 
significant, mostly at the one percent significance level.  The results are less dramatic for 
Chicken and Battle of the Sexes, but real differences do exist for the key statistics of 
proportion of accessible states (which determines cost) and profit as well as many of 
other the statistics. 
Similar results come from the two-game environments, as shown in Table 3.15 
that shows Welch’s t-statistics for differences between all statistics in the two-game, no 
cost setting and the corresponding statistics in the two-game, cognitive cost setting.  
Nearly all performance statistics exhibit statistically significant differences between the 
no cost and cost settings: profit, distinct states activated (both in all games and per game), 
and state usage similarity (both automaton-level and population-level).  For score and 
percent of rounds action 0 is played, the results are mixed: costs matter to these statistics 
always in Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt games, but only sometimes in Battle of the 
Sexes games and Chicken games.  Many structural statistics are affected by the presence 
of cognitive costs as well.  This is always true for distinct initial starting states, 
proportion of accessible states (both in all games and per game), proportion of terminal 
states, and proportion of counting states, and nearly always true for proportion of states 
that play Tit-for-Tat.  For the other structural statistics—the proportion of initial states 
that play action 0, and the proportions of (regular) states that play action 0, reciprocate 
action 0, and reciprocate action 1—costs matter for all Prisoner Dilemma games, but only 
for select other games, depending on the two-game environment.  
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The disparity between cost and no cost environments for row populations can also 
be seen visually by comparing Figure 3.4’s score histograms on the left-hand side 
(cognitive cost) to those on the right-hand side (no cost).  Figure 3.5 shows similar 
differences for column populations.   
Taken as a whole, this result is critically important because it shows that automata 
evolve to different structures when facing cognitive costs.  Furthermore, these structural 
differences definitely affect the execution of the automata’s strategies.  By design, the 
cognitive costs were to matter so that mental constraints in multiple game settings would 
have real effects; this result affirms the design of the model.  Accordingly, the remainder 
of the results presented below will focus mostly on those stemming from cognitive cost 
environments. 
Result 3.1.4:  Row and column populations exhibit no differences as expected in 
the symmetric games, providing a positive validity check for the underlying framework.  
Row and column populations performed similarly as expected.  Any significant 
discrepancy would indicate a bias in the simulation programming.  Figures 3.4 and 3.5 
show the distribution of scores for the row populations and column populations, 
respectively, in single game settings.  A comparison of the graphs show that the score 
distribution for the row population in Figure 3.4 is the nearly identical to its column 
population counterpart in Figure 3.5.  This robustness result shows that there is no loss of 
generality by focusing solely of the results for the row population. 
Result Group 3.2 – One-Game Environment Results 
While this paper focuses on the nature of strategies in multigame environments, 
single game results are needed to serve as a baseline for comparison.  Primary single 
game results are presented below; others will be presented as needed to contrast or 
highlight a two game environment result. 
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Result 3.2.1:  In the no cost settings, outcomes in SH, CH, and BS are all highly 
payoff efficient (greater than 97.9 percent), while outcomes in PD are modestly efficient 
at 54.4 percent.  The introduction of cognitive costs has mixed effects on efficiency in 
these games: efficiency rises slightly in CH by 1.8 percentage points, does not change in 
BS, falls modestly in SH by 15.7 percentage points, and plummets in PD by 52.7 
percentage points to near zero efficiency.  See Tables 3.10 and 3. 11.  The rationale for 
these patterns is outlined below in the discussions of profits for each game. 
 Result 3.2.2:  Profits are greatest in SH, followed by BS, CH, and PD.  Profit is 
greatest in the game of Stag Hunt (1000th generation average profit of 3.21), followed by 
Battle of the Sexes (3.04), Chicken (2.62), and lastly, Prisoner’s Dilemma (1.54).  The 
differences in the profits are all statistically significant well beyond the 1 percent level (p-
values less than 0.0005) except for the difference between the top two, Stag Hunt and 
Battle of the Sexes.  Their difference is only significant at the 10 percent level (p-value 
0.058). 
 Profit is simply score (or payoff) minus cost.  Profit differences are driven by 
similar rankings and significance of differences with scores and nearly no difference in 
costs (see Table 3.6).  The cognitive cost measures are nearly the same in all four single 
game settings.  The only statistically significant (5 percent level) differences in cost are 
between the highest cost (in Chicken) and the two lowest costs (Battle of the Sexes and 
Stag Hunt); all other differences in costs are not statistically different.  However, since 
the costs only range from 0.46 to 0.50, the small magnitude of any difference in cost is 
largely negligible. 
Result 3.2.3:  Profits in Prisoner’s Dilemma reveal that cognitive costs not only 
directly impact profit, but also indirectly impact it by making it more difficult for the 
automata to reach the cooperative outcome.  Cognitive costs push play in Prisoner’s 
Dilemma to the Pareto dominated Nash equilibrium where both players get a payoff of 2 
(the top left cell, see payoff matrix in Table 3.1).  Table 3.10.a reveals this result 
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strikingly by showing the distribution of payoff matrix outcomes for the 1000th 
generation.  Nearly every round (97.1 percent) play results in the Nash equilibrium 
supported by the natural action 0.  The top left graph in Figure 3.4 supports this by 
showing the distribution of scores.   
Interestingly, without cognitive costs, strategies are more successful in escaping 
the Nash equilibrium trap: the mode outcome is the cooperative but dominated outcome 
as shown in Table 3.11.a.  Payoff efficiency in this setting is 54.4 percent compared to 
only 1.4 percent with costs.    
The costs force strategies to economize on the complexity of their automata; the 
mean number of states activated is 5.64 in the no cost setting but only 1.34 in the 
cognitive cost setting (see Table 3.6).  With the simpler automata structures, it seems too 
difficult to coordinate on the more cooperative outcome (in this game, when each player 
uses action 1).  For instance, in the cognitive cost setting, the action 0 usage frequency is 
0.988.  Given this value, if both row and column players use this value as a mixed 
strategy, then the player’s expected score would be 2.01.13
The other three games do not exhibit this feature; in these games, the actual scores 
achieved are much greater than the expected scores.  In settings with costs: (actual score) 
3.51 > 2.52 (expected score) in Battle of the Sexes, 3.13 > 2.38 in Chicken, and 3.67 > 
3.41 in Stag Hunt.  There are similar differences in the settings without costs.  In these 
  This is about the same as the 
actual average score in this game, 2.02.  Thus players do not seem to be using their 
strategies to coordinating their actions since their performance is no better than random.  
A similar effect occurred in the no cost setting—the expected score of a mixed strategy 
playing the natural strategy action 0 with (observed average) probability 0.452 would be 
2.55, and the actual score is 2.53. 
                                                 
13 The mixed strategy with Pr(action 0) = 0.988 in Prisoner’s Dilemma yields E[score] = 
(0.988)2(2) + (0.988)(1 – 0.988)(4) + (1 – 0.988)(0.988)(1) + (1 – 0.988)2(3) = 2.01. 
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three games, automata are able to reach some degree of coordination to lift their payoffs 
above those that would result from random play (further evidence is presented below in 
the discussion of these games).  In Prisoner’s Dilemma, however, its single, dominant-
strategy Nash equilibrium appears to prevent such coordination in the cost setting. 
Result 3.2.4:  Stag Hunt profits are indirectly worsened by the pressures of 
cognitive costs that lower mean score from 3.98 to 3.67.  Play evolves in Stag Hunt 
settings to the one of the two Nash equilibria in over 99 percent of the rounds.  The 
cooperative, payoff dominant Nash equilibrium where both players get their greatest 
payoff of 4 occurs most commonly, in 83.6 percent of rounds, and the risk dominant 
outcome where both players get a payoff of 2 occurs in 15.9 percent of the rounds (see 
Table 3.10.b), giving a payoff efficiency of 83.6 percent.  The second row of panels in 
Figure 3.4 shows this information in slightly different manner by showing the distribution 
of scores.  In the no cost environment, payoff dominant equilibrium occurs in over 99 
percent of rounds in the last generation, leading to a payoff efficiency of 99.3 percent.  
When there are cognitive costs, evolutionary paths that initially lead to the Pareto inferior 
Nash equilibrium are more likely to get stuck there since it is costly to have a complex 
strategy that could more readily move away from this Nash equilibrium to the other that 
has the higher payoff. 
Again, the presence of the cognitive costs created some coordination difficulties 
for the strategies, even in this relatively simply game that Rapoport, et al. (1976) classify 
as game of no conflict.  Strategy complexity again helps to explain the complication.  The 
average number states activated falls from 3.59 in the no cost setting to 1.32 in the 
cognitive costs setting (Table 3.6).  A greater presence of terminal states also point to less 
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complex strategies.  The percent of terminal states jumps from 3 percent to 75 percent 
when going from no cost to cognitive cost environments14
Result 3.2.5:  Profits in Chicken and Battle of the Sexes follow similar patterns 
resulting from strategies coordinating on one of the equilibria in 97.6 percent and 99.5 
percent of rounds, respectively.  These two games are very similar in nature—their paired 
dissimilarity score of 1 means that in the RGG taxonomy they have the same phylum, 




.  Additionally, the taxonomy classifies both as unstable.  So it is 
not surprising that the distributions of outcomes in these two games have a similar 
pattern: for the cognitive cost case, nearly all of the runs at one of the two Nash equilibria 
(see Tables 3. .c and 3.10.d).  They also have similar, near-maximal payoff efficiencies.   
Another similarity is the tendency to play the cooperative action.  When facing 
cognitive costs in CH, action 0 is played in 44.4 percent of rounds, and in BS, action 1 is 
played in 48.0 percent of rounds.  There is no significant difference between these two 
values (two-tailed p-value 0.58). 
What is remarkable, however, is the efficiency of coordinating on a Nash 
equilibrium, especially in the Battle of the Sexes.  For both games, players’ actions result 
in one or the other equilibria in nearly all rounds (97.6 percent for Chicken and 99.5 
percent for Battle of the Sexes).  Indeed, the players’ average scores in both of these 
games—regardless of cost situation—are very close to the Pareto optimal scores.  In 
Chicken, the best score that players’ could jointly achieve is 3, either by alternating 
between the two equilibrium payoffs of 2 and 4 or by coordinating on the upper right 
outcome.  The (row) player’s average score is 3.13 in the cognitive cost situation and 
                                                 
14 These are actually percentages of accessible states that are terminal, meaning both 
transitions out of the state directly back to itself. 
15 Chicken and Battle of the Sexes do differ slightly in genus in that the former exhibits 
“competitive pressure” while the latter does not.  However, this pressure is ignored with 
automated agents that are presumed to lack motives.  See Table 2.1 in Chapter 2. 
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2.96 without costs.  Here, out of 100 independent runs, In Battle of the Sexes, the Pareto 
best average score is 3.5, achieved by alternating between the two equilibrium payoffs of 
3 and 4.  The (row) player’s average score in this game is 3.51 with costs and 3.47 
without costs (see Tables 3.6 and 3.7). 
The appendix provides graphs that depict the evolution of all of the statistics for 
one-game environments. 
Result Group 3.3 – Two-Game Environment Results 
Unless otherwise noted below, the results in this section pertain to environments 
in which automata simultaneously play two games in the presence of cognitive costs. 
Result 3.3.1:  Game pairings affect strategy performance and structure.  
Sometimes in a two-game setting the automata employ distinctive sub-automaton 
strategies for each of the two games, and other times they employ a similar sub-
automaton strategy for both games.  Chicken and Battle of the Sexes have the lowest 
dissimilarity value of 1 (Table 3.3), and so one may expect these two games to be played 
quite comparable manner; in fact, they are.  The dissimilarity value of 13 between 
Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt may suggest, then, that these two games would be 
played in quite different manners, but they are not.  The dissimilarity score based on the 
Rapoport, et al. (1976) taxonomy, it turns out, does not well predict how alike two games 
will be played in multiple game environments.  Instead, one can measure directly how the 
automaton played the two games. 
Automaton-level state activation similarity (ALSAS) is a performance statistic 
that measures how similarly an automaton strategy plays two different games.  State 
activation similarity for a single state of an automaton is measured as the standard 
deviation of its activation rate (the percent of rounds during which the agent activated the 
state) across all different types of games played.  The ALSAS for the automaton as a 
whole is the mean of its states’ activation similarities (see Chapter 2 for details).  The 
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lower the ALSAS, the more similarly the automaton plays two games.16
16
  ALSAS in the 
two-game environments are (in order from most to least similar): {CH, BS}, {PD, SH}, 
{PD, CH}, {SH, CH}, {PD, BS}, and {SH, BS}; the ALSAS values along with other 
data described below and presented in Table 3. .   The {Chicken, Battle of the Sexes} 
setting does indeed have a very low ALSAS (5.4), confirming that when an automaton 
plays these two taxonomy-similar games, it activates its states in very similar proportions.  
Surprisingly, at least from the high taxonomy dissimilarity score, is that {Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, Stag Hunt} also has a low ALSAS.  This discrepancy, though, is well 
explained by automata’s tendencies to play action 0 with high frequency in both of these 
games as explained above in the single-game results.  The other four two-game settings 
have increasingly greater ALSAS measures, indicating that automata are playing the two 
games in increasingly distinct manners. 
This trend in ALSAS measures is matched by the outcome distribution similarity 
of both games in a set.   Consider, for example, the distributions of outcomes in the 
{Chicken, Battle of the Sexes} environment.  Here, the (0, 0) or (Up, Left) outcome 
occurred with frequency 1.3 percent in Chicken and 0.2 percent in Battle of the Sexes.  
The absolute value of the difference is 1.1 percent.  Likewise, the absolute values of the 
difference in frequencies for the other three outcomes are 1.0 percent, 2.0 percent, and 
0.0 percent.  Summing these absolute differences for all four outcomes and dividing by 
four results in a mean absolute outcome distribution difference (AODD) of 1.0 
percentage points—on average, the percentage of rounds each outcome occurs is only 1.0 
percentage point different in Chicken than in Battle of the Sexes.  Table 3.16 shows that 
                                                 
16 The ALSAS measure has a potential shortcoming.  The limitation of the ALSAS 
measure relates to isomorphic equivalences of different automaton strategies.  For 
example, if the numbering of an automaton’s states is altered but so too are its transitions 
to reflect the new numbering, then the new automaton is functionally identical to its 
original configuration.  The ALSAS statistic would fail to recognize the equivalence. 
117 
AODD for the other five two-game sets as well; these follow in the same order as the 
ALSAS measures.  The ALSAS measures how similarly an automaton uses its states 
when playing both games, and the AODD measures how similar an automaton reaches 
outcomes when playing both games.  Since the game sets follow the same order in both 
measures, these measures taken together reinforce the finding that some games are played 
similarly and other are not. 
A third statistic—distinct initial states (DIS)—less stringently supports the same 
finding.  An automaton will either have one or two DIS; if the initialization function θ(·) 
assigns the same state for both games, then DIS is 1, otherwise it is 2.  Across the 
population of thirty automata (and one hundred independent runs), then, the DIS will take 
on a value in the range [1, 2] for any two-game environment. Table 3.16 also lists the DIS 
for each two-game set.  Again, DIS follows the same ordering as ALSAS and AODD.17
Given the evidence, then, that automata play Chicken and Battle of the Sexes in 
nearly the same way in the {CH, BS} setting, and interesting result that contrasts emerges 
when one compares the degree of similarity of how automata play Chicken in {PD, CH} 
setting and Battle of the Sexes in the {PD, BS} setting.  At first thought, one may 
conclude that since Chicken and Battle of the Sexes are played alike, and in these two 
settings they are matched with the same game, Prisoner’s Dilemma, that Chicken and 
Battle of the Sexes will continue to be played alike.  This is not the case.  The mean 
absolute outcome distribution difference between Chicken in {PD, CH} and Battle of the 
Sexes in {PD, BS} is 9.8 percentage points,
 
18
                                                 
17 This is true after accounting for the fact that not all DIS are statistically distinct from 
each other; see note that accompanies Table 3.
 which is greater than the 1.0 percentage 
point difference between the two games in the {CH, BS} environment.  The main reason 
for the increase in the AODD measure when these games are paired with Prisoner’s 
16. 
18 9.8 = (|28.3 – 9.2| + |34.7 – 41.5| + |36.3 – 49.0| + |0.7 – 0.3|)/4 
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Dilemma is the difference in the frequency of action 0 play and the resulting likelihood of 
the (0, 0) outcome.  When Chicken is played within {PD, CH}, the (0, 0) outcome occurs 
in 28.3 percent of rounds, an increase of 27.0 percentage points from the {CH, BS} 
setting.  When Battle of the Sexes is played within {PD, BS}, the (0, 0) outcome occurs 
in 9.2 percent of rounds, an increase of only 8.9 percentage points. 
This difference in the jump in the (0, 0) outcome between Chicken and Battle of 
the Sexes is explained by considering the payoff for that outcome in each game.  In 
Chicken, both players receive 3 at the (0, 0) outcome, and this is equivalent to the mean 
payoff of the two Nash equilibria—there is no drop in payoff when switching for a mean 
of the two equilibria and the (0, 0) outcome.  The same is not true for Battle of the Sexes 
in which there is a drop: the mean of the two equilibria is 3.5, while the (0, 0) outcome 
only pays 2.  Accordingly, in Battle of the Sexes, the higher score received by avoiding 
the (0, 0) outcome justifies an investment in a more complex strategy that can play this 
game distinctly how it plays Prisoner’s Dilemma.  A more complex strategy will mean a 
greater cognitive cost burden.  Cost in the {PD, BS} setting is 0.514, and in the {PD, 
CH} setting it is only 0.466 (see Table 3.8); the difference between these two values is 
significantly different from zero (p-value 0.025).  The greater scores incurred when 
playing Battle of the Sexes distinctly in Prisoner’s Dilemma in {PD, BS} justifies the 
added cost; in {PD, CH}, there is no score advantage to playing it distinctly from 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, and so a more complex (and costly) strategy is not justified. 
Automata in {PD, BS} environments are more complex than those in {PD, CH} 
environments and incur higher costs.  Cost is based on accessible states in all games; the 
{PD, BS} setting has a greater percentage of accessible states (14 percent) than the {PD, 
CH} setting (12 percent, p-value for difference is 0.008).  Another structural statistic that 
correlates to complexity is the percentage of terminal states; the more terminal states, the 
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simpler the structure.  Battle of the Sexes with {PD, BS} has 41 percent terminal states19
Result 3.3.2:  Game pairings most greatly affect strategies’ scores in Stag Hunt.  
The average score that an automaton earns when playing a particular game depends to 
some degree on which other game it is paired in the environment.  Here, scores, and not 
profits, must be considered because an automaton’s profit cannot be calculated for each 
individual game.
, 
and Chicken within {PD, CH} has 54 percent (the difference between these two values 
being non-zero has a p-value of 0.060).  Thus, by several measures, the automaton 
strategies in {PD, BS} environments are more complex than those in {PD, CH} 
environments.  The added complexity, and corresponding added cost, is worth is for 
automata in {PD, BS} settings to avoid playing Battle of the Sexes like Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (with a high frequency of action 0) which would result in subpar payoffs. 
20 8  The second column of data in Table 3.  lists the average scores that 
the thirty automata receive for each game by pairing (averaged over the one hundred 
independent runs). 
As a first comparison of how pairings matter, consider the standard deviation of 
the scores in a particular game across the three different pairs in which it is a member.  
For instance, average score in Stag Hunt when paired with Prisoner’s Dilemma was 3.99, 
when paired with Chicken it was 3.41, and when paired with Battle of the Sexes it was 
3.73.  The standard deviation of these three scores is 0.294.  Likewise, the score standard 
deviation for Battle of the Sexes, Chicken, and Prisoner’s Dilemma were 0.088, 0.067, 
and 0.054, respectively.  Even with only two degrees of freedom in each sample, F-tests 
show that the there are significant difference (at the 10 percent level) between the score 
                                                 
19 These figures are actually the percentage of accessible states that are terminal states, 
not the percentage of all states that are terminal states. 
20 Costs are determined by the proportion of accessible sates in all games, which is not 
calculated on a per game basis. 
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variance within Stag Hunt and the score variances within Prisoner’s Dilemma (F-test 
value 0.0664) and also between Stag Hunt and Chicken (F-test value 0.0978).  Figure 3.6 
depicts for each game a graph that captures the spread of its scores.  All four graphs in 
the figure have the same range on the score axis—the maximum and minimum score 
shown all differ by 1.0—to make visual comparisons between graphs meaningful.  
Clearly, Stag Hunt’s scores it its three pairings have the widest spread.  The gap in 
maximum scores in SH is 0.58, while in the other games gaps are 0.08 (PD), 0.10 (CH), 
and 0.16 (BS). 
Differences between the mean Stag Hunt scores cited in the paragraph above are 
all significant at the 1% level (Table 3.17).  The scores in Stag Hunt when it is paired 
with Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken are also statistically distinct from scores in a single 
game Stag Hunt setting (at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively).  A reason 
why there are drastic differences in automata score performance in Stag Hunt may be due 
to its very simple nature—recall that the entropy measure for this game is the fairly low 
value 0.68 in the cognitive cost setting (and 0.07 with no costs).  As a game of no 
conflict, both players receive their greatest payoff at the same outcome when both play 
the natural strategy action 0.  So even though it does have a second Nash equilibrium, it 
is fairly easy for automata to evolve to usually play action 0.  In the single game Stag 
Hunt environment, they do just that: in 83.6 percent of all rounds, the resulting outcome 
is the payoff dominant Nash equilibrium that occurs when both players use the action 0.  
However, when an automaton also must play a second game, the strategic situation is no 
longer so simple; the presence of the second game can enhance or inhibit a strategy’s 
effectiveness. 
Result 3.3.3: Pairing Prisoner’s Dilemma with Stag Hunt creates a strategic 
complementarity that increases scores in both games relative to the single-game 
environments.  In some cases, the strategic nature of each game in the environment may 
correlate to improve performance in one or both games.  Such is the case with the 
121 
{Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt} environment.  The scores in this environment are 2.05 
for Prisoner’s Dilemma and 3.99 for Stag Hunt (see Table 3.8), for an average of 3.02.   
In single game environments, the scores are 2.02 for Prisoner’s Dilemma and 3.67 for 
Stag Hunt (see Table 3.6), for an average of 2.85—all less than in the two-game {PD, 
SH} setting.  This difference in scores between Stag Hunt when paired with Prisoner’s 
Dilemma and when Stag Hunt is played by itself is significant at the 1 percent level (see 
Table 3.17).  So too is the difference between the average of the two scores in the two-
game environment and the average of the two one-game environment scores (t-statistic of 
-4.66, see Figure 3.7).  The difference in scores between Prisoner’s Dilemma when paired 
with Stag Hunt and when Prisoner’s Dilemma is played by itself is even fairly significant 
(p-value of 0.120), though not large in magnitude (an improvement to the score of only 
0.03). 
A comparison of the single game outcome distributions in Table 3.10.a and 3.10.b 
to those for the {Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt} setting in Table 3.12.a illustrates why 
the scores are greater in the two-game setting.  For scores in Prisoner’s Dilemma, the 
occurrence of the (0, 0) Nash equilibrium outcome (where both players receive payoff 2) 
drops from 97.1 percent to 91.4 percent.  The other three outcomes pick up the extra 5.7 
percentage of outcomes in roughly even proportions, for which the average payoff is 3; 
thus score rises modestly.  At the same time, payoff efficiency increases somewhat from 
1.45 percent to 5.51 percent.  Stag Hunt’s presence causes strategies to use natural action 
0 less frequently in Prisoner’s Dilemma, improving scores in that game as it uses a more 
cooperative strategy. 
Conversely, Prisoner’s Dilemma presence causes strategies to use natural strategy 
action 0 more frequently in Stag Hunt (compared to the single-game Stag Hunt setting), 
also improving scores in that game.  For automata playing Stag Hunt, the complication of 
also having to play Prisoner’s Dilemma improves scores outcomes in Stag Hunt because 
it increases the frequency that the natural action 0 is played from 83.9 to 99.8 percent.  
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There is a much smaller chance that the strategy will evolve to play the Pareto inferior, 
risk dominant Nash equilibrium.  This bears out in the in the outcome distributions: in the 
two-game setting with Prisoner’s Dilemma, play in Stag Hunt ends in the payoff 
dominant equilibrium 99.6 percent of rounds and in the risk dominant equilibrium in 0.0 
percent of rounds. These frequencies starkly contrast with those from the solo Stag Hunt 
setting (83.6 percent for payoff dominant equilibrium and 15.9 percent for risk dominant 
equilibrium).  Payoff efficiencies rise from 83.59 percent in the single-game SH setting to 
99.6 percent when SH is played as part of the {PD, SH} game ensemble. 
Stag Hunt has enough complexity (due to the second Nash equilibrium) that when 
cognitive resources must be expended to play, a player may get trapped in a suboptimal 
strategy.  Pairing this game with Prisoner’s Dilemma creates a positive strategic coupling 
and improves performance in at least one and possibly both games.  In Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, the dominant strategy Nash equilibrium pulls play toward action 0, which 
improves performance in Stag Hunt.   
Investigating a multiple game environment with these strategic complementarities 
serves as a tangible way to model corporate “synergies.”  This term, which has been in 
vogue in the corporate world for some time, is defined by The Oxford English Dictionary 
as “increased effectiveness, achievement, etc., produced as a result of combined action or 
co-operation.”   This realization creates several applications for the use of multiple game 
models, from teamwork models in management to merger and acquisition models to 
industrial organization. 
Result 3.3.4:  Pairing Stag Hunt with Chicken creates a negative strategic 
coupling that decreases scores in both games relative to the single-game environments.  
In other cases, the strategic nature of each game in the environment may correlate to 
degrade performance in one or both games.  This is the case with the {Stag Hunt, 
Chicken} environment.  Payoff efficiencies fall in both games in the ensemble relative to 
the single-game settings: for SH, from 83.6 percent to 69.6 percent, and for CH, from 
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99.7 percent to 97.2 percent.  This two-game setting also produces distinct differences in 
scores from the single-game settings.  The scores in the coupled environment are 3.41 for 
Stag Hunt and 2.90 for Chicken (see Table 3.8), for an average of 3.15.   In single game 
environments, the scores are 3.67 for Stag Hunt and 3.13 for Chicken (see Table 3.6), for 
an average of 3.40—all greater than in the two-game {SH, CH} setting.  This difference 
in scores between Stag Hunt when paired with Chicken and scores when Stag Hunt is 
played by itself is significant at the 5 percent level (see Table 3.17 and Figure 3.6).  Also 
significant at the 10 percent level is the difference in scores between Chicken when 
paired with Stag Hunt and scores when Chicken is played by itself.  Likewise, the 
difference between the average of the two scores in the two-game environment and the 
average of the two one-game environment scores is significant at the 1 percent level (t-
statistic of -2.75, see Figure 3.7). 
Why is it that pairing the Stag Hunt and Chicken games into the same strategic 
environment hampers automata’s ability to score as well?  In the pairing of Prisoner’s 
Dilemma and Stag Hunt, the presence of PD helped strategies play the natural action (0) 
in SH more often, and so play in paired Stag Hunt avoided the inferior equilibrium more 
often.  In the pairing of Stag Hunt with Chicken, by contrast, the presence of each game 
pushes the other to play the natural action 0 at an inefficient level.  Looking at one-game 
environment results in Table 3.6, automata play action 0 relatively often in Stag Hunt 
(frequency of 0.84) and play it relatively seldom in Chicken (0.44).  When paired, 
Chicken’s presence decreases the frequency the natural action 0 is played in Stag Hunt to 
0.73, while Stag Hunt’s presence increases the frequency the natural action 0 is played in 
Chicken to 0.64 (see Table 3.8).  Each game is inhibiting optimal play in the other.  
The effect of these different rates of playing action 0 in the paired environment as 
compared to the individual game environments is reflected in the outcome distributions 
of Table 3.12.d.  When paired with Chicken, play in Stag Hunt ends in the risk 
dominant/Pareto inferior Nash equilibrium 22.6 percent of the time, up from the 15.9 
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percent from the Stag Hunt only setting (Table 3.10.b).  Additionally, a total of 7.8 
percent of rounds end at one of the two non-equilibrium outcomes that are least efficient 
in terms of payoffs (with an average of 1.5); this frequency, too, is greater than the 
comparable 0.5 percent for the Stag Hunt single game setting. 
Stag Hunt’s presence also has significant influence on the distribution of payoff 
matrix outcomes in Chicken.  When played by itself, players in Chicken reach one of the 
two Nash equilibria in 97.6 percent of rounds (Table 3.10.d).  Once Stag Hunt is included 
in the mix, the figure drops to 71.5 percent (3.12.d).  Admittedly, the effect of this shift 
on score is minimal because most of the shift goes to the (0, 0) outcome cell at which 
both players receive a payoff of 3, the same as the average of the two equilibria.  More 
damaging to the player’s average score is the 12.4 percentage point shift to the (1, 1) 
outcome cell at which both players receive a payoff of 1; the increase is 2.5 percentage 
points. 
 
3.4. Results for the Cooperate/Defect Context 
This section considers an alternative, and albeit more common in the literature, 
interpretation of actions available to the players.  Here, a player’s actions are viewed as 
other-regarding (cooperate, denoted by “C”) or as self-regarding (defect, denoted by 
“D”).  Table 3.2 presents the payoffs and features for the three games under these new 
action connotations, PD#, SH#, and CH#.  BS is excluded in this section because it lacks 
clear associations of its actions with these contexts.  With these payoff matrices, now 
action 0 corresponds always to action C.  Note that the only new configuration is for 
Prisoner’s Dilemma; SH# and CH# are identical to SH and CH from Section 3.3.  Within 
the motivating story for each of these three games, C and D take on even more specific 
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meanings, though the other-regarding and self-regarding interpretations will suffice for 
the analysis that follows.21
The purpose of these computer experiments under the alternative contexts is two-
fold.  First, these will be a robustness check on the results presented in section 3.3.  The 
expectation is that the game ensembles involving PD# will have distinctly different results 
than those involving PD.  This anticipated distinction leads to the second reason for these 
further experiments: to gain an initial understanding of how and why context matters.  In 
multiple game settings, there may not always, or even often, be a common action context 
to apply across games; this complication becomes more likely as the size of the game 
ensemble grows. 
 
Other than the modified payoff matrix for Prisoner’s Dilemma, the remainder of 
the experimental design is the same as presented in section 3.2.  The additional trials for 
the computer experiment are detailed in the right-hand side of Table 3.4. 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is the only game to change between the 0/1 action context 
and the C/D action context.  In a single-game environment, the context or labeling of the 
actions is trivial; because the PD# game is an isomorphism of PD, strategy performance 
and structure should be the same after evolving in either game.  A comparison of the 
statistics in from the 0/1 contexts in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 to those from the C/D contexts in 
Tables 3.18 and 3.19 bears this out (for cognitive cost and no cost settings, respectively).  
The only differences in the statistics stem from the relabeling of the actions: action 0 in 
the original experiments was the defect action, and in this alternative context, action 0 is 
the cooperative action.  So, the action 0 usage frequency of 99 percent in the original 
cognitive cost setting means the cooperative action 1 was used in 1 percent of rounds, and 
                                                 
21 In PD#, action C ~ “confess” and action D ~ “don’t confess;” in SH#, action C ~ “high 
effort” and action D ~ “low effort;” and in CH#, action C ~ “swerve” and action D ~ 
“straight.” 
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this is consistent with the action C usage frequency of 1 percent in the alternative C/D 
context experiment.  Similarly, in the no cost setting, action 0 (D) usage frequency of 45 
percent in the original context is consistent with the action C usage frequency of 55 
percent in the alternative C/D context.  Likewise, outcome distributions for the single-
game PD# settings are very similar in those for the PD settings: compare the 0/1 context 
Tables 3.10.a and 3.11.a to the C/D context Tables 3.22.a and 3.23.a.22
Result Group 3.4 – Two-Game Environment Results for C/D Context 
 
 More interesting are the two-game setting results where context does matter.  
Unless otherwise noted below, these results pertain to environments in which automata 
simultaneously play two games in the presence of cognitive costs under the alternative 
C/D context. 
Result 3.4.1:  Action contexts affect strategy performance and structure.  The 
switch in context from the natural outcome paradigm (in which action 0 in every game 
that leads to its natural outcome) to the other- and self-regarding paradigm essentially 
transposes the payoffs in PD to those in PD#.  In PD, strategies evolve to play the natural 
action 0 (that corresponds to defect) with high frequency—99 percent when played in 
isolation (Table 3.6), 95 percent when paired with SH, and 79 percent when paired with 
CH (see Table 3.8).   Now that the Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix is transposed in the 
C/D context, one would expect action D to continue to be used with high frequency, and 
it is: in the solo PD# setting with costs, it continues to be used in 99 percent of rounds 
(Table 3.18).  Accordingly, the game ensembles {PD#, SH#} and {PD#, CH#} induce 
                                                 
22 The outcome distribution tables for SH (3.10.b and 3.11.b) are identical to those for 
SH# (3.22.b and 3.23.b)—they aggregate the same data—as are the outcome distribution 
tables for CH (3.10.c and 3.11.c) and CH# (3.22.c and 3.23.c).  Likewise, the rows for 
SH# and CH# in Tables 3.18 and 3.19 present the same data as the SH and CH rows in 
Tables 3.6 and 3.7.  The data are repeated to ease comparisons within the C/D context.  
The two-game setting statistics and outcome distribution tables for the C/D context 
(Tables 3.20, 3.21, 3.24, and 3.25) also repeat the data for {SH, CH} as {SH#, CH#}. 
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quite different results for several statistics.  Tables 3.20 (cognitive costs) and 3.21 (no 
costs) present the automata population means for the performance and structural 
statistics.  A comparison against their counterpart tables from the natural outcome context 
(3.8 and 3.9) reveals many distinctions.  Table 3.26 evaluates these differences by 
presenting the two-tailed t-statistics that the difference between a given statistic in the 
natural outcome context and the same statistic in the cooperate/defect context is non-
zero.23
The first result that stands out—as expected—is the extremely significant 
differences for all of the action 0 / action C related statistics: actual action 0/C usage 
frequency, states that play action 0/C, initial states that play this action, and states that 
reciprocate this action.  Because the change of contexts implies lower payoffs for 0/C in 
PD# than in PD as this becomes the dominated action, action 0/C is used less in the new 
context than the original (as indicated by the positive t-statistics).  This effect spills over 
into the tandem games as well: both SH# and CH# in the PD# ensembles show lower 
potential and actual usage of action 0/C as compared to the natural outcome contexts. 
 
Because PD# pushes action D, there are now vastly fewer states that play action C, 
and so the number of states that reciprocate action C (0) drops dramatically.  Similar 
reasoning explains why the number of D-reciprocating states rises (indicated by positive 
t-statistics) just as dramatically as the context switches from 0/1 to C/D actions.  The 
most interesting of the other significant differences found in Table 3.26 apply to specific 
game settings are discussed separately below.    
                                                 
23 The payoff matrix for Stag Hunt is the same under either context; the same is true of 
Chicken.  The statistics for SH#, CH#, and {SH#, CH#} in are the same Tables 3.22, 23, 
24, and 25 are the same as in natural outcome context tables (indeed, the data come from 
the same computer experiments)—the data is repeated to aid comparisons within the C/D 
context.  To avoid triviality, these games are not included in Table 3.26. 
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Result 3.4.2:  The strategic complementarity between Prisoner’s Dilemma with 
Stag Hunt under the natural outcome context (Result 3.3.3) unravels under the cooperate 
/ defect context.  First, note that the joint profit is 2.55 in {PD, SH}, and that is 
significantly higher than the 1.98 in {PD#, SH#} (two-tailed p-value of 0.000).  Costs are 
nearly identical in the two paradigms (accessible states in all games, upon which costs are 
based, are very close—12.2 percent and 12.8 percent).  So, the distinction in profit 
originates in score (payoff) differences, but asymmetrically. 
Scores in PD# are actually higher than in PD (2.17 v. 2.05, p-value for non-zero 
difference is 0.051).  In {PD, SH}, action 0 was the natural action in both games.  In SH, 
this action leads to the greatest payoff outcome (4, 4) for both players, and as their 
strategies develop to play it with high frequency, it supports the selection of the natural 
outcome with payoffs of (2, 2) in PD, the dominant strategy equilibrium.  Now in {PD#, 
SH#}, the same cooperative action in SH# pushes play in PD# away from the dominant 
strategy equilibrium and towards the Pareto superior (3, 3) outcome.  Compare Table 
3.12.a to 3.24.a: in Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Pareto superior outcome’s occurrence 
increases from 2.5 percent to 11.8 percent as the context of the “up” action changes from 
0 to C.  Payoff efficiency improves from 5.5 percent to 16.6 percent. 
Thus, in the natural outcome context, SH’s presence hampers’ players ability to 
escape the Pareto inferior Nash equilibrium, but just the opposite is true in the cooperate / 
defect context where SH# presences improves outcomes in PD#.  This modest 
improvement in score from 2.05 to 2.17 going from PD to PD#, however, is dwarfed by 
the much larger drop in score from 3.99 to 2.75 going from SH to SH#.  In the change of 
contexts from 0/1 to C/D, payoff efficiency in Stag Hunt falls from 99.6 percent to 37.6 
percent.  The tendency for strategies to evolve to play action D with high frequency in 
PD# now spills over in SH# as a much greater likelihood to reach the Pareto inferior, risk-
dominant equilibrium, now reached in a majority of rounds (60.9 percent). 
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One last item to note about the {Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt} setting under the 
two different contexts.  Under the natural outcome context, as action 0 is the “natural” 
strategy is both games, one would expect automata to be more likely to economize on the 
number of accessible states by having a common initial state than under the cooperate / 
defect context.  This expectation is confirmed in Table 3.26 by the negative t-statistic for 
number of distinct initial states (p-value 0.98): mean number of distinct initial states in 
the natural outcome is 1.41 and in the cooperate / defect context is 1.53.  An automaton 
strategy is more likely to start each game with a distinct mental subroutine. 
 
3.5. Remarks 
This model of multiple game settings combines a conceptually simple game 
construct with a rich set of performance and structure statistics.  It is an important 
contribution to our ability to evaluate and understand common strategic situations that 
involve agents multitasking.  It also is useful for investigating potential synergies that do 
or do not arise as firms or other entities seek to take advantage of economies of scope. 
In particular, this paper convinces that cognitive costs do affect performance of 
strategies and thus adaptation over time.  The results of the model show that multiple 
game environments are in some cases very different from single game ones.  Strategic 
complementarities can arise, such as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt pairing, 
where the presence of the second game creates a synergy that improves performance.  
Sometimes, the coupling effects are negative, like the Stag Hunt and Chicken pairing.   In 
other cases, and multiple game nature of the environment makes little difference, like in 
the Stag Hunt and Battle of the Sexes coupling.  This model can be used to investigate 
which of these situations would arise in other strategic environments. 
This paper also establishes that context of actions is critically important when 
modeling multiple game environments.  If common mental subroutines (proxied here by 
states) are to be applied across different strategic settings, one must think carefully about 
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what “common” means—the answer to that question has significant implications for 
strategy structure and performance.  It does not seem to require a one-size-fits-all answer, 
either.  The characteristics of the real world phenomena the modeler is investigating may 
dictate the appropriate context in which to frame the agents’ actions. 
Extensions 
Some further steps toward that theory would extend this model to new 
experiments, both on the computer and in the laboratory.  An obvious supplement would 
be to search for more strategic complements and substitutes among broader class of 
games. 
As noted in Section 3.2, the current experiments interpreted simultaneous play to 
mean that an agent played multiple games in sequence—one complete game and then 
another—before the model updated its pool of strategies.  Simultaneity here means that 
an unchanged set of automata played each game. 
Agents could play multiple games in a different fashion.  Instead of playing each 
of g  games separately for r rounds, strategies could play g *r rounds where the game 
played each round varies either deterministically (as in Güth 2000b) or stochastically.  
Conceivably, there are cases where this would be the more realistic model.  It implies that 
an agent’s next action in one repeated game depends on its opponent’s current action in a 
different game.  This interpretation of simultaneity may lead to different conclusions. 
Another natural extension of this model is to replicate the experiment in the 
laboratory with human subjects along the lines of Bednar et al. (2010).  One could relax 
the strict assumptions placed on strategic form and modify or eliminate the automaton 
nature of strategies.  Lab experiments would provide further insights to the development 
of a general theory that computer simulations alone cannot produce. 
Perhaps the most interesting direction for further research suggested by this paper, 
though, deals with the issue of context.  A study designed specifically to investigate the 
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Table 3.1.  Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Chicken, and Battle of the Sexes 
in the natural outcome context. 
For all four games, action 0 corresponds to the natural strategy  
consistent with the Rapoport, Guyer, and Gordon (1976) taxonomy. 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)  Stag Hunt (SH) 
 RGG #12    RGG #61  
             0 1     0 1  
 0 2, 2 4, 1    0 4,4 1, 3  
 1 1, 4 3, 3    1 3, 1 2, 2  
           
           
           
Chicken (CH)  Battle of the Sexes (BS) 
 RGG #66    RGG #69  
             0 1     0 1  
 0 3, 3 2, 4    0 2, 2 4,3  
 1 4, 2 1, 1    1 3, 4 1, 1  
 
Legend 
Bold type indicates the natural outcome, the (0, 0) of each game24
Italic type indicates Pareto optimal outcomes 
 
            indicates a Nash equilibrium of the stage game 
 
 
Table 3.2.  Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt and Chicken in the cooperate/defect context. 
For all three games, action C corresponds to the cooperative or other-regarding strategy 
and action D corresponds to defecting or self-regarding strategy. 
 
Legend 
Italic type indicates Pareto optimal outcomes 
            indicates a Nash equilibrium of the stage game 
  
                                                 
24 See footnote 2. 
 PD#  SH#  CH# 
         
 C D  C D  C D 
C 3, 3 1, 4 C 4, 4 1, 3 C 3, 3 2, 4 
D 4, 1 2, 2 D 3, 1 2, 2 D 4, 2 1, 1 
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Table 3.3.  Dissimilarity measures between games under the natural outcome context. 
 
 PD SH CH BS 
PD 0 13 12 12 
SH 13 0 10 10 
CH 12 10 0 1 
BS 12 10 1 0 
 
 
Table 3.4.  Game and cost specification of experiment trials. 
Natural outcome context  Cooperate/defect context25
Cognitive Costs 
 
 No Costs  Cognitive Costs  No Costs 
Trial Game(s)  Played 
 Trial Game(s)  Played 
 Trial Game(s)   Played 
 Trial Game(s)   Played 
1 PD  11 PD  21 PD#  25 PD# 
2 SH  12 SH  2 SH#  12 SH# 
3 CH  13 CH  3 CH#  13 CH# 
4 BS  14 BS       
5 PD & SH  15 PD & SH  22 PD# & SH#  26 PD# & SH# 
6 PD & CH  16 PD & CH  23 PD# & CH#  27 PD# & CH# 
7 PD & BS  17 PD & BS       
8 SH & CH  18 SH & CH  8 SH# & CH#  18 SH# & CH# 
9 SH & BS  19 SH & BS       




                                                 
25 The payoffs for SH# and CH# are identical to SH and CH, so trials 2-3 and 12-13 also 
represent the single-game trials for SH# and CH#. 
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Table 3.5.  Key simulation parameters common to all trials.26
Type 
 





 runs 100 Independent runs per trial 
generations 1,000 Evolutionary generations per run 
popSize27 30  Automata in row and column populations 




rounds 160 Rounds per game 
noise 0 Probability opponent’s action is misreported. 
discount 1 Time discount factor 
matchType mean 
Each round, each row population 
automaton is matched against every 




costParA4 1 Use overall accessible states for cost 
costParB4 2 Cost increases quadraticly 





The first generation’s average profit is 










 millerCrossover false Use state-wise (as opposed to bit-wise) crossover. 
relativePerformance 2 factor in automaton fitness formula 
mutationRate27 0.005 Probability or mutation for each state’s action, transition to states. 
crossoverRate27 0.33333333 Proportion of the population to which crossover is applied. 
maxCrossoverLength27 15 Maximum number of states to swap in crossover operation. 
 
  
                                                 
26 See Appendix to Chapter 2 for detailed definitions of these parameters. 
27 Same parameter values for row and column populations. 
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Table 3.7.  Statistics in one-game, no cost settings for the natural outcome context. 

















































































































































PD 2.53 2.53 n/a 5.64 1.15 0.45 0.75 0.00 0.08 0.73 0.69 0.75 0.35 0.24 
SH 3.98 3.98 n/a 3.59 0.67 1.00 0.76 0.03 0.05 0.90 0.64 0.73 0.37 0.26 
CH 2.96 2.96 n/a 5.31 1.06 0.54 0.69 0.03 0.09 0.52 0.45 0.47 0.58 0.22 
BS 3.47 3.47 n/a 3.95 0.60 0.48 0.74 0.02 0.06 0.48 0.57 0.53 0.39 0.18 
Overall 
Mean 3.24 3.24 n/a 4.63 0.87 0.62 0.73 0.02 0.07 0.66 0.59 0.70 0.42 0.23 
Means for the 30 automata in row population in the 1000th generation, averaged over 100 
independent runs. 

















































































































































PD 1.54 2.02 0.48 1.34 0.24 0.99 0.09 0.68 0.15 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.01 0.01 
SH 3.21 3.67 0.46 1.32 0.17 0.84 0.09 0.75 0.12 0.78 0.80 0.81 0.20 0.04 
CH 2.62 3.13 0.50 1.36 0.27 0.44 0.09 0.68 0.14 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.61 0.06 
BS 3.04 3.51 0.47 1.25 0.22 0.52 0.08 0.78 0.11 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.48 0.05 
Overall 
Mean 2.60 3.08 0.48 1.32 0.22 0.70 0.09 0.72 0.13 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.33 0.04 
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Table 3.8.  Statistics in two-game, cognitive cost settings for the natural outcome context. 
Means for the 30 automata in the row population in the 1000th generation, averaged over 
100 independent runs. 































































































































































































































} PD in PD-SH n/a 2.05 n/a n/a 1.63 n/a 0.28 0.95 n/a n/a 0.12 0.43 0.22 0.94 0.96 0.98 0.05 0.05 
SH in 
PD-SH n/a 3.99 n/a n/a 1.61 n/a 0.31 1.00 n/a n/a 0.12 0.43 0.22 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.05 0.05 





} PD in PD-CH n/a 2.16 n/a n/a 1.52 n/a 0.21 0.79 n/a n/a 0.10 0.54 0.20 0.80 0.79 0.81 0.23 0.08 
CH in 
PD-CH n/a 3.00 n/a n/a 1.51 n/a 0.24 0.63 n/a n/a 0.11 0.54 0.19 0.53 0.61 0.64 0.40 0.08 





 PD in 
PD-BS n/a 2.08 n/a n/a 1.65 n/a 0.31 0.84 n/a n/a 0.12 0.48 0.15 0.92 0.87 0.88 0.15 0.11 
BS in 
PD-BS n/a 3.32 n/a n/a 1.61 n/a 0.25 0.51 n/a n/a 0.13 0.41 0.16 0.56 0.65 0.67 0.28 0.10 





} SH in SH-CH n/a 3.41 n/a n/a 1.49 n/a 0.21 0.73 n/a n/a 0.13 0.35 0.18 0.64 0.54 0.58 0.52 0.21 
CH in 
SH-CH n/a 2.90 n/a n/a 1.66 n/a 0.24 0.64 n/a n/a 0.13 0.34 0.19 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.18 





 SH in 
SH-BS n/a 3.73 n/a n/a 1.71 n/a 0.28 0.88 n/a n/a 0.14 0.33 0.15 0.74 0.69 0.75 0.33 0.16 
BS in 
SH-BS n/a 3.48 n/a n/a 1.68 n/a 0.30 0.48 n/a n/a 0.15 0.35 0.14 0.51 0.59 0.64 0.38 0.14 





 CH in 
CH-BS n/a 3.02 n/a n/a 1.77 n/a 0.40 0.49 n/a n/a 0.13 0.36 0.23 0.44 0.47 0.49 0.55 0.08 
BS in 
CH-BS n/a 3.46 n/a n/a 1.78 n/a 0.37 0.47 n/a n/a 0.13 0.36 0.23 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.54 0.09 
Mean 2.76 3.24 0.48 1.98 1.78 5.42 0.38 0.48 1.48 0.13 0.13 0.36 0.23 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.55 0.09 
Overall 
Mean 2.55 3.05 0.50 2.09 1.64 32.5 0.28 0.70 1.57 0.14 0.12 0.41 0.19 0.67 0.68 0.70 0.33 0.11 
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Table 3.9.  Statistics in two-game, no cost settings for the natural outcome context. 
 


































































































































































































































PD-SH n/a 2.60 n/a n/a 5.14 n/a 1.11 0.40 n/a n/a 0.75 0.01 0.07 0.60 0.69 0.80 0.36 0.28 
SH in 
PD-SH n/a 3.99 n/a n/a 3.48 n/a 0.97 1.00 n/a n/a 0.74 0.03 0.07 0.80 0.71 0.81 0.33 0.26 





} PD in PD-CH n/a 2.47 n/a n/a 6.87 n/a 1.82 0.54 n/a n/a 0.70 0.03 0.08 0.67 0.60 0.67 0.41 0.27 
CH in 
PD-CH n/a 3.01 n/a n/a 7.17 n/a 1.77 0.58 n/a n/a 0.70 0.04 0.08 0.54 0.55 0.59 0.47 0.26 





 PD in 
PD-BS n/a 2.44 n/a n/a 5.11 n/a 1.02 0.56 n/a n/a 0.65 0.07 0.07 0.73 0.70 0.76 0.33 0.22 
BS in 
PD-BS n/a 3.45 n/a n/a 4.38 n/a 0.64 0.50 n/a n/a 0.73 0.02 0.07 0.55 0.64 0.68 0.38 0.23 





} SH in SH-CH n/a 3.98 n/a n/a 3.18 n/a 0.86 0.99 n/a n/a 0.76 0.02 0.05 0.84 0.58 0.65 0.48 0.30 
CH in 
SH-CH n/a 2.90 n/a n/a 5.78 n/a 1.65 0.77 n/a n/a 0.75 0.01 0.06 0.53 0.55 0.61 0.48 0.28 





 SH in 
SH-BS n/a 3.98 n/a n/a 3.35 n/a 0.57 0.99 n/a n/a 0.71 0.03 0.07 0.77 0.65 0.69 0.33 0.20 
BS in 
SH-BS n/a 3.49 n/a n/a 4.63 n/a 0.79 0.53 n/a n/a 0.73 0.03 0.06 0.53 0.64 0.68 0.34 0.20 





 CH in 
CH-BS n/a 2.93 n/a n/a 4.93 n/a 1.18 0.53 n/a n/a 0.65 0.05 0.08 0.51 0.47 0.45 0.52 0.15 
BS in 
CH-BS n/a 3.53 n/a n/a 4.48 n/a 0.91 0.55 n/a n/a 0.67 0.04 0.07 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.46 0.16 
Mean 3.23 3.23 n/a 6.78 4.70 33.1 1.05 0.54 1.95 0.73 0.66 0.04 0.08 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.16 
Overall 
Mean 3.23 3.23 n/a 7.49 4.87 62.7 1.11 0.66 1.96 0.77 0.71 0.03 0.07 0.63 0.61 0.66 0.41 0.23 
Means for the 30 automata in the row population in the 1000th generation, averaged over 
100 independent runs. 
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Table 3.10.  Outcome distributions in one-game, cognitive cost settings 




0 1 0 1
0 97.1% 1.7% 0 83.6% 0.3%
1 1.2% 0.0% 1 0.2% 15.9%
efficiency: 1.4% efficiency: 83.6%
entropy: 0.22 entropy: 0.68
0 1 0 1
0 2.2% 42.2% 0 0.3% 51.7%
1 55.4% 0.3% 1 47.8% 0.2%
efficiency: 99.7% efficiency: 99.7%
entropy: 1.14 entropy: 1.04
Row player Row player
Table 3.10.a. Table 3.10.b.






Row player Row player
Table 3.10.c. Table 3.10.d.







Distributions are from the 1000th generation. 
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Table 3.11.  Outcome distributions in one-game, no cost settings 




0 1 0 1
0 34.3% 10.9% 0 99.3% 0.3%
1 11.7% 43.1% 1 0.2% 0.2%
efficiency: 54.4% efficiency: 99.3%
entropy: 1.76 entropy: 0.07
0 1 0 1
0 11.0% 43.2% 0 0.3% 47.4%
1 43.7% 2.1% 1 52.2% 0.1%
efficiency: 97.9% efficiency: 99.7%
entropy: 1.51 entropy: 1.03
Column player
Row player Row player
Table 3.11.c. Table 3.11.d.




Row player Row player
Table 3.11.a. Table 3.11.b.








Distributions are from the 1000th generation. 
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Table 3.12.  Outcome distributions in two-game, cognitive cost settings 
for the natural outcome context. 
 
 
0 1 0 1
0 91.4% 3.1% 0 66.3% 12.9%
1 3.0% 2.5% 1 15.3% 5.5%
efficiency: 5.5% efficiency: 19.6%
entropy: 0.56 entropy: 1.42
0 1 0 1
0 99.6% 0.2% 0 28.3% 34.7%
1 0.2% 0.0% 1 36.3% 0.7%
efficiency: 99.6% efficiency: 99.3%
entropy: 0.04 entropy: 1.62
Table 3.12.a. Table 3.12.b.
Two-game set: {PD, SH} Two-game set: {PD, CH}
Outcomes in     
PD                
within {PD, SH}
Column player Outcomes in     
PD                
within {PD, CH}
Column player
Row        
Player
Row        
Player
Outcomes in     
SH                
within {PD, SH}
Column player Outcomes in     
CH                
within {PD, CH}
Column player
Row        
Player





Distributions are from the 1000th generation. 
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Table 3.12.  Outcome distributions in two-game, cognitive cost settings 
for the natural outcome context (continued). 
 
 
0 1 0 1
0 76.5% 7.7% 0 69.6% 3.1%
1 11.5% 4.3% 1 4.7% 22.6%
efficiency: 13.9% efficiency: 69.6%
entropy: 1.13 entropy: 1.21
0 1 0 1
0 9.2% 41.5% 0 25.6% 38.1%
1 49.0% 0.3% 1 33.4% 2.8%
efficiency: 94.2% efficiency: 97.2%
entropy: 1.37 entropy: 1.71
Table 3.12.c. Table 3.12.d.
Two-game set: {PD, BS} Two-game set: {SH, CH}
Outcomes in     
PD                
within {PD, BS}
Column player Outcomes in     
SH                
within {SH, CH}
Column player
Row        
Player
Row        
Player
Outcomes in     
BS                
within {PD, BS}
Column player Outcomes in     
CH                
within {SH, CH}
Column player
Row        
Player





Distributions are from the 1000th generation. 
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Table 3.12.  Outcome distributions in two-game, cognitive cost settings 
for the natural outcome context (continued). 
 
 
0 1 0 1
0 86.8% 1.2% 0 1.3% 47.9%
1 1.0% 11.0% 1 50.5% 0.3%
efficiency: 86.8% efficiency: 99.7%
entropy: 0.67 entropy: 1.11
0 1 0 1
0 0.5% 48.7% 0 0.2% 46.9%
1 50.7% 0.1% 1 52.5% 0.3%
efficiency: 99.6% efficiency: 99.5%
entropy: 1.05 entropy: 1.05
Table 3.12.e. Table 3.12.f.
Two-game set: {SH, BS} Two-game set: {CH, BS}
Outcomes in     
SH                
within {SH, BS}
Column player Outcomes in     
CH                
within {CH, BS}
Column player
Row        
Player
Row        
Player
Outcomes in     
BS                
within {SH, BS}
Column player Outcomes in     
BS                
within {CH, BS}
Column player
Row        
Player





Distributions are from the 1000th generation. 
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Table 3.13.  Outcome distributions in two-game, no cost settings 
for the natural outcome context. 
 
 
0 1 0 1
0 22.0% 18.0% 0 29.6% 24.1%
1 17.9% 42.1% 1 23.8% 22.5%
efficiency: 60.0% efficiency: 46.5%
entropy: 1.90 entropy: 1.99
0 1 0 1
0 99.3% 0.2% 0 21.2% 36.6%
1 0.2% 0.2% 1 40.5% 1.7%
efficiency: 99.3% efficiency: 98.3%
entropy: 0.07 entropy: 1.63
Table 3.13.a. Table 3.13.b.
Two-game set: {PD, SH} Two-game set: {PD, CH}
Outcomes in     
PD                
within {PD, SH}
Column player Outcomes in     
PD                
within {PD, CH}
Column player
Row        
Player
Row        
Player
Outcomes in     
SH                
within {PD, SH}
Column player Outcomes in     
CH                
within {PD, CH}
Column player
Row        
Player





Distributions are from the 1000th generation. 
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Table 3.13.  Outcome distributions in two-game, no cost settings 
for the natural outcome context (continued). 
 
 
0 1 0 1
0 33.9% 21.9% 0 98.8% 0.3%
1 22.0% 22.2% 1 0.2% 0.7%
efficiency: 44.1% efficiency: 98.8%
entropy: 1.97 entropy: 0.11
0 1 0 1
0 2.1% 47.4% 0 47.3% 30.1%
1 50.3% 0.1% 1 21.8% 0.8%
efficiency: 98.6% efficiency: 99.2%
entropy: 1.14 entropy: 1.57
Column player
Row        
Player
Row        
Player
Row        
Player
Row        
Player
Outcomes in     
BS                
within {PD, BS}
Column player Outcomes in     
CH                
within {SH, CH}
Table 3.13.c. Table 3.13.d.
Two-game set: {PD, BS} Two-game set: {SH, CH}
Outcomes in     
PD                
within {PD, BS}
Column player Outcomes in     






Distributions are from the 1000th generation. 
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Table 3.13.  Outcome distributions in two-game, no cost settings 
for the natural outcome context (continued). 
  
 
0 1 0 1
0 99.2% 0.3% 0 2.5% 51.9%
1 0.3% 0.3% 1 44.7% 0.9%
efficiency: 99.2% efficiency: 98.6%
entropy: 0.08 entropy: 1.20
0 1 0 1
0 1.6% 51.3% 0 4.2% 49.2%
1 47.0% 0.2% 1 45.2% 1.4%
efficiency: 98.9% efficiency: 99.2%
entropy: 1.12 entropy: 1.30
Column player
Row        
Player
Row        
Player
Row        
Player
Row        
Player
Outcomes in     
BS                
within {SH, BS}
Column player Outcomes in     
BS                
within {CH, BS}
Table 3.13.e. Table 3.13.f.
Two-game set: {SH, BS} Two-game set: {CH, BS}
Outcomes in     
SH                
within {SH, BS}
Column player Outcomes in     






Distributions are from the 1000th generation. 
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Table 3.14.  t-statistics for differences between cognitive cost and no cost statistics  
for one-game settings for the natural outcome context. 






























































































































































































































































Welch’s t-statistics for difference of statistics between No Cost and Cognitive Cost 
environments in the 1000th generation.  Asterisks indicate significance for two-tailed 
tests that (statistic with no cost – statistic with cognitive cost) differences are non-zero:  
*** 1% significance, ** 5% significance, * 10% significance. 
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Table 3.15.  t-statistics for differences between cognitive cost and no cost statistics  
for two-game settings for the natural outcome context. 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































See note for Table 3.14.  *** 1% significance, ** 5% significance, * 10% significance. 
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Table 3.16.  Similarity of play across both games in two-game, cognitive cost settings 

















{CH, BS} 5.4 1.0% 1.48 
{PD, SH} 8.6 4.1% 1.41 
{PD, CH} 27.5 21.4% 1.47 
{SH, CH} 45.0 31.8% 1.67 
{PD, BS} 45.8 35.6% 1.62 
{SH, BS} 62.5 48.6% 1.74 
 
For ALSAS and DIS, the differences between values in the same block are not 
statistically different from zero at the 10 percent significance level.  For ALSAS, the 
differences in separate blocks are all significant at the 1 percent level; for DIS, the 






Table 3.17.  t-statistics for differences in a game’s scores by pairing 
for the natural outcome context. 
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) Scores 
    
 
{PD, CH} {PD, BS} {PD} 
{PD, SH} 1.412 0.551 -1.563 
{PD, CH} - -0.942 -1.910* 
{PD, BS} - - -1.347 
 
Stag Hunt (SH) Scores 
    
 
{SH, CH} {SH, BS} {SH} 
{SH, PD} -6.528*** -3.955*** -4.440*** 
{SH, CH} - 2.951*** 2.297** 
{SH, BS} - - -0.645 
 
Chicken (CH) Scores 
    
 
{CH, SH} {CH, BS} {CH} 
{CH, PD} -0.948 0.137 1.020 
{CH, SH} - 0.992 1.852* 
{CH, BS} - - 0.810 
 
Battle of the Sexes (SH) Scores 
    
 
{BS, SH} {BS, CH} {BS} 
{BS, PD} 2.244*** 1.955** 2.662*** 
{BS, SH} - -0.290 0.487 
{BS, CH} - - 0.767 
 
The t-statistics are for (game’s score in top margin set – game’s in left margin set) is not 
equal to zero.  For cognitive cost environments during the 1000th generation. 
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Table 3.18.  Statistics in one-game, cognitive cost settings 


















Table 3.19.  Statistics in one-game, no cost settings 
for the cooperate/defect context. 

















































































































































PD# 2.52 2.52 n/a 5.96 1.36 0.55 0.71 0.01 0.07 0.35 0.31 0.34 0.76 0.24 
SH# 3.98 3.98 n/a 3.59 0.67 1.00 0.76 0.03 0.05 0.90 0.64 0.73 0.37 0.26 
CH# 2.96 2.96 n/a 5.31 1.06 0.54 0.69 0.03 0.09 0.52 0.45 0.47 0.58 0.22 
Overall 
Mean 3.15 3.15 n/a 4.95 1.03 0.70 0.72 0.02 0.07 0.59 0.47 0.51 0.57 0.24 
Means for the 30 automata in row population in the 1000th generation, averaged over 100 
independent runs. 

















































































































































PD# 1.54 2.00 0.47 1.24 0.15 0.01 0.08 0.79 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.0 1.00 0.01 
SH# 3.21 3.67 0.46 1.32 0.17 0.84 0.09 0.75 0.12 0.78 0.80 0.81 0.20 0.04 
CH# 2.62 3.13 0.50 1.36 0.27 0.44 0.09 0.68 0.14 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.61 0.06 
Overall 
Mean 2.46 2.93 0.48 1.31 0.20 0.43 0.09 0.74 0.12 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.60 0.04 
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Table 3.20.  Statistics in two-game, cognitive cost settings 
for the cooperate/defect context. 
Means for the 30 automata in the row population in the 1000th generation, averaged over 
100 independent runs. 
































































































































































































































 PD# in 
PD#-SH# n/a 2.17 n/a n/a 1.61 n/a 0.30 0.17 n/a n/a 0.11 0.49 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.90 0.08 
SH# in 
PD#-SH# n/a 2.75 n/a n/a 1.54 n/a 0.38 0.38 n/a n/a 0.13 0.42 0.16 0.33 0.22 0.25 0.87 0.15 







 PD# in 
PD#-CH# n/a 2.14 n/a n/a 1.69 n/a 0.22 0.18 n/a n/a 0.12 0.42 0.23 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.84 0.06 
CH# in 
PD#-CH# n/a 2.97 n/a n/a 1.65 n/a 0.22 0.43 n/a n/a 0.12 0.40 0.23 0.41 0.34 0.31 0.66 0.06 







 SH# in 
SH#-CH# n/a 3.41 n/a n/a 1.49 n/a 0.21 0.73 n/a n/a 0.13 0.35 0.18 0.64 0.54 0.58 0.52 0.21 
CH# in 
SH#-CH# n/a 2.90 n/a n/a 1.66 n/a 0.24 0.64 n/a n/a 0.13 0.34 0.19 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.18 
Mean 2.63 3.15 0.52 2.17 1.57 45.0 0.22 0.68 1.67 0.15 0.13 0.34 0.19 0.58 0.53 0.55 0.52 0.20 
Overall 
Mean 2.22 2.72 0.50 2.07 1.61 35.6 0.26 0.42 1.61 0.14 0.12 0.40 0.19 0.35 0.32 0.33 0.72 0.12 
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Table 3.21.  Statistics in two-game, no cost settings 
for the cooperate/defect context. 
 

































































































































































































































 PD# in 
PD#-SH# n/a 2.87 n/a n/a 5.76 n/a 1.05 0.85 n/a n/a 0.72 0.03 0.07 0.34 0.41 0.47 0.65 0.29 
SH# in 
PD#-SH# n/a 3.95 n/a n/a 2.94 n/a 0.54 0.98 n/a n/a 0.72 0.01 0.07 0.76 0.44 0.50 0.63 0.30 







 PD# in 
PD#-CH# n/a 2.66 n/a n/a 6.68 n/a 1.42 0.62 n/a n/a 0.72 0.02 0.07 0.37 0.38 0.42 0.68 0.26 
CH# in 
PD#-CH# n/a 2.94 n/a n/a 5.39 n/a 1.18 0.58 n/a n/a 0.70 0.01 0.08 0.49 0.39 0.43 0.67 0.26 







 SH# in 
SH#-CH# n/a 3.98 n/a n/a 3.18 n/a 0.86 0.99 n/a n/a 0.76 0.02 0.05 0.84 0.58 0.65 0.48 0.30 
CH# in 
SH#-CH# n/a 2.90 n/a n/a 5.78 n/a 1.65 0.77 n/a n/a 0.75 0.01 0.06 0.53 0.55 0.61 0.48 0.28 
Mean 3.44 3.44 n/a 7.35 4.48 63.5 1.25 0.88 1.98 0.80 0.75 0.02 0.06 0.69 0.57 0.63 0.48 0.29 
Overall 
Mean 3.22 3.22 n/a 7.31 4.96 44.5 1.12 0.80 1.95 0.77 0.73 0.02 0.07 0.56 0.46 0.51 0.60 0.28 
Means for the 30 automata in the row population in the 1000th generation, averaged over 
100 independent runs. 
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Table 3.22.  Outcome distributions in one-game, cognitive cost settings 
for the cooperate/defect context. 
 
 
PD# C D SH# C D CH# C D
C 0.0% 0.8% C 83.6% 0.3% C 2.2% 42.2%
D 0.6% 98.7% D 0.2% 15.9% D 55.4% 0.3%
efficiency: 0.5% efficiency: 83.6% efficiency: 99.7%
















Table 3.23.  Outcome distributions in one-game, no cost settings 
for the cooperate/defect context. 
 
 
PD# C D SH# C D CH# C D
C 40.5% 14.1% C 99.3% 0.3% C 11.0% 43.2%
D 12.8% 32.6% D 0.2% 0.2% D 43.7% 2.1%
efficiency: 54.0% efficiency: 99.3% efficiency: 97.9%










Distributions are from the 1000th generation. 
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Table 3.24.  Outcome distributions in two-game, cognitive cost settings 
for the cooperate/defect context. 
 
PD# C D PD# C D SH# C D
C 11.8% 4.8% C 5.5% 12.7% C 69.6% 3.1%
D 4.8% 78.6% D 10.8% 71.0% D 4.7% 22.6%
efficiency: 16.6% efficiency: 17.3% efficiency: 69.6%
entropy: 1.06 entropy: 1.31 entropy: 1.21
SH# C D CH# C D CH# C D
C 37.6% 0.7% C 6.5% 36.1% C 25.6% 38.1%
D 0.9% 60.9% D 49.4% 8.0% D 33.4% 2.8%
efficiency: 37.6% efficiency: 92.0% efficiency: 97.2%










Table 3.25.  Outcome distributions in two-game, no cost settings 
for the cooperate/defect context. 
 
PD# C D PD# C D SH# C D
C 80.2% 4.4% C 45.4% 16.1% C 98.8% 0.3%
D 5.4% 10.1% D 18.3% 20.1% D 0.2% 0.7%
efficiency: 85.0% efficiency: 62.7% efficiency: 98.8%
entropy: 1.01 entropy: 1.86 entropy: 0.11
SH# C D CH# C D CH# C D
C 97.6% 0.7% C 27.3% 30.6% C 47.3% 30.1%
D 0.2% 1.5% D 36.4% 5.7% D 21.8% 0.8%
efficiency: 97.6% efficiency: 94.3% efficiency: 99.2%









Distributions are from the 1000th generation.  
155 
Table 3.26.  t-statistics for differences between statistics in 
the natural outcome context and the cooperate/defect context. 
 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































For the 1000th generation of cognitive cost settings.  Asterisks indicate significance for 
two-tailed tests that the differences (statistic in 0/1 context – statistic in C/D context) are 
non-zero: *** 1% significance, ** 5% significance, * 10% significance. 
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Figure 3.1.  Example sixteen-state automata that play two games. 
  
Automaton #7 uses eight separate states to play each game independently.   






















Left side transitions for  
  “if opponent plays 0.” 
Example: if in state 1 and 
  opponent plays 0,  
  transition to state 3:  
τA(1,0) = 3 
Initial state when  
playing Battle of  
the Sexes is state 4: 
θA (BS) = 4 
Actions are indicated 
  inside state circles. 
Example: if in state 4, 
  play action 0: 


































Initial state when  
playing Prisoner’s 
Dilemma is state 9: 
θA (BS) = 9 
Right side transitions  
for “if opponent plays 1.” 
Example: if in state 1 and 
opponent plays 1, transition 









































































































Left side transitions for  
  “if opponent plays 0.” 
Example: if in state 1 and 
  opponent plays 0,  
  transition to state 11:  
τ1(1,0) = 11 
Initial state when  
playing Battle of  
the Sexes is state 5: 
θ1(BS) = 5 
Initial state when  
playing Prisoner’s 
Dilemma is state 12: 
θ1(PD) = 12 
Right side transitions for  
“if opponent plays 1.” 
Example: if in state 1 and 
opponent plays 1, transition 
to state 5: f1(1,1) = 5 
Actions are indicated 
  inside state circles. 
Example: if in state 5, 
  play action 0: 
τ1(5) = 0 
Figure 3.2.a: Row automaton #1 in its entirety  









Automaton #1 reduced to 
its functional equivalent 
(only its accessible states, 
5 and 12, are shown) 
158 
Figure 3.3.  Evolution of population-level state activation similarity (PLSAS) 
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Figure 3.4.  Distribution of 1000th generation scores of row populations 
across 100 runs in single game environments. 
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Figure 3.5.  Distribution of 1000th generation scores of column populations 
across 100 runs in single game environments. 
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Figure 3.6.  Average scores in two-game and one-game cognitive cost settings. 
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Figure 3.7.  Mean score of two one-game environments compared to  
mean score in a two-game environment with cognitive costs. 
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Figure 3A.1.  Evolution of statistics in one-game, cost 4 environments (continued). 
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The Role of Strategy Experience 
in Costly Multiple Game Environments 
4.1. Introduction 
People face incredibly complex strategic situations every day.  The complexity 
can arise from many sources, and perhaps one of most perplexing is variations in the 
strategic environment itself.  We must interact in numerous and distinct strategic settings 
simultaneously.  Multiple game ensembles can be constructed to model such situations.   
One natural question that arises in these models is how past learning affects 
success or failure in the multiple game environments.  Can a strategy that proved 
successful in a single-game environment continue its effectiveness once it is applied to an 
ensemble of games?  How is this effectiveness dependent upon the specific game history 
of the player, her opponent, and the nature of the multiple game environment itself? 
This paper attempts to resolve these questions.  Each player begins with 
experience in the sense that she has strategies which have evolved in a specific one-game 
or two-game environment.  Now she must play two games simultaneously against an 
opponent who has a different experience set.  Her strategies’ effectiveness in these 
multiple game sets are assessed along several lines including payoffs, profits, and 
distributions of matrix outcomes, among others. 
This investigation into the role of experience is a novel contribution to the 
literature of multiple game settings.  Others have investigated the simultaneous play of 
multiple games using finite automata to model strategies: Samuelson (2001) compares 
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the benefits and costs of greater strategy sophistication, Miller and Page (2007) develop a 
basic theory and methodology, Bednar and Page (2007) apply analytical and computer 
experiment results to explain the emergence of culture, and Bednar, et al. (2010) fit 
human subject choices from a laboratory experiment to automaton strategies and show 
how behavioral spillovers and cognitive load spread across contexts. 
Many others have considered the role of histories on subsequent performance in 
the context of games, and specifically when an agent’s past differs strategically from its 
present.  Holland (1995) develops classifier systems in which agents use tags to add in 
recognition.  Similarly, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995, 2001) model multiple game 
situations theoretically as sequences of games for which an agent must determine a 
current strategy based on previous encounters.  Güth (2000a, 2000b) also models learning 
in different sequential multiple-game environments and shows how subjects learn to 
anticipate rule changes as they play repeated of games.  The sequential nature of the 
games differentiates these models from the one presented here that emphasizes 
simultaneous play. 
4.2. Experimental Design 
This project employs the computational experiment framework developed in 
Chapter 2.  It also extends the experiments detailed in Chapter 3.  One of the purposes of 
the experiments described in that chapter was to create experienced populations of 
automaton strategies for future use.  The experiments in this chapter make uses of these.  
There are two primary differences in the current project from the previous one. 
First, strategies here have experience playing in different game environments.  
Specifically, each player’s strategy pool has evolved in one of ten possible game 
environments.  There are four single game environments: Prisoner’s Dilemma {PD}, Stag 
Hunt {SH}, Chicken {CH}, and Battle of the Sexes {BS}; and the six dual game 
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environments: {PD, SH}, {PD, CH}, {PD, BS}, {SH, CH}, {SH, BS}, and {CH, BS}.  
All game environments considered in this chapter involve cognitive costs.  This game 
environment summarizes the experience of the player. 
Second, the purpose here is to gauge how a player’s own and its opponent’s 
experiences influence outcomes and performance.  Since the strategies already have 
experience, they compete against each other in a single generation; the model takes a 
snapshot of their current performance given their history.  These experiments make no 
further use of the evolutionary toolset provided in the framework. 
The section below describes specific design features, focusing mainly on the 
differences between the approaches used in Chapter 2. 
Games and Experience 
This project continues with the same four games utilized in Chapter 2: Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (PD), Stag Hunt (SH), Chicken (CH), and Battle of the Sexes (BS).  The 
versions of these games have ordinally ranked payoffs and are consistent with the 
Rapoport, et al. (1976) taxonomy; see Table 4.1.  Since strategies, at least subcomponents 
of them, will be applied in different games, a particular generic action (up, down; right, 
left; etc.) must be defined consistently across games.  The main results of this chapter 
consider the case in which the row player’s up action (and the column player’s left 
action) is her natural action—the one that leads to the Rapoport natural outcome.  Both 
players’ available actions are generically labeled “0” and “1” so that the payoff matrices 
match those in the taxonomy.  Using this labeling system, action 0 (up or left) always 
corresponds to the action that leads to the natural equilibrium of the game1
                                                 
1 The natural outcome (NO) defined by Rapoport, et al. (1976) is determined by applying 
the following conditions in sequence: (1) if a single outcome contains the high payoff for 
both players (4 for each), then it is the NO (applies to Stag Hunt); (2) if there are two 
dominated strategies, then their elimination defines the NO (applies to Prisoner’s 
Dilemma); (3) if there is a single dominated strategy, then after its elimination, the NO is 
.  An 
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automaton strategy can be viewed as a collection of mental states.  Under this context in 
multiple game settings, a state that call for action 0 to be played means that when in this 
state, play the action that leads to the natural outcome of that game.  Thus the context of 
the mental state points action towards a particular type of outcome.  Note that because the 
game matrices coincide with the taxonomy, neither action 0 nor action 1 consistently 
correlate to a cooperating or defecting action.   
Actions will have these alternative contexts in Section 4.4—the alternative case in 
which the row player’s up action (and the column player’s left action) is her other-
regarding or cooperate action and her down action (and the column player’s right action) 
is her self-regarding or defect action.  In that section, action 0 will always correspond to 
the other-regarding action (cooperate) and action 1 will always mean the self-regarding 
action (defect).  The context of the mental state now translates as a particular motivation 
(self or collective interest) for an action.  Table 4.2 presents the payoffs for Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, Stag Hunt, and Chicken under the alternative cooperate/defect context (these 
games are denoted PD#, SH#, and CH#).   
The types of experience considered fall into two categories, those with experience 
playing a single game and those with experience playing a binary set of games.  Thus, a 
player’s experience comes from set {{PD},{SH}, {CH}, {SH}, {PD &  SH}, {PD & 
CH}, {PD & BS}, {SH & CH}, {SH & BS}, {CH & BS}}.  Table 4.3 outlines the trial 
configurations. These experiments consider only the situation in which agents face 
cognitive costs.  The costs are modeled in mostly the same way as in Chapter 3’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
the outcome in which the player with no dominated strategies receives the higher payoff; 
(4) the NO is the maximin outcome (applies to Chicken and Battle of the Sexes). 
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experiments, which are the “Cost 4” specification defined in the framework of Chapter 2.  
The only difference is that in the present experiments, costs are never adjusted.2
The first set of experiments matches strategies that have experience with only a 
single game against each other in the two-game environment game set built by the union 
of their individual experience sets.  There are six such trials.  The interest in these 
configurations is to look for game experiences that are either broadly applicable to other 
game settings or narrowly confined to their own game. 
   
The second set of experiments matches strategies that have experience playing 
two simultaneous games against those that have experience in just one the two games.  
They play the same two-game environment game set as the first player’s experience.  
There are twelve of these trials.  There are two reasons for these trials. 
One is to learn whether an opponent’s experience matters.  For instance, suppose 
a player with PD&SH-experience plays first an opponent with PD-experience and then 
separately an opponent with SH experience.  How do the two-game experience player’s 
outcomes depend upon the opponent’s experience? 
The other is to compare a wider breadth of experience to a narrow one.  
Continuing the example above, now the objective is to compare the PD&SH-experienced 
player’s outcomes directly to its one-game experience opponents.  Since they are playing 
in a two-game environment, one would expect that the strategy that evolved in this 
environment to outperform its opponents who have, in a sense, less experience. 
The third set of experiments investigates the role of action context.  Section 4.4 
provides a sample of the effects context by contrasting the results of the {PD, SH} and 
{PD#, SH#} settings as well as {PD, CH} and {PD#, CH#} settings. 
                                                 
2 In the Chapter 3 experiments, an additive cost factor was determined so that the first 
generation’s average profits across both row and column players were zero.  This factor 
was then applied to costs in all subsequent generations. 
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Strategies 
Sixteen-state finite automata are used to implement a player’s strategy.  Each state 
of a finite automaton represents a portion of an agent’s strategy by specifying the action 
to take when in the state and the next state to which the strategy should transition after it 
executes the action.  This transition depends on the action taken by the player’s opponent.  
An automaton also specifies the initial state for a given game.  This is an important aspect 
in these games in which some players lack experience in a game because this implies that 
they do not a have an initial state assigned for that game.  Implications of this 
inexperience will be explained below. 
Computer Experiments and Simulation Algorithm 
The experiment consists of eighteen trials, each with a specific two-game 
environment and experience sets of its players.  Each trial consists of 100 independent 
runs, and each run consists a single generation.  During each generation, the row and 
column players’ automata match up to play 160 rounds of the first game and then 160 
rounds of the second game. 
The computer experiments use the following algorithm to conduct the trials.  A 
more detailed description of this algorithm appears in Chapter 2; specifications particular 
to this set of experiments are highlighted here.  Table 4.4 summarizes parameter values 
used throughout the experiments. 
Step 1: Initialize strategy populations.  Row and column player strategy 
populations each consist of thirty automata that have evolved in a specific game-cost 
environment.  Each automaton i’s structure—its initialization mappings θi(·), action 
mappings fi(·), and transition mappings τi(·)—have been maintained from previous 
experiments, detailed in Chapter 3.  An automaton’s experience and its effect on how the 
automaton executes its strategy is embedded in the automaton’s structure, so no 
performance data (such as histories of actions and profits) is carried forward.  If an 
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automaton did not have experience playing a particular game, then the algorithm 
randomly assigned its initialization mapping for that game. This way an automaton has a 
defined state at which to start for every game. 
Step 2: Play Games.3
Step 2.1: Match automata.  The program employs mean matching to pair 
automata for competition.  Under this paradigm, each of the thirty automata in the row 
population pairs with each of the thirty automata in the column population to play both 
games selected for that particular trial.  Thus, each automaton plays sixty repeated games 
(thirty repetitions of each repeated game). 
 
Step 2.2: Play game(s).  The matched automata play a repeated game for 160 
rounds4
Step 3: Stop program.  There is no need to iterate to the program since strategies 
are not evolving. 
.  During every round, each automaton plays the action specified by its current 
state and then transitions to a state dependent on the play of its opponent. 
4.3. Results 
Result Group 4.1 – One-Game Experience Populations in Two-Game Settings 
In this group of experiments (trials 1-6), both the row and column players have 
experience in only a single game, but they are matched in the binary game setting that is 
the union of their experience. 
                                                 
3 Step 2 as presented in Chapters 2 and 3 was selection.  Strategies are fixed in this set of 
experiments, so selection is not applied. 
4 The paired automata play 10· s  = 160 rounds, where s  = 16 is the number of their 
states.  Using 10· s  rounds ensures the play extends well beyond the automata’s intrinsic 
memory capacity (Miller, 1996).  All agents report and perceive actions accurately; there 
is no noise. 
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Result 4.1.1.  Prisoner’s Dilemma experience leads always to the greatest profit 
and almost always to the greatest score.  In the three two-game environments that 
include the Prisoner’s Dilemma game ({PD, SH}, {PD, CH}, and {PD, BS}), the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma experienced strategy population always earns significantly greater 
profit than the other population with Stag Hunt, Chicken, or Battle of the Sexes 
experience (p-values less than 0.00005).  See Tables 4.5.a., b., and c.  Because of the 
method in which costs are measured, profit can only measured across the average 
performance in the two-game environment and not on a per game basis.5
Similar to the Chapter 3 no-experience simulations, costs do not significantly vary 
between row and column players (who have different experience sets) or between 
different game environments; see Table 4.
  Breaking profit 
into its score (the payoffs from the game matrices) and cost components, allows a more 
refined look at what happens. 
6.  Thus, the differences in profits are driven by 
differences in scores. 
The strategy population with PD-experience outscored its opponents when 
playing Prisoner’s Dilemma, as shown in the left-hand columns of Tables 4.7.a, b, and c.  
Moreover, PD-experience even outscores SH-experience and BS-experience when 
playing Stag Hunt and Battle of the Sexes, respectively (see the middle columns on the 
table).  The CH-experienced population was the only one that is able to beat a PD-
experienced population, and then only when playing Chicken.  Overall, the average score 
across both games is always significantly greater for the PD-experienced population, 
even compared to the CH-experienced population (see right-hand columns of Tables 
4.7.a, b, and c). 
                                                 
5 This is because profit is score net of cost and cost is determined by the number of 
accessible states in all games, which is not calculated on a per game basis. 
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An analysis of the tendency to play action 0 coupled with the effects of 
inexperience explain these strong results.  First I will establish that action 0 is used more 
frequently by PD-experienced strategies and then explain the structural characteristics of 
these strategies that lead to the high usage of action 0. 
Tables 4.8.a, b, and c. show that in these multiple game settings, PD-experience 
induces the high frequency of the use of action 0 in Prisoner’s Dilemma games (at least 
99.0 percent of rounds no matter what experience the opponent has), in the other three 
games (about 72 percent of rounds) and on average in each of the three two-game sets 
(about 86 percent of rounds).  These percentages are all significantly greater than the 
opponent’s use of action 0 except for the in the Stag Hunt game against a SH-experienced 
player. 
Before evaluating the impact of this high frequency of action 0 usage by PD-
experienced populations on scores, first consider the structural features of PD-
experienced strategies that lead them to play action 0 so often.  The first structural 
statistics that provides support is the percentage of initial states that play action 0.  When 
playing Prisoner’s Dilemma, the population with PD-experience always has significantly 
more initial states that play action 0 than its SH-, CH-, or BS-experienced opponent (p-
values of 0.0000).  The magnitude of the PD-experienced population’s excess of action 0 
playing initial states over its opponents is so great that the same result holds when 
considering the average over both games in the two-game set. See Tables 4.9.a, b, and c. 
Expanding the view beyond just initial states to consider the number of accessible 
states that play action 0, we see a similar effect: PD-experienced populations have 
significantly more action 0 playing accessible states than opponents with other 
experience when playing PD and when considering the average of both games in the two-
game set, and even when playing Chicken and Battle of the Sexes.  Stag Hunt-experience 
is the only population that PD-experience does not have more 0-playing accessible states 
and then only when playing Stag Hunt.  See Tables 4.10.a, b, and c.   
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Another structural feature of PD-experienced automata is their extremely high 
frequency of action 0 reciprocating states: those states that transition to a state that plays 
action 0 in response to the opponent’s play of action 0.  Table 4.11 shows that this 
frequency was 99.6 percent for a PD-experienced strategy when playing Prisoner’s 
Dilemma in a multigame setting (regardless of its opponent’s experiences) and about 64 
percent when it played any of the other three games (again, regardless of its opponent’s 
experiences).  In all cases, this frequency of action 0 reciprocation is significantly greater 
than the opponent with a different experience base.   
These structural characteristics to play action 0—both in initial states and 
accessible states—translate to the high frequencies that the PD-experienced strategies 
actually employ action 0 as described above.  It is this feature of PD-experienced 
strategies in multiple game settings that enables their high scores. 
First, consider why a PD-experienced row player outscores a BS-experienced 
player in the Battle of the Sexes game within the {PD, BS} environment.  Table 4.7.c 
shows the scores are 2.758 for PD-experience compared to 2.570 for BS-experience (the 
p-value for the difference being distinct from zero is 0.0139). 
Action 0 is the natural strategy action for both of these games, and the experience 
of each player leads to different propensities to play action 0.  The PD-experience 
strategy evolved in a PD setting to use action 0 in nearly all rounds (99 percent, see 
Chapter 3, Table 3.6).  Then in the multiple game setting, the PD-experienced player, of 
course, lacks expertise in Battle of the Sexes, and its initial state for BS is randomly 
assigned.  It still uses action 0 in a relatively high frequency (72.9 percent), but not as 
high a frequency as it did in the single Prisoner’s Dilemma game environment. 
The BS-experience strategy evolved in a BS setting to use action 0 in about half 
of the rounds (52 percent; see Chapter 3, Table 3.6).  Since the BS-experience player 
tailored its strategy to play Battle of the Sexes, it continues to use action 0 with about the 
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same frequency (54.2 percent, see Table 4.8.c) in the multiple game setting as in the 
single game setting.   
The player’s different experiences lead to quite different tendencies to use action 
0: 72.9 percent versus 54.2 percent.  It is the asymmetry of these action 0 frequencies that 
lead to PD-experience’s greater score. Because the BS-experienced column player is 
more likely to use action 1 (100 – 54.2 = 45.8 percent) than was the PD-experienced row 
player (100 – 72.9 = 27.1 percent), the outcome lies in the (0, 1) payoff matrix cell more 
than twice as often than the (1, 0) cell.  The bottom panel of Table 4.12.c shows that play 
ended in the (0, 1) cell 35.1 percent of the time compared to only 16.3 percent of the time 
for the (1, 0) cell.  Thus, the row player with PD-experience was more than twice as 
likely to receive a payoff of 4 than was the column player with BS-experience.  The 
different experience led to the disparity of payoffs between these two types of experience 
in Battle of the Sexes.  In this particular case, Prisoner’s Dilemma experience translates 
better to a Battle of the Sexes game than vice versa.  The advantage lies in the outcome 
asymmetry that is created.  Asymmetric transference is not uncommon in real situations.  
Using a sports analogy, soccer players often can integrate successful into the long 
distance running sport of cross country; the soccer player’s experience has prepared her 
well for the long distance running which demands stamina.  The reverse integration may 
likely less successful; a cross country runner would likely lack the necessary ball 
handling skills and tactics necessary for success in soccer. 
Next, consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt multiple game setting.  
When learning to play Prisoner’s Dilemma by itself, strategies developed a very strong 
tendency to play the natural action 0; by the end of their evolution, this action is utilized 
in 99 percent of rounds (see Chapter 3, Table 3.6).  The corresponding (0, 0) outcome, 
the Nash equilibrium, occurred in 97.1 percent of rounds (see Chapter 3, Table 3.10.a).  
When learning to play Stag Hunt by itself, strategies developed a less intense inclination 
to play the action 0; this action was utilized in only 84 percent of rounds (see again Table 
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3.6).  In the single game setting of Stag Hunt, the (0, 0) outcome, the Pareto superior 
Nash equilibrium, occurred in 83.6 percent of rounds, while the (1, 1) outcome, the 
Pareto inferior Nash equilibrium, occurred in 15.9 percent of rounds (see Table 3.10.b). 
These learned action 0 tendencies are hard-wired into the automaton structures (in 
their high frequency of initial and accessible states that play action 0 as described above) 
and lead to non-symmetric outcome distributions when the experienced players are 
matched together.  Compare the top and bottom panels of Table 4.12.a. that show the 
distribution of payoff matrix outcomes for Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt, 
respectively, in the two-game environment that matches these two types of experienced 
players. 
Starting with the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the PD-experienced row players used 
action 0 in 99.3 percent of the rounds (see Table 4.8.a), while the SH-experienced column 
players used action 0 in 67.1 percent of rounds.  Given their usage of action 0 (and shown 
in Table 4.12.a), two-thirds of the time play results in the (0, 0) outcome and both get a 
payoff of 2.  However, roughly one-third of the time, play results in the (0, 1) outcome 
where the PD-experienced row player gets the 4 payoff while the SH-experienced column 
player gets the 1 payoff (see Table 4.12.a.).  The SH-experienced column player does not 
have a set of rules developed specifically for Prisoner’s Dilemma, and so its randomly 
assigned initial state for PD causes it to activate a state that plays action 1 in this game 
more than would otherwise (action 0 frequency drops from 84 to 67 percent, so action 1 
frequency increases from 16 to 33 percent).  These deviations from action 0 to action 1 
are caused by the SH-experienced column player’s lack of experience in Prisoner’s 
Dilemma.  The deviations help the PD-experienced row player by giving it its greatest 
payoff (4) and harm the SH-experienced column player by giving it its least payoff (1).  
Intuitively, one would not expect an SH-experienced player to do better than the PD-
experienced player in Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
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Counterintuitively, even when playing Stag Hunt, the row population’s 
experience in Prisoner’s Dilemma prepared it to outscore the SH-experienced column 
player.  The middle two columns of Table 4.7.a. show the two populations’ scores when 
playing Stag Hunt; the PD-experienced row player earns a score of 3.222 on average, 
while the SH-experienced column player earns only 3.053.  This difference is fairly 
significant with a p-value of 0.1657. 
The bottom panel of Table 4.12.a. shows the distribution of outcomes in the Stag 
Hunt game that resulted when these two experienced players are matched in this game.  
The difference in the players’ scores came from the asymmetrical outcome percentages in 
the (0, 1) cell, 15.3 percent, and the (1, 0) cell, 23.7 percent.  In 15.3 percent of rounds 
that resulted in the (0, 1) outcome, the PD-experienced row player received a payoff of 1 
and the SH-experienced column player received a payoff of 3, so the SH-experienced 
player did better.  However, in the greater percentage—23.7 percent—of rounds that 
resulted in the (1, 0) outcome, the PD-experienced row player received a payoff of 3 and 
the SH-experienced column player received a payoff of 1, so the PD-experienced player 
outscores the SH-experienced player overall. 
Unlike Prisoner’s Dilemma, in Stag Hunt a row player sticking with the natural 
action 0 while the column player switches and plays action 1 incurs a more severe 
penalty (row’s payoff falls from 4 to 1) for the natural action row player than for the 
column player (whose payoff falls from 4 to 3).  The PD-experienced player is more 
likely to deviate in Stag Hunt precisely because it lacks experience in this game. While it 
evolved to almost always play action 0, this tendency would also make it almost always 
play the natural strategy in SH.  Specifically, The PD-experienced strategy’s crucial 
structural characteristic that directs it at which state to start play in Stag Hunt is simply a 
random guess among its sixteen states; it has had no experience to fine tune this initial 
position.  Given that the strategy evolved to use less than two of its sixteen states (see 
Chapter 3, Table 3.6), fourteen of its states have not been subjected to evolutionary 
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pressure and so will have a more random structure.  Accordingly, the newly assigned 
initial state for Stag Hunt has a reasonable chance to start at action 1.  Its lack of 
experience causes it to switch from action 0 to action 1 to its benefit and to its SH-
experienced opponent’s detriment. 
Result 4.1.2.  Stag Hunt experience handicaps the player in the game of Stag 
Hunt.  The player with SH-experience receives lower payoffs than its PD-, CH-, and BS-
experienced opponents even when playing Stag Hunt.  The lack-of-experience 
shortcoming was a liability in the Prisoner’s Dilemma; in Stag Hunt it turns out to be an 
asset.  PD-experience outscores a SH-experienced player in a Stag Hunt game as 
explained above.  Similar arguments can be constructed to explain why a player with 
experience in either Chicken or Battle of the Sexes outscores a SH-experienced player in 
the game of Stag Hunt.  The cause of a SH-experienced strategy’s lower score is the other 
strategy’s random initial state for Stag Hunt (since in lacks experience in this game) and 
the resulting asymmetries of action 0 and 1 usage among the two players.   
A player with Stag Hunt experience loses on its home turf.  PD-experience 
automata outscore SH-experience automata when playing Stag Hunt (3.222 > 3.053), 
CH-experience automata outscore SH-experience automata when playing Stag Hunt 
(3.126 > 2.553), and BS-experience automata outscore SH-experience automata when 
playing Stag Hunt (3.138 > 2.581).  The two-tailed p-values are 0.1567, 0.0000, and 
0.0000, respectively.  See Tables 4.7.a, d, and e. 
The lack of cost differentiation between the multiple game environments implies 
a similar effect with profit.  In the three environments that involve a SH-experienced 
strategy population, that population always earns significantly less profit than the other 
populations with Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, or Battle of the Sexes experience (p-
values are 0.0000, 0.0001, and 0.0606).  See Tables 4.5.a, d, and e. 
Result 4.1.3.  Inexperience always increases the prevalence of Tit-for-Tat 
components of strategies with the average increase15.9 percent.  Inexperience in a 
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particular game always causes an automaton to have more accessible states that play the 
Tit-for-Tat strategy than its experienced opponent in that game.  These Tit-for-Tat states 
reciprocate the opponent’s play of action 0 by transitioning to a state that plays action 0 
and reciprocate the opponent’s play of action 1 by transitioning to a state that plays action 
1.  Whenever a player with experience in game X plays game Y with a player that has 
experience in game Y, the X-experienced player’s automaton strategies will have more 
Tit-for-Tat states than the Y-experienced player’s automaton strategies.  This is a very 
robust result—it holds for all twelve possible combinations of games formed by 
substituting PD, SH, CH, and BS in for X and Y above, and the two-tailed p-values for 
differences are all less than 0.0001.  Tables 4.13.a-f  list the frequencies of (accessible) 
states that play Tit-for-Tat.  The right-hand columns of this table provide the frequencies 
differentials between the inexperienced and experienced strategy populations for each 
game within the two-game environments: all twelve differentials are positive (indicating 
the inexperienced player is using a greater frequency) and range from 11.1 percent to 
20.6 percent, with the mean increase being 15.9 percent.  
Chapter 3 showed that in single game environments in which players face 
cognitive costs, a very small percentage of accessible states played Tit-for-Tat.  This was 
true for all four games, ranging from 1% for Prisoner’s Dilemma to 6% for Chicken.  Tit-
for-Tat components were not successful in those environments. 
The same experiments in Chapter 3 also showed that the sixteen-state automata 
evolve their structures such that they actually only activate very few states (on average, 
about 1.3 states in single game settings and about 2.1 states in multiple game settings).  
Thus the sixteen-state automaton is usually isomorphically equivalent to a one- or two-
state automaton (Miller and Page, 2007).  So when a player faces a novel game not found 
in its experience set, there is a high probability that its newly assigned initial state for that 
game will fall outside of the small subset of states it has evolved to use in its strategy.  If 
the new initial state lies outside the experienced game’s accessible set that that is 
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previously used, then that new initial state is likely to have a more random appearing 
structure—since it was not involved in determining the success of the strategy, it would 
not have been subjected to evolutionary pressure to change in any particular way.  The 
same would be true of most other states to which the new initial state transitioned.  Thus, 
when playing a game in which a player has no previous experience, the states that are 
activated are likely to have components (actions and transitions) that have no regularity 
to their structures since they have not been subjected to evolutionary pressures. 
Any randomly created state would have 25 percent probability of playing Tit-for-
Tat.6 13  Table 4. . shows that the inexperienced player in each pair had  about 20 percent 
of its accessible states play Tit-for-Tat.  This makes sense; usually, that randomly 
assigned initial state has a 25 percent chance of playing Tit-for-Tat, but occasionally the 
random assignment would fall within the automaton’s accessible set (for the game in 
which it has experience), and then have a very small probability of playing Tit-for-Tat. 
Result 4.1.4.  Inexperience does not significantly influence several strategy 
statistics including cost, distinct states activated in all games, distinct initial states, 
automaton-level state activation similarity, and accessible states across all games.  See 
Tables 4.A.1, 2, 3, and 4 in the appendix for the statistic’s values and their (small) t-
statistics that the differences between the experienced and inexperienced player are 
distinct from zero and correspondingly large p-values.  For the most of the other 
statistics, there are very predictable experienced-based distinctions on the per game basis, 
but these cancel each other out across the two-game set resulting in no difference on 
average that is based on experience.  These statistics include mean states activated per 
game, population-level state activation similarity, mean accessible states per game, and 
                                                 
6 There is a 0.5 probability that state m’s transition function, in response to the 
opponent’s action 0, assigns a state n that plays action 0, and an independent 0.5 
probability that state m’s transition function, in response to the opponent’s action 1, 
assigns a state o that plays action 1. 
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proportion of terminal states (see Tables 4.A.5, 6, 7, and 8).  The randomly assignment of 
the initial state for the new game for which a player lacks experience drives this 
observation.  The effect of this random assignment is to likely start the automaton’s 
active state along a segment of the automata where transitions are more likely to be 
random.  Since most automata have evolved to use only a few states (see Result 3.1.2 in 
Chapter 3), then it is probable that the randomly assigned state will not belong to this 
subset of states.  The majority portion of the automaton that is not used has not been 
subjected to as much adaptive pressure through selection and the genetic operators, and 
thus is more likely to have a random structure.  This randomness directly impacts the 
statistics listed above in predictable ways. 
Result Group 4.2 – Two-Game Experience v. One-Game Experience 
in Two-Game Settings 
In this group of experiments (trials 7-18), the row player has experience playing 
in a binary game setting, column player has experience playing in a single game setting.  
The first result compares the two players directly.  The subsequent results compare 
players who faced a common opponent. 
Result 4.2.1:  Broader experience always leads to significantly greater profit, with 
the two-game experienced player earning a profit premium over the one-game 
experienced player ranging from 1.26 to 2.09 with a mean of 1.53.  For a reference point 
to understand how large this profit advantage is, the maximum possible profit is 2.87.7
                                                 
7 This maximum profit stems from a strategy that receives a score of 4 from the payoff 
matrix that has only one state accessible in both games (that is, the same state accessible 
for both games), incurring a cost of (1 + 1/16)2 = 1.13. 
  
Whenever the row player that had experience playing both of the games it faced was 
matched against the column player that had experience playing only one of the two 
games, the row player always received the greatest profit.  This was true for all twelve 
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possible combinations of a player with two-game experience matched against a player 
game experience.  Tables 4.14.a and b through 4.19.a and b present the mean profits as 
well as the t-statistics that the difference in profit between the two players is non-zero.  
Eleven of the corresponding p-values are less than 0.0001, and the other is only 0.0469 
(for {PD, SH}-experience matched against PD-experience in the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game).  This result is not surprising on an intuitive level.  It is easily explained on a 
structural level by the random assignment of the initial state for the new game that the 
one-game experienced column player had to then play. 
Result 4.2.2:  Prisoner’s Dilemma experience continues to dominate the other 
types of experience in terms of profit; against the same two-game experienced opponent 
PD-experience earns profit premiums of 0.124, 0.188, and 0.300 compared to SH-, CH-, 
and BS-experience, respectively.  See Tables 4.14.c, 4.15.c, and 4.16.c.  This result is 
similar to and resonates with Result 4.1.1.  In the three two-game settings that include 
Prisoner’s Dilemma ({PD, SH}, {PD, CH}, and {PD, BS}), there are six possible 
pairings.  The row player is always the one with the experience in the two-game set.  The 
column player has experience in only one of the two games.  For instance, trial 7 matched 
the {PD, SH}-experienced row player against the PD-experienced column player, and 
trial 8 matched the {PD, SH}-experienced row player against the SH-experienced column 
player.   The profit received by the column player with PD-experience from trial 7 can be 
meaningfully compared to the profit received by the column player with SH-experience 
from trial 8 because both face the same opponent in the same two-game setting.   In this 
comparison, the PD-experienced player has the greater profit (0.057 > -0.067, p-value 
0.0671).  The same is true for the other two-game environments that combine Prisoner’s 
Dilemma with Chicken (-0.234 > -0.422, p-value 0.0310) and with Battle of the Sexes (-
0.351 > -0.651, p-value 0.0014). 
The argument to illustrate why a player with Prisoner Dilemma experience bests a 
player with Stag Hunt experience parallels the one presented in Result 4.1.1—
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inexperience means a random assignment of an initial state, and this leads to asymmetric 
outcomes that favor the PD-experienced strategy.  The {PD, SH}-experienced population 
evolved to use natural action 0 in Prisoner’s Dilemma with frequency 0.95 and to use 
natural action 0 in Stag Hunt with frequency 1.00 (Chapter 3, Table 3.8).  Then when 
facing an opponent with either PD experience or SH experience, it continues to almost 
always use action 0 in either game with frequency 0.99, so the result is almost always in 
the top row of the relevant payoff matrix.  When playing PD against this {PD, SH}-
experienced opponent, the PD-experienced player that evolved to play action 0 with 
frequency 0.99, still uses this high frequency, and so play results in the Pareto-dominated 
(0, 0) equilibrium in 99.4 percent of rounds (Table 4.20), giving the PD-experienced 
column player a payoff close to 2 (2.002, see Table 4.21).  The SH-experienced player 
uses action 0 less frequently for two reasons.  First, it lacks expertise in PD, and its 
random initial state leads to lower use of action 0 since there is roughly a 14-in-16 chance 
that the newly assigned initial state will fall in the non-optimized portion of the 
automaton (where action 0 and 1 are both equally likely).  Second, even for the 2-in-16 
chance when the new initial state does fall within in evolved structure, its tendency to 
play action 0 is less: it evolved to play the action 0 with a relatively lower frequency 
(0.84) than the PD-experienced player (0.99).  Even though the context of action 0 
changes for the SH-experienced strategy from cooperative to self-serving, these two 
reasons coupled results in the SH-experienced players using action with frequency 0.667.  
Accordingly, it receives a payoff of 2.0 in two-thirds of rounds at the (0, 0) outcome and 
only 1.0 in the remaining one-third of rounds at the (0, 1), giving it a payoff of 1.687 (≅ 
2/3*2.0 + 1/3*1.0).  Thus, when playing Prisoner’s Dilemma against a {PD, SH}-
experienced opponent, the PD-experienced player outscores the SH-experienced player 
by 0.315. 
Now compare how these two players fare when playing Stag Hunt against the 
{PD, SH}-experienced opponent.  Although action 0 led to the sub-optimal equilibrium 
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in Prisoner’s Dilemma, now it leads to the Pareto dominant equilibrium in Stag Hunt.  A 
closer look at usage frequencies explains why the PD-experienced player still does 
relatively well in Stag Hunt. 
The SH-experienced player uses the natural action 0 almost as frequently (0.804) 
as it did when it evolved in the single game setting (0.84).  Now it is the PD-experienced 
player that gets a randomly assigned initial state.  Since the {PD, SH}-experienced row 
player is almost always playing action 0, the players are best served by also playing 
action 0 all the time to reach the payoff dominant equilibrium (0, 0) to receive a payoff of 
4.  While the lack of experience does cause the PD-experienced player to deviate more 
often to action 1 (frequency 0.282) than the SH-experienced players (0.196) for a similar 
reason as the preceding paragraph, this is less problematic.  Compared to the SH-
experienced player’s deviates when playing Prisoner’s Dilemma, the PD-experienced 
player in Stag Hunt deviates absolutely and relatively less.  Absolutely less because its 
action 1 frequency or 0.282 in Stag Hunt is less than the SH-experienced players action 1 
frequency of 0.333 in Prisoner’s Dilemma.  Relatively less because the difference 
between action 1 usage in Prisoner’s Dilemma is 0.329 (0.333 – 0.004), while the 
difference between action 1 usage in Stag Hunt is 0.086 (0.282 – 0.196).  So there are 
fewer deviations from the equilibrium action by PD-experience in Stag Hunt than by SH-
experience in Prisoner’s Dilemma, and the deviations incur a penalty of a one point lower 
payoff in both games. 
All this results in SH-experienced player outscoring the PD-experienced player in 
Stag Hunt by only 0.103 (3.792 – 3.689, see Table 4.21).  Recalling that in the opposite 
situation, PD-experienced player outscores the SH-experienced player by 0.315, and that 
there is no significant difference between cost (across both games) in either situation, we 
see that on the whole, the PD-experienced player earns more profit than the SH-
experienced player. 
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Similar asymmetric outcome arguments can be constructed to show why PD-
experienced player earns higher profit against the {PD, CH}-experienced and {PD, BS}-
experienced than do CH-experienced and BS-experienced players, respectively.  
Noticeably, the other three pairings that do not involve Prisoner’s Dilemma ({SH, CH}, 
{SH, BS}, and {CH, BS}) show no significant difference between the profits earned by 
players with different single-game experiences. 
Result 4.2.3:  An opponent’s experience matters: a {X, PD}-experienced player 
earns less profit when facing a PD-experienced player than when facing an X-
experienced player for X ∈ {SH, CH, BS}; the profit premiums are -0.457, -0.199, and -
0.524, respectively (see Tables 4.14.d, 4.15.d, and 4.16.d).  Alternatively, a {X, SH}-
experienced player earns more profit when facing a SH-experienced player than when 
facing an X-experienced player for X ∈ {PD, CH, BS}; the profit premiums are 0.457, 
0.535, and 0.255, respectively (see Tables 4.14.d, 4.17.d, and 4.18.d).  
A player that has two-game experience receives lower profit when its opponent 
has (single game) Prisoner’s Dilemma experience than when its opponent has (single 
game) experience in one of the other three games.  For example, take the {PD, SH}-
experienced row player; against the PD-experienced column opponent, the row player 
earned a profit of 1.313 (Table 4.14.a).  Matched against a SH-experienced column 
player, the row player earned a profit of 1.770 (Table 4.14.b).  The t-statistic for the 
difference is 7.174 and the corresponding p-value is less than 0.0001 (Table 4.14.d).  
Similarly significant differences are established in Table 4.15 (for {PD, CH}) and Table 
4.16  (for {PD, BS}).   
Just the opposite is true when the opponent has Stag Hunt experience.  A player 
that has two-game experience receives more profit when its opponent has Stag Hunt 
experience than when its opponent has experience in one of the other three games.  The 
case for the {PD, SH}-experienced player is established in preceding paragraph and 
Table 4.14.  Table 4.17 presents an analogous case for the {SH, CH}-experienced player, 
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and Table 4.18 does the same for the {SH, BS}-experienced player.  Again, the 
arguments for these results are quite similar to the one detailed above in Result 4.2.2. 
4.4. Cooperate/Defect Context 
This section considers an alternative interpretation of actions available to the 
players.  Here, a player’s actions are viewed as other-regarding (or cooperate), denoted 
by “C,” or as self-regarding (or defect), denoted by “D.”  Table 4.2 presents the payoffs 
and features for the three games under these new action connotations, PD#, SH#, and CH#.  
BS is excluded in this section because it lacks clear associations of its actions with these 
contexts.  With these payoff matrices, now action 0 corresponds always to action C.  Note 
that the only new payoff configuration in for Prisoner’s Dilemma; SH# and CH# are 
identical to SH and CH from Section 4.3. 
Result 4.4.1.  Prisoner’s Dilemma experience always leads to the greatest profit 
and the greatest score.  The natural outcome context produced a similar result (Result 
4.1.1); even though the change of contexts effectively transposed the payoffs in PD to 
those in PD#, experience in this game still is a boon.  In the both two-game environments 
that include the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, {PD#, SH#} and {PD#, CH#}, the PD#-
experienced strategy population always earns significantly greater profit than the other 
population with either SH#- or CH#- experience (p-values less than 0.00005).  See Table 
4.22.  Again, costs do not vary much from game to game, so the profit differences are 
driven by scores. 
The strategy population with PD-experience achieves a greater score than its 
opponents when playing PD#, as shown in the left-hand columns of Table 4.23 (two-
tailed p-values of 0.0000).  Moreover, PD#-experience even outscores SH#-experience 
and CH#-experience when playing SH# and CH# (see the middle columns on the table, p-
values are 0.0000 and 0.0750, respectively).  This is an even stronger result than under 
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the natural outcome context, because in that context the CH-experienced population 
outscored the PD-experienced population when playing Chicken. 
To explain this phenomenon, consider the outcome distributions of single-game 
experienced players for the cooperate/defect context in Table 4.28.  The basic arguments 
follow the lines presented in the support for Result 4.1.1 that match (a) the evolved action 
C usage frequency from Chapter 3, Table 3.18 for the player with experience in the game 
being played with (b) a closer-to-random action C usage frequency for the player with no 
experience in the game because she has a randomly assigned initial state.  These action C 
usage frequencies result in outcome distributions whose asymmetries always favor the 
PD#-experienced player. 
For example, consider when the players with PD#-experience and SH#-experience 
square off to play SH#.  Table 3.18 shows that the player with SH#-experience evolved to 
play action C with frequency 0.84.  Since she is still playing SH#, she can be expected to 
continue to play action C with roughly this frequency.  And she does; in SH# within the 
{PD#, SH#} setting, she plays action C with frequency 0.805 (inferred from Table 4.28.a, 
bottom panel).  The PD#-experience player evolved to play action C with frequency 0.01; 
but this player is now playing an unfamiliar game, and so does not have an efficiently 
assigned initial state.  Since she starts playing at a random state, she does not play action 
C with such a low frequency—her actual frequency of action C usage is now 0.278.  The 
particular action C usage frequencies by the two players lead to the asymmetric 
outcomes.  The (D, C) outcome is reached in 57.2 percent of rounds at which the PD#-
experience player gets a payoff of 3 while the SH#-experience player gets a payoff of 
only 1.  The other off-diagonal outcome cell at which these payoffs are inverted only 
occurs in 4.5 percent of rounds, and both players receive the same payoff at the on-
diagonal payoffs.  Thus, the PD#-experienced player earns the greater score. 
Supporting this result further is a comparison of the profits of the PD#-
experienced to those of the SH#-experienced player when each is matched against a 
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player with experience in the two-game {PD#, SH#} setting.  Trials 21 and 22 of the 
experiments matched the row player with experience in both PD# and SH# with the 
column player who had experience in only PD# and SH#, respectively.  Since both single-
game experience players are facing the same opponent, we can meaningfully compare 
their profits and scores.   
Looking first at profits, we see the same effect: Table 4.24 shows that the PD#-
experienced player earns a higher profit (-0.670) than the SH#-experienced player  
(-0.945) when playing this common {PD#, SH#}-experienced opponent (p-value for the 
difference is 0.0173).  Similarly, Table 4.25 shows that the PD#-experienced player earns 
a higher profit (-0.603) than the CH#-experienced player (-0.753) when playing a 
common {PD#, CH#}-experienced opponent, although the significance of the difference 
in profits is borderline (p-value is 0.1784).  
Turning attention to scores in the two-game experience versus one-game 
experience trials at least does not contradict the PD#-experience superiority result.  Table 
4.26 shows that when the {PD#, SH#}-experienced row player matches against the PD#-
experienced column player in PD#, the column player earns a payoff of 2.204; this is 
significantly greater than the payoff earned by the SH#-experienced column player in PD# 
(1.662, p-value for difference is 0.0000).   
When the same column players match against the {PD#, SH#}-experienced row 
player in SH#, the PD#-experienced player no longer earns a greater payoff—there is no 
statistically difference between the two column player’s payoffs (two-tailed p-value of 
0.7296, Table 4.26.c).   
Trials 23 and 24 of the experiments matched the row player with experience in 
both PD# and CH# with the column player who had experience in only PD# and CH#, 
respectively.  These trials produce qualitatively the same results described in the 
preceding two paragraphs—see Table 4.27. 
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Thus, experience in Prisoner’s Dilemma trumps experience in both Stag Hunt and 
Chicken (especially in profits, and to a lesser extent in payoffs) for the cooperate/defect 
context and for the natural outcome context.  This result is surprising; I had conjectured 
that the transposition of the payoffs from PD to PD# would negate Prisoner’s Dilemma 
experience effectiveness in the natural outcome context described Result 4.1.1.  Instead, 
experience in Prisoner’s Dilemma proves advantageous in either context. 
4.5. Remarks 
The preceding results provide strong evidence of the utility of experience in 
Prisoner Dilemma like settings.  Strategies developed in such settings perform well in 
multiple game environments and not only in other Prisoner Dilemma games, but the other 
games as well.  This in true in both the natural outcome and the cooperate/defect 
contexts.  Opponents do worse, too, when they face a player with PD-experience.  This 
result may provide a template for training regimes. It may also suggest an effective catch-
all strategy—when in doubt as to how to proceed, play as if you face a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. 
On the other hand, experience in Stag Hunt was detrimental to future success both 
in other games and even in Stag Hunt itself.  Stag Hunt is the “easy” game.  This 
suggests, then, that strategies developed in low-stress, no-conflict environments will not 
fare well when utilized in strategically diverse settings. 
The results indicate more broadly that strategic complementarities form in 
multiple game environments, and experience is crucial to determining whether those 
complementarities will be positive or negative.  This framework and these results propose 
an approach to model specific strategic interdependencies desired in a model.  The 
specific situation desired can be tailored by appropriate combinations of games into a 
multiple game environment. 
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Extensions 
Several natural extensions that consider other types of multiple game 
environments related to the present work are readily evident.  First, there some ways one 
could expand the analysis of the four games used in the present paper.  Here, the 
matching of past experience is limited to the cases where both players have experience in 
a single game or where one player has experience in two games while her opponent has 
experience in a single game.  Instead, one could investigate the case where both players 
have two-game experience.  For instance, match a player with {PD, CH}-experience 
against another with {SH, CH}-experience, and then compare their performance along 
several dimensions: in familiar games, in unfamiliar games, in the common CH game, 
and in the entire set.  Another expansion to consider would be to use the same four 
games, but also consider three-game and the four-game settings. 
Along these lines, one could also widen the set of available games beyond the 
four employed here.  The individual players would have distinctive experience with 
different sets of games that may or may not include a common game.  These models 
would allow us to see whether some games have a consistently larger impact on future 
play than others.  Additionally, these models with expanded game sets would enable us to 
more thoroughly explore the issues of context, such as if the experience of playing a 
particular game, say the PD, depends on the context within which it is played. 
Using agent based modeling allows the large number of possible combinations of 
sets of games discussed in these extensions to be reasonable managed.  Ideally, one could 
initially explore these environments using agent based modeling and then use laboratory 
experiments and analytic techniques to delve deeper into those combinations that produce 
the most interesting results. 
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Table 4.1.  Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Chicken, and Battle of the Sexes 
for the natural outcome context. 
For all four games, action 0 corresponds to the natural strategy  
consistent with the Rapoport, Guyer, and Gordon (1976) taxonomy. 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)  Stag Hunt (SH) 
 RGG #12    RGG #61  
             0 1     0 1  
 0 2, 2 4, 1    0 4,4 1, 3  
 1 1, 4 3, 3    1 3, 1 2, 2  
           
           
           
Chicken (CH)  Battle of the Sexes (BS) 
 RGG #66    RGG #69  
             0 1     0 1  
 0 3, 3 2, 4    0 2, 2 4,3  
 1 4, 2 1, 1    1 3, 4 1, 1  
 
Legend 
Bold type indicates the natural outcome, the (0, 0) of each game8
Italic type indicates Pareto optimal outcomes 
 
            indicates a Nash equilibrium of the stage game 
 
 
Table 4.2.  Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, and Chicken 
for the cooperate/defect context. 
For all three games, action C corresponds to the cooperative or other-regarding strategy 
and action D corresponds to defecting or self-regarding strategy. 
 
Legend 
Italic type indicates Pareto optimal outcomes 
            indicates a Nash equilibrium of the stage game  
                                                 
8 See footnote 1. 
 PD#  SH#  CH# 
         
 C D  C D  C D 
C 3, 3 1, 4 C 4, 4 1, 3 C 3, 3 2, 4 
D 4, 1 2, 2 D 3, 1 2, 2 D 4, 2 1, 1 
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Table 4.3.  Games and experience specification of experiment trials. 
Trial Games Played Row Player’s Experience 
Column Player’s 
Experience 
One-game v. one-game experience trials for the natural outcome context 
1 PD & SH PD SH 
2 PD & CH PD CH 
3 PD & BS PD BS 
4 SH & CH SH CH 
5 SH & BS SH BS 
6 CH & BS CH BS 
Two-game v. one-game experience trials for the natural outcome context 
7 PD & SH PD & SH PD 
8 PD & SH PD & SH SH 
9 PD & CH PD & CH PD 
10 PD & CH PD & CH CH 
11 PD & BS PD & BS PD 
12 PD & BS PD & BS BS 
13 SH & CH SH & CH SH 
14 SH & CH SH & CH CH 
15 SH & BS SH & BS SH 
16 SH & BS SH & BS CH 
17 CH & BS CH & BS CH 
18 CH & BS CH & BS BS 
Trials for the cooperate/defect context 
19 PD# & SH# PD# SH# 
20 PD# & CH# PD# CH# 
21 PD# & SH# PD# & SH# PD# 
22 PD# & SH# PD# & SH# SH# 
23 PD# & CH# PD# & CH# PD# 
24 PD# & CH# PD# & CH# CH# 
Legend: PD, PD# = Prisoner’s Dilemma 
   SH, BS# = Stag Hunt 
   CH, CH# = Chicken  
   BS = Battle of the Sexes 
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Table 4.4.  Key simulation parameters common to all trials.9
Type 
 





 runs 100 Independent runs per trial 
generations 1 No evolution of strategies 
popSize10 30  Automata in row and column populations 




rounds 160 Rounds per game 
noise 0 No misreporting of opponents’ actions 
discount 1 Time discount factor 
matchType mean 
Each round, each row population automaton is 





costParA4 1 Accessible states in any game determine cost 
costParB4 2 Cost increases quadratically 
costParA0,A1,A2,A3 0 Cost 1, Cost 2, and Cost 3 are not used 




                                                 
9 See Appendix to Chapter 2 for detailed definitions of these parameters. 
10 Same parameter values for row and column populations. 
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Table 4.5.  Profits in settings where both players have experience in a single game 
for the natural outcome context. 
 





















Games played are Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Chicken (CH)
(Trial 2)




Games played are Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Battle of the Sexes (BS)
(Trial 3)




Games played are Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Stag Hunt (SH)
(Trial 1)




Table 4.5.  Profits in settings where both players have experience in a single game 
for the natural outcome context (continued). 
 






























Games played are Stag Hunt (SH) and Battle of the Sexes (BS)
(Trial 5)
Mean of SH & BS
Table 4.5.d.
Games played are Stag Hunt (SH) and Chicken (CH)
(Trial 4)





Table 4.6.  Cost in settings where both players have experience in a single game 
for the natural outcome context. 
 






















Games played are Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Stag Hunt (SH)
(Trial 1)




Games played are Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Chicken (CH)
(Trial 2)




Games played are Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Battle of the Sexes (BS)
(Trial 3)





Table 4.6.  Cost in two-game environments where both players have experience in a 
single game for the natural outcome context (continued). 
 






























Games played are Stag Hunt (SH) and Battle of the Sexes (BS)
(Trial 5)
Mean of SH & BS
Table 4.6.d.
Games played are Stag Hunt (SH) and Chicken (CH)
(Trial 4)





Table 4.7.  Scores in settings where both players have experience in a single game 
for the natural outcome context. 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column score – Row score) ≠ 0. 
 
In game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD SH PD SH PD SH




Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD CH PD CH PD CH




Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD BS PD BS PD BS






Games played are Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Battle of the Sexes (BS)





Games played are Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Chicken (CH)





Games played are Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Stag Hunt (SH)





Table 4.7.  Scores in settings where both players have experience in a single game 
for the natural outcome context (continued). 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column score – Row score) ≠ 0. 
 
In game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH CH SH CH SH CH




Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH BS SH BS SH BS




Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: CH BS CH BS CH BS






Games played are Chicken (CH) and Battle of the Sexes (BS)
(Trial 6)




Games played are Stag Hunt (SH) and Battle of the Sexes (BS)
(Trial 5)




Games played are Stag Hunt (SH) and Chicken (CH)
(Trial 4)




Table 4.8.  Action 0 usage frequencies in settings where both players have experience in 
a single game for the natural outcome context. 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column frequency – Row frequency) ≠ 0. 
 
Action 0 usage frequency in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD SH PD SH PD SH
Frequency: 0.993 0.671 0.721 0.806 0.857 0.738
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Action 0 usage frequency in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD CH PD CH PD CH
Frequency: 0.990 0.509 0.734 0.427 0.862 0.468
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Action 0 usage frequency in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD BS PD BS PD BS




Table 4.8.a: PD experience v. SH experience in {PD, SH} two-game setting.






Table 4.8.c: PD experience v. BS experience in {PD, BS} two-game setting.
PD BS Mean of PD & BS
-14.831 -3.594 -8.756
Table 4.8.b: PD experience v. CH experience in {PD, CH} two-game setting.




Table 4.8.  Action 0 usage frequencies in settings where both players have experience in 
a single game for the natural outcome context (continued). 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column frequency – Row frequency) ≠ 0. 
 
Action 0 usage frequency in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH CH SH CH SH CH
Frequency: 0.804 0.518 0.604 0.420 0.704 0.469
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Action 0 usage frequency in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH BS SH BS SH BS
Frequency: 0.802 0.524 0.631 0.531 0.717 0.527
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Action 0 usage frequency in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: CH BS CH BS CH BS
Frequency: 0.421 0.511 0.496 0.529 0.458 0.520
t-statisitic:
p-value:




Table 4.8.d: SH experience v. CH experience in {PD, SH} two-game setting.
SH CH Mean of SH & CH




Table 4.8.f: CH experience v. BS experience in {PD, BS} two-game setting.






Table 4.9.  Frequencies of initial states that play action 0 in settings where both players 
have experience in a single game for the natural outcome context. 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column frequency – Row frequency) ≠ 0. 
 
In game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD SH PD SH PD SH




Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD CH PD CH PD CH




Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD BS PD BS PD BS






Games played are Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Battle of the Sexes (BS)
(Trial 3)




Games played are Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Chicken (CH)
(Trial 2)




Games played are Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Stag Hunt (SH)
(Trial 1)




Table 4.9.  Frequencies of initial states that play action 0 in settings where both players 
have experience in a single game for the natural outcome context (continued). 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column frequency – Row frequency) ≠ 0. 
 
In game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH CH SH CH SH CH




Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH BS SH BS SH BS




Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: CH BS CH BS CH BS




Games played are Stag Hunt (SH) and Chicken (CH)
(Trial 4)




Games played are Stag Hunt (SH) and Battle of the Sexes (BS)
(Trial 5)




Games played are Chicken (CH) and Battle of the Sexes (BS)
(Trial 6)
CH BS Mean of CH & BS
1.513 1.112 1.700
0.1328 0.2686 0.0907  
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Table 4.10.  Frequencies of accessible states that play action 0 in settings where both 
players have experience in a single game for the natural outcome context. 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column frequency – Row frequency) ≠ 0. 
 
In game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD SH PD SH PD SH




Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD CH PD CH PD CH




Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD BS PD BS PD BS




Games played are Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Stag Hunt (SH)
(Trial 1)




Games played are Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Chicken (CH)
(Trial 2)




Games played are Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Battle of the Sexes (BS)
(Trial 3)
PD BS Mean of PD & BS
-27.918 -2.066 -9.805
0.0000 0.0411 0.0000  
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Table 4.10.  Frequencies of accessible states that play action 0 in settings where both 
players have experience in a single game for the natural outcome context (continued). 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column frequency – Row frequency) ≠ 0. 
 
In game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH CH SH CH SH CH




Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH BS SH BS SH BS




Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: CH BS CH BS CH BS




Games played are Stag Hunt (SH) and Chicken (CH)
(Trial 4)




Games played are Stag Hunt (SH) and Battle of the Sexes (BS)
(Trial 5)




Games played are Chicken (CH) and Battle of the Sexes (BS)
(Trial 6)
CH BS Mean of CH & BS
1.521 0.326 1.109
0.1309 0.7451 0.2688  
  
211 
Table 4.11.  Frequencies of states that reciprocate action 0 in settings where both players 
have experience in a single game for the natural outcome context. 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column frequency – Row frequency) ≠ 0. 
 
0-reciprocating states in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD SH PD SH PD SH
Frequency: 0.996 0.604 0.644 0.813 0.820 0.708
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Column Frequency – Row Frequency) ≠ 0
0-reciprocating states in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD CH PD CH PD CH
Frequency: 0.996 0.505 0.644 0.437 0.820 0.471
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Column Frequency – Row Frequency) ≠ 0
0-reciprocating states in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD BS PD BS PD BS
Frequency: 0.996 0.510 0.649 0.550 0.823 0.530
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Column Frequency – Row Frequency) ≠ 0
0.0000 0.0531 0.0000
Table 4.11.c: PD experience v. BS experience in {PD, BS} two-game setting.




Table 4.11.b: PD experience v. CH experience in {PD, CH} two-game setting.
PD CH Mean of PD & CH
-21.531 4.168 -4.270
0.0000 0.0001 0.0478
Table 4.11.a: PD experience v. SH experience in {PD, SH} two-game setting.




Table 4.11.  Frequencies of states that reciprocate action 0 in settings where both players 
have experience in a single game for the natural outcome context (continued). 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column frequency – Row frequency) ≠ 0. 
 
0-reciprocating states in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH CH SH CH SH CH
Frequency: 0.813 0.503 0.605 0.437 0.709 0.470
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Column Frequency – Row Frequency) ≠ 0
0-reciprocating states in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH BS SH BS SH BS
Frequency: 0.813 0.510 0.603 0.550 0.708 0.530
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Column Frequency – Row Frequency) ≠ 0
0-reciprocating states in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: CH BS CH BS CH BS
Frequency: 0.437 0.508 0.508 0.550 0.472 0.529
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Column Frequency – Row Frequency) ≠ 0
Table 4.11.d: SH experience v. CH experience in {SH, CH} two-game setting.
SH CH Mean of SH & CH
-7.233 -3.332 -5.918
0.0000 0.0011 0.0000
Table 4.11.e: SH experience v. BS experience in {SH, BS} two-game setting.




Table 4.11.f: CH experience v. BS experience in {CH, BS} two-game setting.





Table 4.12.  Outcome distributions in settings where both players have experience in a 
single game for the natural outcome context. 
 
0 1 0 1
0 66.6% 32.7% 0 50.3% 48.8%
1 0.5% 0.2% 1 0.6% 0.4%
efficiency: 16.8% efficiency: 25.1%
entropy: 0.97 entropy: 1.08
0 1 0 1
0 56.9% 15.3% 0 30.9% 42.5%
1 23.7% 4.2% 1 11.8% 14.8%
efficiency: 56.9% efficiency: 85.2%
















Outcomes in     





Outcomes in     
CH                
within {PD, CH}
Table 4.12.a. Table 4.12.b.
Two-game set: {PD, SH} Two-game set: {PD, CH}
Outcomes in     





Outcomes in     








Table 4.12.  Outcome distributions in settings where both players have experience in a 
single game for the natural outcome context (continued). 
 
0 1 0 1
0 52.6% 46.7% 0 42.0% 38.4%
1 0.5% 0.2% 1 9.8% 9.8%
efficiency: 23.8% efficiency: 42.0%
entropy: 1.06 entropy: 1.71
0 1 0 1
0 37.8% 35.1% 0 27.6% 32.9%
1 16.3% 10.7% 1 14.4% 25.1%
efficiency: 66.6% efficiency: 74.9%
entropy: 1.83 entropy: 1.94
Table 4.12.c. Table 4.12.d.
Two-game set: {PD, BS} Two-game set: {SH, CH}
Outcomes in     





Outcomes in     











Outcomes in     





Outcomes in     














Table 4.12.  Outcome distributions in settings where both players have experience in a 
single game for the natural outcome context (continued). 
 
0 1 0 1
0 43.0% 37.3% 0 21.7% 20.4%
1 9.4% 10.3% 1 29.5% 28.5%
efficiency: 43.0% efficiency: 71.5%
entropy: 1.71 entropy: 1.98
0 1 0 1
0 35.3% 27.8% 0 27.1% 22.4%
1 17.8% 19.1% 1 25.8% 24.6%
efficiency: 59.7% efficiency: 59.1%







Outcomes in     





Outcomes in     











Outcomes in     





Outcomes in     





Two-game set: {SH, BS} Two-game set: {CH, BS}
Table 4.12.e. Table 4.12.f.
 
216 
Table 4.13.  Frequencies of states that play Tit-for-Tat in settings where both players 
have experience in a single game for the natural outcome context. 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column frequency – Row frequency) ≠ 0. 
 
In game:
Player: Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD SH PD SH




Player: Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD CH PD CH




Player: Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD BS PD BS





Games played are Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Battle of the Sexes (BS)
(Trial 3)








Games played are Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Chicken (CH)
(Trial 2)







Games played are Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Stag Hunt (SH)
(Trial 1)







Table 4.13.  Frequencies of states that play Tit-for-Tat in settings where both players 
have experience in a single game for the natural outcome context (continued). 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column frequency – Row frequency) ≠ 0. 
 
In game:
Player: Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH CH SH CH




Player: Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH BS SH BS




Player: Row Column Row Column
Experience: CH BS CH BS





Games played are Chicken (CH) and Battle of the Sexes (BS)
(Trial 6)








Games played are Stag Hunt (SH) and Battle of the Sexes (BS)
(Trial 5)







Games played are Stag Hunt (SH) and Chicken (CH)
(Trial 4)







Table 4.14.  Profits in settings when row player has {PD, SH}-experience & column 
player has either PD-experience or SH-experience for the natural outcome context. 
 















Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
Population 2 profit - Population 1 profit:
t-statisitic:
p-value: 0.0000





Table 4.14.d: Differences in Profit between {PD, SH} experience when opponent.
has {PD} experience and when opponent has {SH} experience.






when facing the same {PD, SH} experience opponent.
Table 4.14.a: {PD, SH} experience v. {PD} experience in {PD, SH} two-game setting.
Both PD & SH
-22.347
0.0469
Table 4.14.b: {PD, SH} experience v. {SH} experience in {PD, SH} two-game setting.
Both PD & SH
-24.979
0.0000




Table 4.15.  Profits in settings when row population has {PD, CH}-experience & column 
population has either PD-experience or CH-experience for the natural outcome context. 
 















Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
Population 2 profit - Population 1 profit:
t-statisitic:
p-value:
when facing the same {PD, CH} experience opponent.
Table 4.15.a: {PD, CH} experience v. {PD} experience in {PD, CH} two-game setting.
Both PD & CH
-24.006
0.0000
Table 4.15.b: {PD, CH} experience v. {CH} experience in {PD, CH} two-game setting.
Both PD & CH
-20.893
0.0000
Table 4.15.c: Differences in Profit between {PD} experience and {CH} experience
0.0002





Table 4.15.d: Differences in Profit between {PD, CH} experience when opponent
has {PD} experience and when opponent has{CH} experience.









Table 4.16.  Profits in settings when row population has {PD, BS}-experience & column 
population has either PD-experience or BS-experience for the natural outcome context. 
 















Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
Population 2 profit - Population 1 profit:
t-statisitic:
p-value:
when facing the same {PD, BS} experience opponent.
Table 4.16.a: {PD, BS} experience v. {PD} experience in {PD, BS} two-game setting.
Both PD & BS
-19.168
0.0000
Table 4.16.b: {PD, BS} experience v. {BS} experience in {PD, BS} two-game setting.
Both PD & BS
-21.289
0.0000
Table 4.16.c: Differences in Profit between {PD} experience and {BS} experience
0.0000





Table 4.16.d: Differences in Profit between {PD, BS} experience when opponent
has {PD} experience and when opponent has{BS} experience.









Table 4.17.  Profits in settings when row population has {SH, CH}-experience & column 
population has either SH-experience or CH-experience for the natural outcome context. 
 















Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
Population 2 profit - Population 1 profit:
t-statisitic:
p-value:
when facing the same {SH, CH} experience opponent.
Table 4.17.a: {SH, CH} experience v. {SH} experience in {SH, CH} two-game setting.
Both SH & CH
-15.269
0.0470
Table 4.17.b: {SH, CH} experience v. {CH} experience in {SH, CH} two-game setting.
Both SH & CH
-11.103
0.0000
Table 4.17.c: Differences in Profit between {SH} experience and {CH} experience
0.0000





Table 4.17.d: Differences in Profit between {SH, CH} experience when opponent
has {SH} experience and when opponent has{CH} experience.









Table 4.18.  Profits in settings when row population has {SH, BS}-experience & column 
population has either SH-experience or BS-experience for the natural outcome context. 
 















Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
Population 2 profit - Population 1 profit:
t-statisitic:
p-value:
when facing the same {SH, BS} experience opponent.
Table 4.18.a: {SH, BS} experience v. {SH} experience in {SH, BS} two-game setting.
Both SH & BS
-16.306
0.0000
Table 4.18.b: {SH, BS} experience v. {BS} experience in {SH, BS} two-game setting.
Both SH & BS
-13.797
0.0000
Table 4.18.c: Differences in Profit between {SH} experience and {BS} experience
0.0008





Table 4.18.d: Differences in Profit between {SH, BS} experience when opponent
has {SH} experience and when opponent has{BS} experience.









Table 4.19.  Profits in settings when row population has {CH, BS}-experience & column 
population has either CH-experience or BS-experience for the natural outcome context. 
 















Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
Population 2 profit - Population 1 profit:
t-statisitic:
p-value: 0.2625





Table 4.19.d: Differences in Profit between {CH, BS} experience when opponent
has {CH} experience and when opponent has{BS} experience.






when facing the same {CH, BS} experience opponent.
Table 4.19.a: {CH, BS} experience v. {CH} experience in {CH, BS} two-game setting.
Both CH & BS
-12.542
0.0000
Table 4.19.b: {CH, BS} experience v. {BS} experience in {CH, BS} two-game setting.
Both CH & BS
-14.113
0.0000




Table 4.20.  Outcome distributions in settings where the row player has  
{PD, SH}-experience & the column player has either PD- or SH-experience 
for the natural outcome context. 
0 1 0 1
0 99.4% 0.4% 0 66.0% 33.0%
1 0.3% 0.0% 1 0.7% 0.3%
efficiency: 0.3% efficiency: 17.1%
entropy: 0.06 entropy: 1.00
0 1 0 1
0 71.0% 27.6% 0 80.2% 19.1%
1 0.8% 0.6% 1 0.2% 0.5%
efficiency: 71.0% efficiency: 80.2%







Outcomes in     





Outcomes in     











Outcomes in     





Outcomes in     
PD                
within {PD, SH}




Experience: {PD, SH} v {PD} Experience: {PD, SH} v {SH}




Table 4.21.  Scores in settings when row population has {PD, SH}-experience & column 
population has either PD-experience or SH-experience for the natural outcome context. 
t-statistics are for (Column profit – Row profit) ≠ 0 or (Pop. 2 profit – Pop. 1 profit) ≠ 0 
 
Score in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD&SH PD PD&SH PD PD&SH PD




Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD&SH SH PD&SH SH PD&SH SH




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):








Table 4.21.b: {PD, SH} experience v. {SH} experience in {PD, SH} two-game setting.
SH Mean of PD & SH
6.768 6.760
0.0000 0.0477




Table 4.21.c: Differences in Score between {PD} experience and {SH} experience




SH Mean of PD&SH




Table 4.21.d: Differences in Score between {PD, SH} experience when opponent
has {PD} experience and when opponent has{SH} experience.










SH Mean of PD&SH
PD&SH (v PD) PD&SH (v PD)
PD&SH (v SH) PD&SH (v SH)
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Table 4.22.  Profits in settings where both players have experience in a single game 
for the cooperate / defect context. 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column score – Row score) ≠ 0. 
In game: In game:
Player: Row Column Player: Row Column
Experience: PD# SH# Experience: PD# CH#
Profit: 0.302 -1.114 Profit: -0.130 -0.998
t-statisitic: t-statisitic:
p-value: p-value:
Table 4.22.a.  Profit when Table 4.22.b.  Profit when
games played are PD# and CH#.
Jointly in PD# & CH#
-8.490
0.0000
Jointly in PD# & SH#
-17.312





Table 4.23.  Scores in settings where both players have experience in a single game 
for the cooperate / defect context. 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column score – Row score) ≠ 0. 
 
In game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD# SH# PD# SH# PD# SH#




Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD# CH# PD# CH# PD# CH#





Table 4.23.a.  Score in {PD#, SH#}.
Table 4.23.b.  Score in {PD#, CH#}.
PD# CH# Mean of PD# & CH#
0.0000 0.0000 0.0470





Table 4.24.  Profits in settings where row player has {PD#, SH#}-experience 
and column player has either PD#-experience or SH#-experience  
for the cooperate/defect context 
 















Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
t-statisitic:





Table 4.24.d: Differences in Profit between {PD#, SH#} experience when opponent
has {PD#} experience and when opponent has {SH#} experience.




when facing the same {PD#, SH#} experience opponent.
Table 4.24.a: {PD#, SH#} experience v. {PD#} experience in {PD#, SH#} two-game setting.
Both PD# & SH#
-21.806
0.0475
Table 4.24.b: {PD#, SH#} experience v. {SH#} experience in {PD#, SH#} two-game setting.
Both PD# & SH#
-25.624
0.0000
Table 4.24.c: Differences in Profit between {PD#} experience and {SH#} experience
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Table 4.25.  Profits in settings where row player has {PD#, CH#}-experience 
and column player has either PD#-experience or CH#-experience  
for the cooperate/defect context 
 















Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
t-statisitic:
when facing the same {PD#, CH#} experience opponent.
Table 4.25.a: {PD#, CH#} experience v. {PD#} experience in {PD#, CH#} two-game setting.
Both PD# & CH#
-14.670
0.0000
Table 4.25.b: {PD#, CH#} experience v. {CH#} experience in {PD#, CH#} two-game setting.
Both PD# & CH#
-17.668
0.0000
Table 4.25.c: Differences in Profit between {PD#} experience and {CH#} experience





Table 4.25.d: Differences in Profit between {PD#, CH#} experience when opponent
has {PD#} experience and when opponent has {CH#} experience.






Table 4.26.  Scores in settings where row player has {PD#, SH#}-experience 
and column player has either PD#-experience or SH#-experience  
for the cooperate/defect context. 
 
t-statistics are for (Column profit – Row profit) ≠ 0 or (Pop. 2 profit – Pop. 1 profit) ≠ 0 
 
Score in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD#&SH# PD# PD#&SH# PD# PD#&SH# PD#




Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD#&SH# SH# PD#&SH# SH# PD#&SH# SH#




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
















Table 4.26.c: Differences in Score between {PD#} experience and {SH#} experience









Table 4.26.d: Differences in Score between {PD#, SH#} experience when opponent
has {PD#} experience and when opponent has{SH#} experience.











PD#&SH# (v PD#) PD#&SH# (v PD#)
PD#&SH# (v SH#) PD#&SH# (v SH#)
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Table 4.27.  Scores in settings where row player has {PD#, CH#}-experience 
and column player has either PD#-experience or CH#-experience  
for the cooperate/defect context. 
 
t-statistics are for (Column profit – Row profit) ≠ 0 or (Pop. 2 profit – Pop. 1 profit) ≠ 0 
 
Score in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD#&CH# PD# PD#&CH# PD# PD#&CH# PD#




Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD#&CH# CH# PD#&CH# CH# PD#&CH# CH#




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):






PD#&CH# (v PD#) PD#&CH# (v PD#)









Table 4.27.d: Differences in Score between {PD#, CH#} experience when opponent
has {PD#} experience and when opponent has{CH#} experience.






Table 4.27.c: Differences in Score between {PD#} experience and {CH#} experience





PD# (PD#&CH#) PD# (PD#&CH#)
PD#











Table 4.28.  Outcome distributions in settings where both players have experience 
in a single game in the cooperate/defect context. 
 
C D C D
C 0.4% 0.1% C 0.6% 0.1%
D 58.0% 41.5% D 48.1% 51.1%
efficiency: 29.5% efficiency: 24.8%
entropy: 1.03 entropy: 1.06
C D C D
C 23.3% 4.5% C 11.0% 17.8%
D 57.2% 15.0% D 29.6% 41.6%
efficiency: 23.3% efficiency: 58.4%
entropy: 1.56 entropy: 1.84
Table 4.28.a. Table 4.28.b.
Two-game set: {PD#, SH#} Two-game set: {PD#, CH#}
Outcomes in        





Outcomes in        











Outcomes in        





Outcomes in        














Table 4.29.  Outcome distributions in settings where the row player has  
{PD#, SH#}-experience & the column player has either PD#- or SH#-experience  
for the cooperate/defect context. 
C D C D
C 0.0% 10.3% C 12.1% 2.0%
D 0.3% 89.4% D 49.7% 36.2%
efficiency: 5.3% efficiency: 37.9%
entropy: 0.51 entropy: 1.51
C D C D
C 5.8% 9.1% C 27.3% 2.4%
D 22.4% 62.8% D 54.1% 16.2%
efficiency: 5.8% efficiency: 27.3%







Outcomes in        





Outcomes in        











Outcomes in        





Outcomes in         
PD#                    
within {PD#, SH#}




Experience: {PD#, SH#} v {PD#} Experience: {PD#, SH#} v {SH#}




Table 4.30.  Outcome distributions in settings where the row player has  
{PD#, CH#}-experience & the column player has either PD#- or CH#-experience  
for the cooperate/defect context. 
C D C D
C 0.0% 13.2% C 7.4% 7.8%
D 0.2% 86.5% D 39.8% 45.0%
efficiency: 6.8% efficiency: 31.2%
entropy: 0.59 entropy: 1.61
C D C D
C 8.8% 23.8% C 12.9% 21.9%
D 18.4% 49.0% D 27.1% 38.2%
efficiency: 51.0% efficiency: 61.8%
entropy: 1.76 entropy: 1.90




Experience: {PD#, CH#} v {PD#} Experience: {PD#, CH#} v {CH#}







Outcomes in        





Outcomes in         








Outcomes in        





Outcomes in        











Table 4.A.1.  Distinct states activated (DSA) in both games in settings where both players 
have experience in a single game for the natural outcome context. 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column statistic – Row statistic) ≠ 0. 
 
Games: Games:
Player: Row Column Player: Row Column
Experience: PD SH Experience: PD CH




Player: Row Column Player: Row Column
Experience: PD BS Experience: SH CH




Player: Row Column Player: Row Column
Experience: SH BS Experience: CH BS
DSA in both: 4.995 4.926 DSA in both: 5.138 5.076
t-statisitic: t-statisitic:
p-value: p-value:
Table 4.A.1.a: PD experience v. SH 
experience in {PD, SH} setting.
Table 4.A.1.b: PD experience v. CH 
experience in {PD, CH} setting.
Both PD & SH Both PD & CH
-1.301 -0.226
0.1948 0.8218
Table 4.A.1.c: PD experience v. BS 
experience in {PD, BS} setting.
Table 4.A.1.d: SH experience v. CH 
experience in {SH, CH} setting.
Both PD & BS Mean of SH & CH
-1.164 -0.357
0.2459 0.7214
Table 4.A.1.e: SH experience v. BS 
experience in {SH, BS} setting.
Table 4.A.1.f: CH experience v. BS 
experience in {CH, BS} setting.
Mean of SH & BS Mean of CH & BS
-0.364 -0.313
0.7163 0.7546  
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Table 4.A.2.  Distinct initial states (DIS) in settings where both players have experience 
in a single game for the natural outcome context. 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column statistic – Row statistic) ≠ 0. 
 
Games: Games:
Player: Row Column Player: Row Column
Experience: PD SH Experience: PD CH




Player: Row Column Player: Row Column
Experience: PD BS Experience: SH CH




Player: Row Column Player: Row Column
Experience: SH BS Experience: CH BS
DIS: 4.995 4.926 DIS: 5.138 5.076
t-statisitic: t-statisitic:
p-value: p-value:
Table 4.A.2.a: PD experience v. SH 
experience in {PD, SH} setting.
Table 4.A.2.b: PD experience v. CH 
experience in {PD, CH} setting.
Both PD & SH Both PD & CH
-1.301 -0.226
0.1948 0.8218
Table 4.A.2.c: PD experience v. BS 
experience in {PD, BS} setting.
Table 4.A.2.d: SH experience v. CH 
experience in {SH, CH} setting.
Both PD & BS Mean of SH & CH
-1.164 -0.357
0.2459 0.7214
Table 4.A.2.e: SH experience v. BS 
experience in {SH, BS} setting.
Table 4.A.2.f: CH experience v. BS 
experience in {CH, BS} setting.
Mean of SH & BS Mean of CH & BS
-0.364 -0.313
0.7163 0.7546  
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Table 4.A.3.  Automaton-level state activation similarity (ALSAS) in settings where both 
players have experience in a single game for the natural outcome context. 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column statistic – Row statistic) ≠ 0. 
 
Games: Games:
Player: Row Column Player: Row Column
Experience: PD SH Experience: PD CH




Player: Row Column Player: Row Column
Experience: PD BS Experience: SH CH




Player: Row Column Player: Row Column
Experience: SH BS Experience: CH BS
ALSAS: 63.408 63.760 ALSAS: 61.927 64.038
t-statisitic: t-statisitic:
p-value: p-value:





Table 4.A.3.e: SH experience v. BS 
experience in {SH, BS} setting.
Table 4.A.3.f: CH experience v. BS 
experience in {CH, BS} setting.
0.7795 0.7009
Table 4.A.3.c: PD experience v. BS 
experience in {PD, BS} setting.
Table 4.A.3.d: SH experience v. CH 
experience in {SH, CH} setting.
Both PD & BS Mean of SH & CH
Table 4.A.3.a: PD experience v. SH 
experience in {PD, SH} setting.
Table 4.A.3.b: PD experience v. CH 
experience in {PD, CH} setting.





Table 4.A.4.  Frequencies of accessible states across both games in settings where both 
players have experience in a single game for the natural outcome context. 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column statistic – Row statistic) ≠ 0. 
 
Games: Games:
Player: Row Column Player: Row Column
Experience: PD SH Experience: PD CH




Player: Row Column Player: Row Column
Experience: PD BS Experience: SH CH




Player: Row Column Player: Row Column
Experience: SH BS Experience: CH BS
Accessible: 0.647 0.663 Accessible: 0.650 0.672
t-statisitic: t-statisitic:
p-value: p-value:





Table 4.A.4.e: SH experience v. BS 
experience in {SH, BS} setting.
Table 4.A.4.f: CH experience v. BS 
experience in {CH, BS} setting.
0.8809 0.5713
Table 4.A.4.c: PD experience v. BS 
experience in {PD, BS} setting.
Table 4.A.4.d: SH experience v. CH 
experience in {SH, CH} setting.
Both PD & BS Mean of SH & CH
Table 4.A.4.a: PD experience v. SH 
experience in {PD, SH} setting.
Table 4.A.4.b: PD experience v. CH 
experience in {PD, CH} setting.





Table 4.A.5.  Mean states activated in settings where both players have experience 
in a single game for the natural outcome context. 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column statistic – Row statistic) ≠ 0. 
 
Table 4.A.5.a: PD experience v. SH experience in {PD, SH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD SH PD SH PD SH
Mean states activated: 1.407 4.019 4.249 1.354 2.828 2.686
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.5.b: PD experience v. CH experience in {PD, CH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD CH PD CH PD CH
Mean states activated: 1.407 4.116 4.232 1.452 2.820 2.784
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.5.c: PD experience v. BS experience in {PD, BS} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD BS PD BS PD BS
Mean states activated: 1.407 4.054 4.242 1.296 2.825 2.675
t-statisitic:
p-value: 0.0000 0.0000 0.1337





PD CH Both PD & CH





Table 4.A.5.  Mean states activated in settings where both players have experience 
in a single game for the natural outcome context (continued). 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column statistic – Row statistic) ≠ 0. 
 
Table 4.A.5.d: SH experience v. CH experience in {PD, SH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH CH SH CH SH CH
Mean states activated: 1.357 4.207 4.404 1.456 2.881 2.832
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.5.e: SH experience v. BS experience in {PD, CH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH BS SH BS SH BS
Mean states activated: 1.361 4.180 4.253 1.297 2.807 2.739
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.5.f: CH experience v. BS experience in {PD, BS} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: CH BS CH BS CH BS
Mean states activated: 1.454 4.337 4.333 1.292 2.894 2.814
t-statisitic:
p-value:
SH CH Both SH & CH
18.685 -21.005 -0.479
0.0000 0.0000 0.6328









Table 4.A.6.  Population-level state activation similarity (PLSAS) in settings where both 
players have experience in a single game for the natural outcome context. 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column statistic – Row statistic) ≠ 0. 
 
Table 4.A.6.a: PD experience v. SH experience in {PD, SH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD SH PD SH PD SH
PLSAS: 0.259 7.314 7.098 0.257 3.678 3.786
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.6.b: PD experience v. CH experience in {PD, CH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD CH PD CH PD CH
PLSAS: 0.260 7.366 6.865 0.311 3.562 3.838
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.6.c: PD experience v. BS experience in {PD, BS} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD BS PD BS PD BS
PLSAS: 0.258 7.292 7.376 0.228 3.817 3.760
t-statisitic:
p-value: 0.0000 0.0000 0.7604





PD CH Both PD & CH





Table 4.A.6.  Population-level state activation similarity (PLSAS) in settings where both 
players have experience in a single game for the natural outcome context (continued). 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column statistic – Row statistic) ≠ 0. 
 
Table 4.A.6.d: SH experience v. CH experience in {PD, SH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH CH SH CH SH CH
PLSAS: 0.208 7.137 6.839 0.325 3.524 3.731
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.6.e: SH experience v. BS experience in {PD, CH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH BS SH BS SH BS
PLSAS: 0.263 6.978 7.248 0.257 3.756 3.617
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.6.f: CH experience v. BS experience in {PD, BS} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: CH BS CH BS CH BS
PLSAS: 0.259 7.418 7.319 0.252 3.789 3.835
t-statisitic:
p-value:
SH CH Both SH & CH
25.688 -21.985 1.008
0.0000 0.0000 0.3148









Table 4.A.7.  Frequencies of accessible states per game in settings where both players 
have experience in a single game for the natural outcome context. 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column statistic – Row statistic) ≠ 0. 
 
Table 4.A.7.a: PD experience v. SH experience in {PD, SH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD SH PD SH PD SH
Accessible states: 0.089 0.638 0.638 0.085 0.363 0.362
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.7.b: PD experience v. CH experience in {PD, CH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD CH PD CH PD CH
Accessible states: 0.089 0.632 0.644 0.092 0.366 0.362
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.7.c: PD experience v. BS experience in {PD, BS} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD BS PD BS PD BS
Accessible states: 0.089 0.655 0.638 0.082 0.363 0.368
t-statisitic:
p-value: 0.0000 0.0000 0.6135





PD CH Both PD & CH





Table 4.A.7.  Frequencies of accessible states per game in settings where both players 
have experience in a single game for the natural outcome context (continued). 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column statistic – Row statistic) ≠ 0. 
 
Table 4.A.7.d: SH experience v. CH experience in {PD, SH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH CH SH CH SH CH
Accessible states: 0.085 0.636 0.637 0.092 0.361 0.364
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.7.e: SH experience v. BS experience in {PD, CH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH BS SH BS SH BS
Accessible states: 0.085 0.651 0.637 0.082 0.361 0.366
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.7.f: CH experience v. BS experience in {PD, BS} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: CH BS CH BS CH BS
Accessible states: 0.092 0.660 0.642 0.082 0.367 0.371
t-statisitic:
p-value:
SH CH Both SH & CH
39.440 -39.367 0.335
0.0000 0.0000 0.7383









Table 4.A.8.  Frequencies of terminal states in settings where both players have 
experience in a single game for the natural outcome context. 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column statistic – Row statistic) ≠ 0. 
 
Table 4.A.8.a: PD experience v. SH experience in {PD, SH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD SH PD SH PD SH
Terminal states: 0.676 0.119 0.106 0.747 0.391 0.433
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.8.b: PD experience v. CH experience in {PD, CH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD CH PD CH PD CH
Terminal states: 0.676 0.107 0.104 0.678 0.390 0.393
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.8.c: PD experience v. BS experience in {PD, BS} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD BS PD BS PD BS
Terminal states: 0.676 0.122 0.108 0.776 0.392 0.449
t-statisitic:
p-value: 0.0000 0.0000 0.1173





PD CH Both PD & CH





Table 4.A.8.  Frequencies of terminal states in settings where both players have 
experience in a single game for the natural outcome context (continued). 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column statistic – Row statistic) ≠ 0. 
 
Table 4.A.8.d: SH experience v. CH experience in {PD, SH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH CH SH CH SH CH
Terminal states: 0.747 0.105 0.118 0.678 0.432 0.391
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.8.e: SH experience v. BS experience in {PD, CH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH BS SH BS SH BS
Terminal states: 0.747 0.123 0.123 0.776 0.435 0.449
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.8.f: CH experience v. BS experience in {PD, BS} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: CH BS CH BS CH BS
Terminal states: 0.678 0.117 0.099 0.776 0.388 0.446
t-statisitic:
p-value:
SH CH Both SH & CH
-14.534 11.763 -1.111
0.0000 0.0000 0.2678









Table 4.A.9.  Frequencies of counting states in settings where both players have 
experience in a single game for the natural outcome context. 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column statistic – Row statistic) ≠ 0. 
 
Table 4.A.9.a: PD experience v. SH experience in {PD, SH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD SH PD SH PD SH
Counting states: 0.151 0.101 0.101 0.122 0.126 0.111
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.9.b: PD experience v. CH experience in {PD, CH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD CH PD CH PD CH
Counting states: 0.151 0.106 0.098 0.138 0.124 0.122
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.9.c: PD experience v. BS experience in {PD, BS} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD BS PD BS PD BS
Counting states: 0.151 0.093 0.101 0.115 0.126 0.104
t-statisitic:
p-value: 0.0549 0.6371 0.3951





PD CH Both PD & CH





Table 4.A.9.  Frequencies of counting states in settings where both players have 
experience in a single game for the natural outcome context (continued). 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column statistic – Row statistic) ≠ 0. 
 
Table 4.A.9.d: SH experience v. CH experience in {PD, SH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH CH SH CH SH CH
Counting states: 0.122 0.104 0.100 0.138 0.111 0.121
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.9.e: SH experience v. BS experience in {PD, CH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH BS SH BS SH BS
Counting states: 0.122 0.093 0.097 0.115 0.109 0.104
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.9.f: CH experience v. BS experience in {PD, BS} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: CH BS CH BS CH BS
Counting states: 0.138 0.089 0.106 0.115 0.122 0.102
t-statisitic:
p-value: 0.0770 0.7637 0.4048





SH BS Both SH & BS





Table 4.A.10.  Frequencies of states that reciprocate action 1 in settings where both 
players have experience in a single game for the natural outcome context. 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column statistic – Row statistic) ≠ 0. 
 
Table 4.A.10.a: PD experience v. SH experience in {PD, SH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD SH PD SH PD SH
1-Reciprocating states: 0.014 0.420 0.329 0.197 0.172 0.308
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.10.b: PD experience v. CH experience in {PD, CH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD CH PD CH PD CH
1-Reciprocating states: 0.014 0.516 0.331 0.606 0.172 0.561
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.10.c: PD experience v. BS experience in {PD, BS} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD BS PD BS PD BS
1-Reciprocating states: 0.014 0.494 0.326 0.485 0.170 0.490
t-statisitic:
p-value: 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000





PD CH Both PD & CH





Table 4.A.10.  Frequencies of states that reciprocate action 1 in settings where both 
players have experience in a single game for the natural outcome context (continued). 
 
Welch’s t-statistics are for (Column statistic – Row statistic) ≠ 0. 
 
Table 4.A.10.d: SH experience v. CH experience in {PD, SH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH CH SH CH SH CH
1-Reciprocating states: 0.197 0.513 0.415 0.606 0.306 0.560
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Table 4.A.10.e: SH experience v. BS experience in {PD, CH} setting.
Game(s):
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH BS SH BS SH BS





Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: CH BS CH BS CH BS
1-Reciprocating states: 0.606 0.498 0.512 0.485 0.559 0.491
t-statisitic:
p-value: 0.0368 0.5938 0.1254





SH BS Both SH & BS





Table 4.A.11.  Outcome distributions in settings where the row player has 
{PD, CH}-experience & the column player has either PD- or CH-experience 
for the natural outcome context. 
 
0 1 0 1
0 82.3% 0.2% 0 40.1% 39.1%
1 16.9% 0.5% 1 8.8% 11.9%
efficiency: 9.1% efficiency: 35.9%
entropy: 0.73 entropy: 1.73
0 1 0 1
0 43.4% 18.4% 0 26.5% 36.6%
1 29.2% 9.1% 1 15.2% 21.7%
efficiency: 90.9% efficiency: 78.3%
entropy: 1.80 entropy: 1.93
Experience: {PD, CH} v {PD} Experience: {PD, CH} v {CH}
Two-game set: {PD, CH} Two-game set: {PD, CH}







Outcomes in     





Outcomes in     











Outcomes in     





Outcomes in     








Table 4.A.12.  Outcome distributions in settings where the row player has 
{PD, BS}-experience & the column player has either PD- or BS-experience 
for the natural outcome context. 
 
0 1 0 1
0 90.1% 0.5% 0 47.0% 40.7%
1 9.3% 0.1% 1 5.9% 6.4%
efficiency: 5.0% efficiency: 29.7%
entropy: 0.50 entropy: 1.54
0 1 0 1
0 50.6% 18.7% 0 34.1% 31.7%
1 23.7% 7.0% 1 19.9% 14.3%
efficiency: 62.7% efficiency: 65.2%
entropy: 1.71 entropy: 1.92




Experience: {PD, BS} v {PD} Experience: {PD, BS} v {BS}







Outcomes in     





Outcomes in     








Outcomes in     





Outcomes in     








Table 4.A.13.  Outcome distributions in settings where the row player has 
{SH, CH}-experience & the column player has either SH- or CH-experience 
for the natural outcome context. 
 
0 1 0 1
0 55.0% 6.1% 0 28.4% 26.3%
1 25.3% 13.6% 1 22.0% 23.3%
efficiency: 55.0% efficiency: 28.4%
entropy: 1.61 entropy: 1.99
0 1 0 1
0 34.6% 16.1% 0 15.4% 33.8%
1 28.6% 20.6% 1 25.4% 25.4%
efficiency: 79.4% efficiency: 74.6%
entropy: 1.94 entropy: 1.95




Experience: {SH, CH} v {SH} Experience: {SH, CH} v {CH}







Outcomes in     





Outcomes in     








Outcomes in     





Outcomes in     








Table 4.A.14.  Outcome distributions in settings where the row player has 
{SH, BS}-experience & the column player has either SH- or BS-experience 
for the natural outcome context.. 
 
0 1 0 1
0 67.2% 14.3% 0 38.8% 34.3%
1 13.6% 4.9% 1 14.3% 12.6%
efficiency: 67.2% efficiency: 38.8%
entropy: 1.39 entropy: 1.84
0 1 0 1
0 44.9% 20.4% 0 30.1% 30.3%
1 18.7% 16.0% 1 23.8% 15.8%
efficiency: 57.1% efficiency: 66.1%
entropy: 1.86 entropy: 1.96
Experience: {SH, BS} v {SH} Experience: {SH, BS} v {BS}
Two-game set: {SH, BS} Two-game set: {SH, BS}







Outcomes in     





Outcomes in     











Outcomes in     





Outcomes in     








Table 4.A.15.  Outcome distributions in settings where the row player has 
{CH, BS}-experience & the column player has either CH- or BS-experience 
for the natural outcome context.. 
 
0 1 0 1
0 22.6% 25.7% 0 25.8% 21.4%
1 19.3% 32.4% 1 27.5% 25.2%
efficiency: 67.6% efficiency: 74.8%
entropy: 1.97 entropy: 1.99
0 1 0 1
0 24.8% 24.6% 0 27.8% 21.1%
1 24.1% 26.5% 1 26.2% 25.0%
efficiency: 58.6% efficiency: 58.3%
entropy: 2.00 entropy: 1.99




Experience: {CH, BS} v {CH} Experience: {CH, BS} v {BS}







Outcomes in     





Outcomes in     








Outcomes in     





Outcomes in     








Table 4.A.16.  Scores in settings when row population has {PD, CH}-experience and 
column population has either PD-experience or CH-experience 
for the natural outcome context. 
Score in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD&CH PD PD&CH PD PD&CH PD
Score: 1.841 2.341 2.926 2.710 2.383 2.526
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Column Score – Row Score) ≠ 0
Score in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD&CH CH PD&CH CH PD&CH CH
Score: 2.813 1.905 2.352 2.779 2.583 2.342
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Column Score – Row Score) ≠ 0
Game played:
Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Pop. 2 Score – Pop. 1 Score) ≠ 0
Game played:
Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Pop. 2 Score – Pop. 1 Score) ≠ 0
-5.391 3.995
0.0000 0.0001
CH Mean of PD&CH
PD&CH (v PD) PD&CH (v PD)









Table 4.A.16.d: Differences in Score between {PD, CH} experience when opponent
has {PD} experience and when opponent has{CH} experience.






Table 4.A.16.c: Differences in Score between {PD} experience and {CH} experience




CH Mean of PD&CH
PD (PD&CH) PD (PD&CH)
PD




Table 4.A.16.b: {PD, CH} experience v. {CH} experience in {PD, CH} two-game setting.
CH Mean of PD & CH
-2.468 3.284
0.0145 0.0012
CH Mean of PD & CH
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Table 4.A.17.  Scores in settings when row population has {PD, BS}-experience and 
column population has either PD-experience or BS-experience  
for the natural outcome context. 
Score in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD&BS PD PD&BS PD PD&BS PD
Score: 1.918 2.182 2.542 2.591 2.230 2.387
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Column Score – Row Score) ≠ 0
Score in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD&BS BS PD&BS BS PD&BS BS
Score: 2.818 1.776 2.690 2.571 2.754 2.174
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Column Score – Row Score) ≠ 0
Game played:
Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Pop. 2 Score – Pop. 1 Score) ≠ 0
Game played:
Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Pop. 2 Score – Pop. 1 Score) ≠ 0
1.372 7.608
0.1723 0.0000
BS Mean of PD&BS
PD&BS (v PD) PD&BS (v PD)









Table 4.A.17.d: Differences in Score between {PD, BS} experience when opponent
has {PD} experience and when opponent has{BS} experience.






Table 4.A.17.c: Differences in Score between {PD} experience and {BS} experience




BS Mean of PD&BS
PD (PD&BS) PD (PD&BS)
PD




Table 4.A.17.b: {PD, BS} experience v. {BS} experience in {PD, BS} two-game setting.
BS Mean of PD & BS
0.746 3.477
0.4564 0.0006
BS Mean of PD & BS
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Table 4.A.18.  Scores in settings when row population has {SH, CH}-experience and 
column population has either SH-experience or CH-experience  
for the natural outcome context. 
Score in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH&CH SH SH&CH SH SH&CH SH
Score: 3.292 2.908 2.712 2.463 3.002 2.686
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Column Score – Row Score) ≠ 0
Score in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH&CH CH SH&CH CH SH&CH CH
Score: 2.526 2.611 2.409 2.576 2.467 2.594
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Column Score – Row Score) ≠ 0
Game played:
Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Pop. 2 Score – Pop. 1 Score) ≠ 0
Game played:
Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Pop. 2 Score – Pop. 1 Score) ≠ 0
-2.504 -5.617
0.0133 0.0000
CH Mean of SH&CH
SH&CH (v SH) SH&CH (v SH)









Table 4.A.18.d: Differences in Score between {SH, CH} experience when opponent
has {SH} experience and when opponent has{CH} experience.






Table 4.A.18.c: Differences in Score between {SH} experience and {CH} experience




CH Mean of SH&CH
SH (SH&CH) SH (SH&CH)
SH




Table 4.A.18.b: {SH, CH} experience v. {CH} experience in {SH, CH} two-game setting.
CH Mean of SH & CH
-2.650 -2.989
0.0087 0.0470
CH Mean of SH & CH
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Table 4.A.19.  Scores in settings when row population has {SH, BS}-experience and 
column population has either SH-experience or BS-experience  
for the natural outcome context. 
Score in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH&BS SH SH&BS SH SH&BS SH
Score: 3.337 3.349 2.435 2.418 2.886 2.884
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Column Score – Row Score) ≠ 0
Score in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH&BS BS SH&BS BS SH&BS BS
Score: 2.576 2.976 2.686 2.622 2.631 2.799
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Column Score – Row Score) ≠ 0
Game played:
Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Pop. 2 Score – Pop. 1 Score) ≠ 0
Game played:
Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Pop. 2 Score – Pop. 1 Score) ≠ 0
2.249 -3.532
0.0259 0.0005
BS Mean of SH&BS
SH&BS (v SH) SH&BS (v SH)









Table 4.A.19.d: Differences in Score between {SH, BS} experience when opponent
has {SH} experience and when opponent has{BS} experience.






Table 4.A.19.c: Differences in Score between {SH} experience and {BS} experience




BS Mean of SH&BS
SH (SH&BS) SH (SH&BS)
SH




Table 4.A.19.b: {SH, BS} experience v. {BS} experience in {SH, BS} two-game setting.
BS Mean of SH & BS
-0.239 -0.036
0.8116 0.9715
BS Mean of SH & BS
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Table 4.A.20.  Scores in settings when row population has {CH, BS}-experience and 
column population has either CH-experience or BS-experience  
for the natural outcome context. 
Score in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: CH&BS CH CH&BS CH CH&BS CH
Score: 2.288 2.415 2.468 2.462 2.378 2.439
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Column Score – Row Score) ≠ 0
Score in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: CH&BS BS CH&BS BS CH&BS BS
Score: 2.557 2.435 2.433 2.484 2.495 2.459
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Column Score – Row Score) ≠ 0
Game played:
Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Welch's t-statistics are for (Pop. 2 Score – Pop. 1 Score) ≠ 0
Game played:
Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
t-statisitic:
p-value:



















Table 4.A.20.d: Differences in Score between {CH, BS} experience when opponent










Table 4.A.20.c: Differences in Score between {CH} experience and {BS} experience


















Mean of CH & BS
0.591
0.5551
BS Mean of CH & BS
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Table 4.A.21.  Action 0 usage frequencies in settings when row player has  
{PD, SH}-experience & column player has either PD-experience or SH-experience 
for the natural outcome context. 
 
t-statistics are for (Column profit – Row profit) ≠ 0 or (Pop. 2 profit – Pop. 1 profit) ≠ 0 
 
Action 0 Frequency in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD&SH PD PD&SH PD PD&SH PD
Action 0 connotative experience: S & C S S & C n/a S & C S
Action 0 Frequency: 0.997 0.996 0.987 0.718 0.992 0.857
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Action 0 Frequency in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD&SH SH PD&SH SH PD&SH SH
Action 0 connotative experience: S & C n/a S & C C




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
t-statisitic:
p-value:
in {PD, SH} two-game setting.
in {PD, SH} two-game setting.
Table 4.A.21.a: {PD, SH}-experience v. PD-experience
PD SH Mean of PD & SH
-11.913 -4.775 -8.836
Table 4.A.21.b: {PD, SH}-experience v. SH-experience




Table 4.A.21.c: Differences in Action 0 Frequency for strategy populations with
different one-game experiences facing the same opponent.
SH (PD&SH) SH  (PD&SH)
-12.222 1.851 -3.888
PD&SH (v PD) PD&SH (v PD) PD&SH (v PD)
PD&SH (v SH) PD&SH (v SH) PD&SH (v SH)
-2.207 0.813 -0.140
0.0294 0.4174 0.8887
PD SH Mean of PD&SH
0.0480
0.0000 0.0659
Table 4.A.21.d: Differences in Action 0 Frequency for strategy populations with
the same two-game experience facing different opponents.
PD SH Mean of PD&SH
0.0002





Table 4.A.22.  Action 0 usage frequencies in settings when row player has  
{PD, CH}-experience & column player has either PD-experience or CH-experience 
for the natural outcome context. 
 
t-statistics are for (Column profit – Row profit) ≠ 0 or (Pop. 2 profit – Pop. 1 profit) ≠ 0 
 
Action 0 Frequency in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD&CH PD PD&CH PD PD&CH PD
Action 0 connotative experience: S & C S S & C n/a
Action 0 Frequency: 0.826 0.992 0.618 0.725 0.722 0.859
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Action 0 Frequency in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD&CH CH PD&CH CH PD&CH CH
Action 0 connotative experience: S & C n/a S & C C




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
t-statisitic:
p-value:
in {PD, CH} two-game setting.
in {PD, CH} two-game setting.
Table 4.A.22.a: {PD, CH}-experience v. PD-experience
PD CH Mean of PD & CH
-6.500 -3.320 -5.219
Table 4.A.22.b: {PD, CH}-experience v. CH-experience




Table 4.A.22.c: Differences in Action 0 Frequency for strategy populations with
different one-game experiences facing the same opponent.
CH (PD&CH) CH  (PD&CH)
-15.538 -5.768 -10.616
PD&CH (v PD) PD&CH (v PD) PD&CH (v PD)
PD&CH (v CH) PD&CH (v CH) PD&CH (v CH)
-0.695 0.215 -0.208
0.4880 0.8299 0.8351
PD CH Mean of PD&CH
0.0002
0.0000 0.0000
Table 4.A.22.d: Differences in Action 0 Frequency for strategy populations with
the same two-game experience facing different opponents.
PD CH Mean of PD&CH
0.0000





Table 4.A.23.  Action 0 usage frequencies in settings when row player has 
{PD, BS}-experience & column player has either PD-experience or BS-experience 
for the natural outcome context. 
 
t-statistics are for (Column profit – Row profit) ≠ 0 or (Pop. 2 profit – Pop. 1 profit) ≠ 0 
 
Action 0 Frequency in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD&BS PD PD&BS PD PD&BS PD
Action 0 connotative experience: S S S n/a
Action 0 Frequency: 0.906 0.994 0.693 0.743 0.800 0.868
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Action 0 Frequency in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: PD&BS BS PD&BS BS PD&BS BS
Action 0 connotative experience: S n/a S S




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
t-statisitic:
p-value:
in {PD, BS} two-game setting.
in {PD, BS} two-game setting.
Table 4.A.23.a: {PD, BS}-experience v. PD-experience
PD BS Mean of PD & BS
-9.286 -1.831 -5.167
Table 4.A.23.b: {PD, BS}-experience v. BS-experience




Table 4.A.23.c: Differences in Action 0 Frequency for strategy populations with
different one-game experiences facing the same opponent.
BS (PD&BS) BS  (PD&BS)
-15.748 -3.865 -9.021
PD&BS (v PD) PD&BS (v PD) PD&BS (v PD)
PD&BS (v BS) PD&BS (v BS) PD&BS (v BS)
-0.900 -0.616 -0.870
0.3690 0.5384 0.3855
PD BS Mean of PD&BS
0.0119
0.0000 0.0002
Table 4.A.23.d: Differences in Action 0 Frequency for strategy populations with
the same two-game experience facing different opponents.
PD BS Mean of PD&BS
0.0000





Table 4.A.24.  Action 0 usage frequencies in settings when row player has 
{SH, CH}-experience and column player has either SH-experience or CH-experience 
for the natural outcome context. 
 
t-statistics are for (Column profit – Row profit) ≠ 0 or (Pop. 2 profit – Pop. 1 profit) ≠ 0 
 
Action 0 Frequency in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH&CH SH SH&CH SH SH&CH SH
Action 0 connotative experience: C C C n/a
Action 0 Frequency: 0.611 0.803 0.508 0.632 0.560 0.718
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Action 0 Frequency in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH&CH CH SH&CH CH SH&CH CH
Action 0 connotative experience: C n/a C C




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
t-statisitic:
p-value:
SH CH Mean of SH&CH
in {SH, CH} two-game setting.
in {SH, CH} two-game setting.
0.0470
0.0000 0.0001
Table 4.A.24.d: Differences in Action 0 Frequency for strategy populations with
the same two-game experience facing different opponents.
-1.054 -0.264 -0.757
0.2933 0.7918 0.4497
SH&CH (v SH) SH&CH (v SH) SH&CH (v SH)
SH&CH (v CH) SH&CH (v CH) SH&CH (v CH)
SH CH Mean of SH&CH
0.0000
SH (SH&CH) SH (SH&CH) SH (SH&CH)
CH (SH&CH) CH (SH&CH) CH  (SH&CH)
-6.431 -4.155 -5.957
0.3738 0.1860 0.2002
Table 4.A.24.c: Differences in Action 0 Frequency for strategy populations with
different one-game experiences facing the same opponent.
Table 4.A.24.a: {SH, CH}-experience v. SH-experience
SH CH Mean of SH & CH
-0.892 -1.327 -1.285
Table 4.A.24.b: {SH, CH}-experience v. CH-experience






Table 4.A.25.  Action 0 usage frequencies in settings when row player has  
{SH, BS}-experience & column player has either SH-experience or BS-experience 
for the natural outcome context. 
 
t-statistics are for (Column profit – Row profit) ≠ 0 or (Pop. 2 profit – Pop. 1 profit) ≠ 0 
 
Action 0 Frequency in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH&BS SH SH&BS SH SH&BS SH
Action 0 connotative experience: S & C C S & C n/a
Action 0 Frequency: 0.814 0.808 0.653 0.636 0.734 0.722
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Action 0 Frequency in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: SH&BS BS SH&BS BS SH&BS BS
Action 0 connotative experience: S & C n/a S & C S




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
t-statisitic:
p-value:
SH BS Mean of SH&BS
in {SH, BS} two-game setting.
in {SH, BS} two-game setting.
0.7861
0.0000 0.0842
Table 4.A.25.d: Differences in Action 0 Frequency for strategy populations with
the same two-game experience facing different opponents.
-1.599 -0.822 -1.342
0.1115 0.4123 0.1810
SH&BS (v SH) SH&BS (v SH) SH&BS (v SH)
SH&BS (v BS) SH&BS (v BS) SH&BS (v BS)
SH BS Mean of SH&BS
0.0001
SH (SH&BS) SH (SH&BS) SH (SH&BS)
BS (SH&BS) BS (SH&BS) BS  (SH&BS)
-5.426 -1.738 -3.928
0.0001 0.3359 0.0133
Table 4.A.25.c: Differences in Action 0 Frequency for strategy populations with
different one-game experiences facing the same opponent.
Table 4.A.25.a: {SH, BS}-experience v. SH-experience
SH BS Mean of SH & BS
-4.009 -0.965 -2.498
Table 4.A.25.b: {SH, BS}-experience v. BS-experience






Table 4.A.26.  Action 0 usage frequencies in settings when row player has 
{CH, BS}-experience & column player has either CH-experience or BS-experience 
for the natural outcome context. 
 
t-statistics are for (Column profit – Row profit) ≠ 0 or (Pop. 2 profit – Pop. 1 profit) ≠ 0 
 
Action 0 Frequency in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: CH&BS CH CH&BS CH CH&BS CH
Action 0 connotative experience: S & C C S & C n/a
Action 0 Frequency: 0.483 0.419 0.494 0.488 0.488 0.454
t-statisitic:
p-value:
Action 0 Frequency in game:
Player: Row Column Row Column Row Column
Experience: CH&BS BS CH&BS BS CH&BS BS
Action 0 connotative experience: S & C n/a S & C S




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):




Pop. 1 Experience (opponent's experience):
Pop. 2 Experience (opponent's experience):
in {CH, BS} two-game setting.
in {CH, BS} two-game setting.
Table 4.A.26.a: {CH, BS}-experience v. CH-experience
CH BS Mean of CH & BS
1.105 0.758 0.957
Table 4.A.26.b: {CH, BS}-experience v. BS-experience




Table 4.A.26.c: Differences in Action 0 Frequency for strategy populations with
different one-game experiences facing the same opponent.
BS (CH&BS) BS  (CH&BS)
2.045 0.920 1.670
CH&BS (v CH) CH&BS (v CH) CH&BS (v CH)
CH&BS (v BS) CH&BS (v BS) CH&BS (v BS)
CH BS Mean of CH&BS
0.5558
0.0424 0.3590
Table 4.A.26.d: Differences in Action 0 Frequency for strategy populations with
the same two-game experience facing different opponents.
CH BS Mean of CH&BS
0.0966
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